

## MIND

## A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

## PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

I.—SOLIPSISM.<sup>1</sup>

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"SOLIPSISM is the most detestable form of wickedness that ever entered into the mind of a philosopher." This pronouncement, the *solipsissima verba* of an intelligent undergraduate, occurred in an Oxford Examination paper last summer. It should afford philosophers much food for reflection. At first sight it seems to evince only an insufficient apprehension of the philosophic mind's capacity for crime. There is a not ignoble apologia for the Speculative Life in the suggestion that if philosophers were not allowed to indulge in it they might be committing murders instead of paralogisms. Even so the Philosopher-Villain has been, as Plato himself has testified,<sup>2</sup> a good deal commoner than the Philosopher-King. Possibly however the writer was desirous only of complimenting his tutor and of taking an optimistic view of his character. But supposing him to have been sincere, why should he have regarded so practically innocuous a thing as Solipsism as an offence, and have classified it as a form of wickedness, however mild? And what did he mean by Solipsism?

These questions are worthy of investigation, and the

<sup>1</sup> When one considers what an appalling amount of time and energy is annually consumed in Examinations, and how little any of the parties to them have to show for it, it is surprising that they are so rarely utilised for the purpose of gauging the trend of current thought upon the subjects examined on. That they can be made to afford instruction to others than the examiners will, I hope, be a conclusion distinctly suggested by the present article, which is largely inspired by the answers to a question set last year in the Oxford School of *Literæ Humaniores*.

<sup>2</sup> *Republic*, 487 D.

present writer feels himself peculiarly fitted for the task. For though not himself a solipsist, he has been repeatedly mistaken for one, even by no less an authority than the Editor himself (*MIND*, xvi., p. 587).<sup>1</sup> He may be presumed therefore to hold views sufficiently akin to Solipsism to appreciate it, and yet to be interested in distinguishing himself from it.

Inherently of course Solipsism is an absurd predicate to fasten on to a humanist philosophy. Humanism is essentially social, and therefore pluralistic. But for this very reason it cannot treat the problem of Solipsism with that curious mixture of *hauteur* and frivolity to which monistic philosophies are driven. It may honestly admit and sympathetically examine the case for Solipsism, and gather therefrom much instruction about the processes by which individual valuations acquire social currency. A monistic philosophy on the other hand is always haunted by the dread that if the One which alone truly is should turn out to be in any real sense spiritual, it may be driven to admit that Solipsism is the ultimate truth. It is tempted, therefore, to hedge, and to obscure its logical implications, and to fix a gulf between the theoretic meaning of its principles and its practical consequences.

A humanist can afford to be more candid—because no logical necessity impels him. He is quite free in the matter. If he wanted to be a solipsist he could be. If he were, he need not hesitate to say so. He would be afraid of no one, for he would see that there was no one to be afraid of. But if he did not want to be a solipsist, and denied that he was, this assurance should suffice, because it would yield a trustworthy guarantee. And if it could be observed that in his actions he did *not* ignore the existence of others, but recognised them as beings with thoughts, wills and tempers of their own, for which he was both unable and unwilling to undertake the responsibility, the guarantee would be complete.

For it is a unique peculiarity of a humanist's philosophy

<sup>1</sup> This criticism would seem however to proceed from an insufficiently concrete consideration of the postulation of other minds. They may be postulated in two ways—(1) It may be held that certain experiences behave *as if* there were other minds behind them. If so, this postulate need *not* lead to a belief in the existence of other minds. But if (2) other minds are postulated *as existing*, then the confirmation of this postulate by its working seems necessarily to prove that other minds really and truly exist. A mere appeal to postulation thus leaves either of these ways open; but only the first could be correctly described as compatible with Solipsism.



that in it it is possible to argue back from a behaviour to the belief that underlies it. He holds that the reality of a belief depends on, and is tested by, its applicability. His beliefs therefore must be acted on, and he cannot afford the luxury of theoretic beliefs, which cannot be acted on in practice. If he acts on a belief, he must hold it true; if he does not act on it, he does not truly believe it. In all other philosophies the 'highest' truths may be unpractical and inapplicable to life, while the beliefs implied in action may be secretly despised as 'practical makeshifts'. Hence arise endless possibilities of ambiguity and misconstruction, not to say disingenuousness. It cannot, therefore, be inferred that if such a philosopher behaves as if his fellowmen were other than himself, or he himself were other than God, he really believes this. He may only be pretending, or finding it necessary to convey a false impression for practical purposes, because in his philosophy there is no necessary connexion between theory and practice. Now in practice no one actually behaves as if he not only owned the world, but also *was* the world; but whereas in the humanist's case it is possible to infer from his actions that he does not believe that he is the world, in the case of other philosophers it is not. Humanism, therefore, may safely be believed when it disavows Solipsism; other philosophies may be Solipsisms at heart, though they do not avow this in their behaviour.

But what is Solipsism? It may best be defined perhaps as the doctrine that all existence is experience, and that there is only one experient. The Solipsist thinks that *he is the one*.

Now if this is thought out, it will be seen that very many sorts of philosophers are ultimately solipsists or as good as solipsists. When they do not themselves see this, they may fitly be called crypto-solipsists. Crypto-solipsism may also be ascribed to any view which needs Solipsism for its logical completion, and so the various sorts of Solipsism add up to a formidable total.

1. That the 'absolute idealist' is a solipsist need only be barely stated. For the matter has been thrashed out elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> He is a solipsist because he believes that the Absolute is the sole experient, and that he is himself the incarnate Absolute. A good many absolute idealists, moreover, see this, and are proud of being the Absolute.<sup>2</sup> But it

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Studies in Humanism*, x.

<sup>2</sup> We learn however from one answer that when the writer (under ether) dreamt that he was the Absolute 'and that in fact Solipsism was true,' he felt 'very lonely and miserable'.

is needless to linger over this distressing sort of philosophic megalomania, as its nature is so clear.

2. 'Subjective idealists' are classed as solipsists, almost by acclamation; and yet this attribution seems in their case far more disputable. For a good many of them are also charged with pluralism, and it is hard to see how one can be both a pluralist and a solipsist. Why moreover should not Berkeley's pluralistic universe of 'Spirits' be taken by us as seriously as it was intended? It may have been a mistaken compliment to the Deity to impose on him the duty of lurking behind every particle of 'matter,' but this is no reason for denying the communion of spiritual beings. The only difficulty Berkeley's system here presents is that of explaining how the individual comes to suspect a transcendent cause beyond the flow of appearances; but this difficulty is common to nearly all philosophies, so that we should be ill-advised to press the point.

3. Aristotle on the other hand is clearly a crypto-solipsist, and if Aristotelians took their master seriously and tried to live up to his precepts, they should all be solipsists. For though at first sight Aristotle seems a perfect type of common-place realism, he has a queer streak of romance at the bottom of his mind, which nearly always in the end transfigures his conclusions. And so it ought not to surprise us that he has put up Solipsism as his supreme ideal. He makes his God into an incorrigible solipsist. For he is completely wrapped up in the contemplation of his own experience (*νόησις νοήσεως*), in the ecstatic enjoyment of his own eternal perfection. God thinks only of himself, not of the world; *αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ*, Aristotle gleefully declares, and the rest of the world does not exist for him. Unlike Olympian Zeus, he is non-social, and leads a *βίος μονότης*, like a beast. Nevertheless Aristotle thinks we ought to imitate and emulate his God; he insists that such imitation is not futile flattery, but the best and highest thing we can do. Thus the Theoretic Life and the injunction *ὅπως μάλιστα ἀθανατίξεν* mean—'be as solipsistic as you can, as your imperfect *ὄλη* will allow'. The concluding romance of the *Nicomachean Ethics*,<sup>1</sup> therefore, means that Solipsism is the highest truth.

4. If it is permissible to consult the opinions of the young and to accept them as omens of the future, we shall have to say that most of the historically famous philosophies are logically solipsisms, or at least will hereafter be treated as such. For the answers to the 'Greats' question mentioned

<sup>1</sup> Book x., ch. 7 and 8.

at the outset unequivocally teach that the ranks of the Solipsists include Berkeley (without a scruple), Hume (despite his annihilation of the self), Locke (despite his belief in external reality), Descartes (because he is supposed to have started that pernicious falling away from Aristotle which is called modern philosophy), Fichte and Lotze (because they were German idealists), all personal idealists, pragmatists and humanists *en bloc* and as a matter of course, and last, but not least, Dr. Rashdall, who was even said to be 'the typical solipsist'. Evidently, if these *voces populi* are to be believed, the solipsists are a very formidable band, both here and in Hades. On the other hand some may perversely think that these dicta are not so much contributions to the history of philosophy as reflections upon the way this subject is taught in Oxford.

5. Still Solipsism is strangely insinuating, beyond doubt, and, especially when disguised as Crypto-Solipsism, worms its way into the most unlikely places. It has for example a curious affinity for the New Realism. To illustrate this it will not be necessary happily to examine all the New Realisms *seriatim*; for their name is legion, and they agree in little but this that none of them can find any obvious escape from the old difficulties of the Old Realism. It will suffice therefore if we try to understand the reason of this affinity, and then trace its working in two or three of the most notable brands of New Realism.

To attribute solipsistic leanings to New Realisms seems at first a paradox which is not adequately vindicated by the common experience of the meeting of extremes. But there are in this case real logical grounds for the coincidence. The New Realist gets so absorbed in his object that he takes no account of the subject at all, and so is not on his guard against *his own* subjectivity. Hence his account of the Real becomes *de facto* his own private view of it, which cannot be accommodated to any one else's and is at bottom a fabrication of his own idiosyncrasy. Thus Solipsism finds it easy to enter into New Realisms and to possess them in at least four distinct ways.

(1) New Realisms are mostly uncritical because they are so unpsychological. Despising the study of the history and pedigree of mind, the New Realist accepts as real whatever he thinks he perceives, without inquiring as to how he came to perceive it. Consequently he is hardly conscious that he is not infallible, but is frequently forced to correct his first perceptions by subsequent experiences. His trust in the perception of the moment blinds him to the need of recognising and

amending his 'ideas'. He falls a prey to the 'intuitions' of the moment, and never inquires how 'true' intuitions are discriminated from 'false'.

(2) In consequence of never comparing his perceptions at different times with each other, he never asks himself how his perceptions accord with those of others. Hence he fails to notice the social and human character of truth, and to discover that the most imperative reason for assuming the existence of subjective 'ideas' lies in the necessity of a social compromise. When A and B perceive reality differently, it is easier, humaner and better to ascribe to both an 'idea' of reality than to assert the unreality of one of these perceptions. Reality is thus cleared of a contradiction which can be treated as 'merely subjective'. New Realism on the other hand, after ruling out such problems as psychological irrelevance, unwittingly bases its analysis on the single case of a knower knowing *his* world, without regard to the worlds of others. And this procedure is naturally and essentially solipsistic.

(3) Even this case of a single mind at a given moment it cannot analyse effectively for lack of psychological interest. Hence it fails to perceive the all-pervading selectiveness of all thought, and to reflect on the important fact that whatever is perceived has been conditioned by the direction of attention upon it, and preferred to something else that might have been perceived if the attention had been directed otherwise. About the totality of reality an infinity of truths may be enunciated or perceived; hence the one which is enunciated or perceived is necessarily the outcome of an enormous amount of selection. And it is obvious that the ground of this selection cannot lie in the reality as such, but must proceed from the interests of the selector. The facet of reality which is affirmed cannot have been selected by itself. For alike in active and in passive experiencing reality is always present as a whole. Hence the mere perceiving of any particular reality already implies an immense adjustment or cutting down of reality to subjective interests, which if unchecked may easily develop into Solipsism.

(4) Being of a trustful and dogmatic character, the New Realism does not expect to be deceived and misled into error. It is consequently ill-equipped to deal with the deceitfulness of nature in a world in which everything genuine is mimicked, protectively or aggressively, and even a childlike faith in absolute truth is no guarantee of infallibility. Hence so long as the New Realist refuses to be critical and to study this whole apparatus of deception, he will accept all its results as

real just as they appear to him, and once more glides into an unwitting Solipsism.

But it is high time to illustrate these generalities by their application to three selected cases of New Realism. All of these appear to be psychogenetically joint products of incapacity to reply to Mr. G. E. Moore's 'refutation of Idealism,' and of unwillingness to carry Kantian principles out completely into a consistent account of mental activity, for fear of lapsing into 'subjectivism'; but as two of these have not yet appeared in the philosophic arena, they must be described anonymously as secret doctrines endemic in two of our leading colleges.

(a) The first of them is the more lively, or less stable, form, and varies perceptibly from year to year. It is convinced that the troubles of dogmatic philosophy began when Locke introduced 'ideas' into it, and that if ideas are abolished all will be well. It has no ideas, therefore, in its theory of knowledge. It starts from a definition of knowledge as an immediate apprehension of what is. It perceives realities, and not 'copies' of them. There is, therefore, no 'gap' between subject and object, and no need to interpose ideas between the mind and reality and to puzzle oneself vainly about their 'correspondence'. The mind is caught fast in the embrace of that which is, and nothing can divorce them. By thus shutting out 'ideas' it hopes to leave no loophole for the demon of subjectivism to enter in.

The theory has its difficulties, doubtless, especially when asked to explain the nature of error, but on the whole it is very reminiscent of Aristotle and seems very sensible. It reproduces, almost completely, the view of reality initially taken by an unsophisticated human mind.

And yet its weak point lies just here. It is good for a human mind. But not for more. As soon as the problem is complicated by the introduction of a second mind, its solution ceases to satisfy. For the second mind also perceives reality. Only it does not perceive quite like the first. Each naturally maintains that it perceives rightly, and the other wrongly. The result is a row. To allay this disturbance, and to render social life possible, therefore, a compromise has to be effected between the conflicting claims of divergent minds. Common-sense rules that to avoid quarrels *neither* shall be deemed to be in direct contact with the object as it really is. For if both had an immediate and inerrant apprehension of what is, the actual divergence between its results would plainly be impossible. But both are supposed to recognise one and the same object in their own subjective way. The common world

of reality is variously reflected in the various individuals that cognise it. Thus to avoid greater evils a subjective factor is introduced into all knowing; the "ideas" of various minds are interpolated between the mind and the realities it tries to know, but can never apprehend immediately. All perception of reality thus becomes representative, and is subject to subjective distortion, and how far this may go can never be determined *a priori*.

*Hinc illæ lacrimæ*; hence the long agony of the theory of knowledge, from Descartes to Kant and from Kant to Humanism. For the whole problem of what it means for two minds to know the same thing, and of how it can be called the same if they know it differently, rushes back upon us.

For Humanism indeed the coast remains clear and the answer simple. It merely bids us complete the work of Kant (most infelicitously called by him Copernican) by describing the psychical functioning to which our data are conformed *in their integrity*, i.e., without mutilating, depersonalising and sublimating them by fictions of a *Bewusstsein überhaupt*. The 'subjectivity' which was thought to vitiate cognition and refused to be eliminated, is a blessing not a curse; for it is really that which gives the needful cue to the 'objective' ordering of the initial mess of crude experience. It is the importance of some of its contents for the purposes of human life which confers upon them a superior reality; it is the usefulness of some ideas which leads to their (intersubjective) recognition as 'true' and objectively valid, and effectively discriminates them from the vagrant fancies that are rejected as worthless and therefore remain 'merely subjective'. For a mind, however, which has become replete with fixed ideas that the thinker's personality must at all costs be ignored, that the study of psychical fact is incompatible with that of physical order, that the genesis of knowledge has no relation to its nature, and that once science condescends to take note of the individual it is for ever debarred from noticing anything else, this humanist way of producing 'objectivity' will seem to demand far too radical a rethinking of old prejudices. It will be rejected doubtless; but what will be done about the problem?

It may be suggested to the New Realist that the simplest way of maintaining his original position and escaping from the difficulties of this whole criticism is to turn solipsist. As he cannot find room for the objects of other minds, he had better get rid of the other minds. If he will systematically refuse to recognise the other minds that seem to disagree with him, he avoids the complication which such recognition

inevitably introduces. He is left alone with his objects, and no one can question the rightness of his perceptions. In words perhaps this position may be thought to fall short of Solipsism, because there are still realities for him to perceive. But he has become the autocratic judge of this whole reality; and this is in substance Solipsism. He is the only mind in the world, of which he is the sole experient. *Οἷος πέπνυται, τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀίσσουσιν.*<sup>1</sup>

(b) The second type of New Realism seems less extreme, and one might prognosticate for it a longer life. It makes attempts to account for the existence and correction of error, and for the growth and improvement of knowledge. To do so it has to admit the presence of a subjective contribution in our perceptions of reality; but it regards this as the source only of error and 'opinion'. Between 'opinion' and 'knowledge' it fixes a great gulf, like Plato in the *Republic*. Knowledge is of the object, and though it involves a relation of the mind, it must not be supposed to alter the nature of its terms. Hence the object *in* the cognitive relation is just as it was (or would be) in itself, and nothing about it is dependent on the mind's knowing it. This last corollary is of course somewhat difficult to defend, when it is questioned. So is the gulf between opinion and knowledge. It might prove hard to adduce an unequivocal example of 'knowledge,' and to show that what is so called is ever more than 'opinion'; and again the theory is hard put to it to assign a tolerable position to a good many facts, *e.g.*, those of colour-perception.

But it is when confronted with the facts of error and difference of opinion that this New Realism most clearly seems to falter. When A and B both claim to apprehend reality, but differ irreconcilably as to what reality is, it is at a loss to decide which of them is right. And yet the need for such decisions cannot lightly be denied. For such differences are deep-seated and persistent. Two men may even agree entirely as to the facts, so far as human science can express them; yet they may still be worlds apart in their attitude towards them. What the one hails with joy, the other may recoil from with abhorrence. For example, one may worship the syllogism, and another despise it, though both may agree upon the perfection of its form. One man may shrink from immortality, another from extinction. To one the belief that all is one may be an inspiring gospel, to another the paralysis of all effort and the grave of all interest in life. Does it not seem

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Odyssey*, x., 495.



piteously inadequate then to decree all such differences out of existence by calling them differences of *opinion*, proving only that there is no *knowledge* of the matters they concern? And moreover it is vain; for men differ as to the truth about all things (even about mathematics so soon as one gets beyond the merest verbal trifling), and differ most signally about the matters of the highest import, such as God, Freedom and Immortality, and the meaning and value of life. This New Realism, therefore, has either to confine itself to the abstract enunciation of the veriest platitudes, such as that everything either is or is not, though no one can tell which, or to exclude from the realm of knowledge proper everything that is really important and therefore in dispute, and to assume an agnostic attitude on such questions as, *e.g.*, whether God exists and the like.

Hence once more a great temptation comes upon the New Realist. He could treat the whole body of his own opinions as 'knowledge,' if only he could suppress the opinions of those who disagree with him. This he could do in two ways, either practically or theoretically. Of these the practical way would doubtless be preferable in itself, were it not impracticable; however much he may desire to produce unanimity by the old effective methods, ruthless persecution for the sake of establishing a philosophic theory of knowledge would not be tolerated in these days.

In theory however Solipsism grants him the means to achieve his end. If he can persuade himself that he alone experiences, he can hold that whatever he feels certain of is knowledge, and the 'opinions' of others need no longer contradict his. He can treat them as illusory equally with themselves.

The difference between this type of New Realism and the first will be plainly this, that whereas Solipsism was a *necessity* for the truth of the theory in the first case, in the second it is only a *convenience*.

(c) A third crypto-solipsistic form of New Realism has been promulgated by Prof. S. Alexander in his presidential address to the Aristotelian Society (1908). Like so many realists, he assumes the chief crux, *viz.* that perception is unequivocally of the object, and that the object is not mental but physical. It is assumed also that perception makes no difference to the object, and that therefore a hundred persons may all see the same tree. So far this is only naïve Realism, and not obviously untenable. But what are we to think of the further doctrine that the memory also of the tree is a physical object? Do the hundred persons have the same

memory-object, or does each have his own, and are there as many objects as there are memories? If so, the one perceived tree has magically blossomed into a hundred remembered ones, and these must all be related to the tree and to each other. And what of the changes memory-objects undergo? Are they too all 'physical' and not mental? The only way to reduce this plethoric wealth of 'physical objects' to something like a manageable compass would seem to be that of Solipsism, and this might also relieve the theory of the embarrassments in which its obvious and avowed inability to account for error at present involves it.

6. One more example of a constructively solipsistic doctrine may complete our survey. The doctrine that Subject and Object are mutually interdependent is crypto-solipsistic. It begins, tamely enough, by holding that the Object must exist for a Subject, and no subject can exist without objects. This doctrine, in its proper meaning, is a purely verbal truth, an affair of definitions, stating the meaning of the words 'subject' and 'object'. But in Oxford it is, for some inscrutable reason, still regarded as important; and strangely enough is credited to 'idealism,' instead of being classed as thoroughgoing relativism.

At any rate the doctrine becomes either Solipsism or nonsense so soon as an attempt is made to apply it. If it seriously means to affirm that the existence of the Object is conditional upon that of the Subject, it implies that whenever a subject dies the world of objects must be annihilated with it. But this is clearly not what happens to our common world whenever one of us dies. It follows therefore either that the death of a subject is inconceivable and impossible, or that what died was not a subject, or that the common world is not an object, or that what was annihilated was not the common world and so that the latter is *not* dependent on its relation to a subject. But the first of these alternatives seems contrary to fact, while the last is contrary to the theory; the others render it irrelevant to the problem of knowledge. For what we wanted to know was what happened to the 'objective' world when a 'subject' died, on the 'idealistic' assumption that a 'subject' is implied in the persistence of every 'object'. Clearly if this is so, the persistence of the Object after the death of a subject shows that the Subject which sustained it does *not* die when one of us dies (alike whether that death means our extinction or our transfer to a different world). We, therefore, and our world are not Subject and Object in the sense required by the theory. The Subject is not one of us, but must be a category, or a

Cosmic Ego, or what not. But if so, how is it, and its Object, relevant to the nature of our knowledge? There is on the one hand the deathless Subject of an indestructible world, and on the other we, who are not subjects in this sense, perceiving objects after our kind; and between the two there is no real connexion. The Subject, doubtless, may continue to perceive the changeless world which forms its Object throughout all the mischances of our mortal life; but we never perceived that world, and to our questions about the relation of our world to our minds we get no answer. The whole doctrine has thus become an irrelevant speculation concerning a Subject and an Object about which we only know that they are not human, nor humanly knowable; it leaves unexplained and unintelligible the position of the pseudo-subjects and pseudo-objects which surround us.

Once more the only way of really making the theory mean anything and of really correlating subject and object is to construe it solipsistically. The consistent idealist must hold that since with the Subject there would pass away the Object, it is only if, and so long as, *he* is a subject that a world of objects can endure.

It is possible that by this time the force of the argument may be producing an impression that for company's sake every philosopher, who cannot bear to stand alone and to lead the *βίος μονώτης*, had better own to Solipsism. But such intimidation will not daunt the humanist or cause him to desist from his endeavour (1) to refute Solipsism and (2) to solve the solipsistic puzzle.

(1) The humanist's refutation of Solipsism is simple and sufficient. He is not a solipsist, because he chooses to believe in the existence of others. He believes this not so much for the sentimental reason that he does not want to be alone in the universe, but because he does not want to regard himself as the author of his whole experience. He will not take the responsibility of being all there is in a world such as is now provided. He does not desire to be any or all of the other minds, nor the totality of reality. He sees that he cannot be the Absolute without being also the Devil (and an insane Devil at that!), and so he prefers to be neither.

Now this position seems eminently reasonable, but if any one declines to accept it, the humanist cannot *compel* dissentients to adopt it. He cannot compel them not to be solipsists, if they prefer to regard him and everything else as just creatures of their disordered imaginations; nor does it follow from the nature of his theory that he should have this

power. Whereas to a solipsist it must appear extremely puzzling, as well as annoying, that he should not be able to avoid contradiction and resistance at the hands of what *ex hypothesi* are his own creatures.

The humanist refutation of Solipsism, then, begins frankly with a postulate. Into the origin of this postulate it is no more necessary to inquire here than in other cases. For it seems unmeaning to discuss the antecedent reasonableness of a thing not yet in existence. The human reason must have something to reflect on before it can discuss the value of anything. A postulate, therefore, has to be made before it can be justified. The 'origin,' therefore, of our fundamental postulates can only be deduced in a 'mythical' form. But we are not really concerned with it. Whether it was an inspiration or a random guess, the postulate that there are others has come into existence. Once made, it has of course been tested by its working. And it will hardly be disputed that it has worked very well. It is therefore accounted reasonable and true by the generality of mankind, who are not philosophers. And a humanist philosopher at any rate is not easily persuaded that in so vital a point the experience of mankind is wrong. He will therefore claim the right to hold the postulate true, because, and so long as, it works.

It will be noticed that the refutation of Solipsism by the success of this postulate is thoroughly pragmatic. It is neither *a priori* nor absolute. It does not rest on presuppositions about the possibilities of all experience. It does not profess to show that Solipsism is unthinkable. It is willing to allow that Solipsists may exist, and even flourish. It is willing to listen to what they have to say for themselves. It makes no higher claim for its own postulate than that it seems to provide a congenial and adequate way of handling the facts of human experience. If that experience should alter, it admits that it might be necessary to revise our postulates. But while it endures as it is, a successful postulate is as true and as reasonable as truth can be.

But does not this concede too much and admit that a reasonable Solipsism also may be possible? To deny this possibility *a priori* would be to deny that there may be legitimate differences of opinion, conditioned by the deep-seated differences of human personalities. It would imply a relapse into that absolutistic intolerance, which has provoked so many inhuman attempts to reduce all thought to the level of a mechanical uniformity, and renders the pretensions of metaphysical system-mongers so ludicrous a series of failures. It does not follow then from the fact that Solipsism may

reasonably be denied that it may not reasonably be upheld. This latter contention therefore demands distinct examination.

(2) If the belief in other minds is a postulate, any one may, if he chooses, try to dispense with it. But he still remains under the obligation of devising an alternative scheme for the conduct of his life. Let him, therefore, try. His position is that his whole experience is like a dream, and he interprets his waking experience by his dream experience, instead of *vice versa*, like the generality of men. He believes that he makes his dreams and all the creatures in it, and this belief he extends to all the incidents of his life.

There seems to be nothing theoretically absurd or untenable about such Solipsism; it may even claim the merit of greater consistency as compared with the vulgar view that interprets solipsistically dreams alone. But the solipsist would have of course to adapt his theory somehow to his practice. He must not for example be led to imagine that because life was a dream of his, he could know beforehand how the dream was going. For if he imagined this, events would soon refute his theory. In other words his Solipsism would have to be *empirical*, and not *a priori*, precisely as is our ordinary solipsistic interpretation of dreams.

A Solipsism so conceived would seem to be harmless. It would make no practical difference. Our solipsist would have to recognise in the persons and objects of his 'dream' quite as much 'independence' and ability to resist the control of his will as the most benighted pluralist. He would have to treat them as other than his dreaming self. We all usually pay this amount of respect to the creatures of our dreams. If the solipsistic theory of their nature is to be retained, it is on condition that it remains a mere theory which is not allowed to affect conduct. Should it be allowed to do so, it would of course spell disaster, and would refute itself in the one really final way, *viz.*, by the elimination of its holder.

Nevertheless it is a point deserving of consideration whether theoretic exception should not be taken to an assumption which Solipsism shares with Common-Sense. Both assume it as self-evident that the solipsistic interpretation of dream life is valid, *i.e.*, that the self that *has* the dream is identical with the self that *makes* the dream. This, however, may be disputed. The dreamer is the victim, and not the maker, of the dream which surprises and torments him. Hence every dreamer, and every solipsist, is not really *one* but *two*. The strange possibilities of such an inherent

duality in the 'self' are vividly illustrated by the famous 'Beauchamp' case so graphically recorded by Dr. Morton Prince,<sup>1</sup> in which, apparently, the 'maker of dreams' obtained control of the body. If then after the fashion of Miss 'Beauchamp' every solipsist is accompanied by his 'Sally,' it might become a subtle question whether the dreamer or the maker of dreams was really entitled to be a solipsist, and how sincerely the former could really take a solipsistic view of his complex personality. But it will probably be vain to raise this point; metaphysicians have always been too neglectful of ordinary people's dreams to be critical of their own; and besides the subject is too recent, too sensational, and above all too psychological, to appeal to them.

For a philosophy, however, which is content to stop short at the theoretic level there is no other way of refuting the Solipsism which we have described. But for a philosophy which insists that theoretic doctrines must be capable of application to practice the last word is not yet said. It will fasten on the very feature in this Solipsism which exempted it from theoretic refutation, and justify thereby its final condemnation. A Solipsism, it will say, which must in practice recognise other minds and makes no practical difference in the solipsist's behaviour, does not logically differ from the view it simulates in practice.

On pragmatic principles this objection seems sound and insuperable. If a solipsism admits that it must in practice behave as if other beings were real, then it has plainly passed into its other, and can no longer boast of a separate existence: it has suffered the same fate as an offensive ghost which, according to Plutarch, once made itself a nuisance in the Platæan territory. When it declined to yield to entreaty or exorcism, the Platæans simply caused an image of it to be placed over the spot it haunted, and then, though no doubt it continued to occupy the same space, it was no longer a supernatural, but merely an æsthetic, eyesore—a hideous statue being something wholly natural. To any solipsism, on the other hand, which will not in practice admit the existence of other minds, the sufficient reply is that it is impracticable. And the fact that neither of these retorts constitutes a conclusive refutation of Solipsism in the eyes of philosophies which have assumed a different conception of the relation of theory to practice, leaves Solipsism a thorn in the flesh (or perhaps a squib in the vitals) only of those other philosophies.

<sup>1</sup> *The Dissociation of a Personality* (1906).

## II.—PROFESSOR LAURIE'S NATURAL REALISM.<sup>1</sup>

BY PROFESSOR J. B. BAILLIE.

### II.

#### THE ONTOLOGY OF NATURAL REALISM.

THE meditations in the second volume of the *Synthetica* are exclusively devoted to the consideration of two problems—the nature and meaning of Ultimate Reality, and the place in that Reality of man's individual existence. While these problems are necessarily connected in every way, they are treated as distinct. And rightly so; for it is difficult to say which, in a speculative interpretation of experience, is to be taken as logically prior. From one point of view doubtless the solution of the first problem is determined by the significance assigned to man's individuality in the whole: from another point of view it is equally evident that the meaning of Ultimate Reality determines the solution of the second problem. In Prof. Laurie's arguments the problems are so interrelated that it is only by a process of abstraction that they can be discussed separately.

The meditations are described as ontological in character. But this does not mean that the epistemology contained in the first volume is merely to be treated as a ladder to be thrown down when we have reached the height of speculative vision. The epistemology remains with us throughout the ontology, both in the sense that the ontological synthesis is a kind of knowledge, and in the sense that the conclusions of the epistemology now reappear as elements in the composition of the specific meaning of the Absolute as such. The results of the epistemology are, in fact, recast in the interests of an "absolute synthesis".

We are here dealing with a different object of knowledge, and an object of a very peculiar kind. At the outset, therefore, two preliminary questions regarding Prof. Laurie's method must be considered. What form of knowledge is to

<sup>1</sup> Since the following article went to press the distinguished author of the *Synthetica* has passed away. It was the hope of the writer that some reply might have been made by Prof. Laurie to certain criticisms the article contains. But there seems no reason for making any change in the form or substance of these criticisms, now that a reply is unhappily no longer possible.



be adopted for the attainment of this "absolute synthesis"? And to what extent does the subject-object relation characteristic of knowledge still hold in the case of an "absolute synthesis" which ostensibly transcends finitude?

On the first question, Prof. Laurie's statements seem at first somewhat ambiguous. Prof. Laurie leaves us at the end of vol. i. still within the region of finite human knowledge, with the conception of rational synthesis analysed, and the potencies and limits of systematic reflection delineated. Such reflection is confined to the interpretation of phenomenal reality, and merely brings out in connected form the substantial content of the individual. He has not yet discussed the stage of "rational intuition," the highest level of knowledge. But he goes so far as to say in vol. ii.<sup>1</sup> that this highest level or kind of knowledge is not found in our finite experience, though it is a "probable level of being".<sup>2</sup> This position is difficult to maintain, for otherwise where is the source of our knowledge of what is transfinite to be found? 'Rational intuition' is the only remaining type of cognitive activity to which the knowledge we want could be assigned. And this is really admitted to be the source of the higher synthesis. For our author declares<sup>3</sup> that the "activity of mind" by which we "behold" "Being Unconditioned" as the "One of all Actuality" is "to be called Intuition": here "we see all in God". With this statement too may be compared the expressions used in the opening paragraphs of the volume,<sup>4</sup> where Prof. Laurie points out that insight, vision, is the end of all cognition, and the function by which we apprehend Ultimate Reality. There does, in fact, seem no other way than that of "rational intuition" by which the absolute synthesis or ontology could be furnished; and the apparent inconsistency in maintaining that "rational intuition" is not ours, and yet is the condition of an absolute synthesis, can only be verbal in character if our author's position is to be intelligible.

The organ or function of rational intuition, which is the highest reach of knowledge, being thus the means of supplying us with our ontological synthesis, it is evident that the method of this synthesis cannot consist of a series of demonstrations. Demonstration in the sense of proof is out of the question:<sup>5</sup> all we can do is to "indicate," "contemplate," "unveil" or "reveal" the content and nature of the Absolute. This is not merely necessary, it is sufficient for the

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., pp. 54-55.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 56.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 193, cf. precisely similar expressions on pp. 195-196.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2. <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

purposes of knowledge, on Prof. Laurie's theory of knowledge. It is necessary, because in dealing with the Whole, the "One-All" as such, we cannot proceed by employing a function of knowledge which deals ostensibly with parts of experience *quâ* parts, which analyses and "comprehends" these under the *assumption* of, but not by explicit reference to, the Absolute: we can only make use of a function which, while implying, yet transcends such a stage of knowledge, and which, being the end of all knowledge, deals with complete unity as unity, views the whole as a whole and in a single act of knowledge. And it is sufficient, because this final function of knowledge gathers up all the varied meaning of reality apprehended by the subordinate levels of knowledge, brings all these varied meanings to a single focus, shows them to be phases of a single unity, in short reads them in the light of, and recasts their contents in terms of, the one unity which they all severally imply and together exhaustively express, so far at least as man's plane of being is concerned. Beyond what the various levels of knowledge convey the Whole has no meaning for man; to gather up and focus all this meaning is therefore to reveal the Whole as a whole. In a sense, then, this supreme intuition does not give us anything new,<sup>1</sup> unless the vision of the unity as such be something new. To see the unity as a unity is thus sufficient for the apprehension of the Absolute and for the purposes of knowledge.

It is important to observe at once that the intuition is not a mere subjective process of finite mind without an objective counterpart. It seems indeed to involve an annihilation of that distinction of subject and object on which knowledge rests, and which is the foundation of our author's epistemology. But in point of fact it is the culmination of knowledge, and for that reason alone cannot contradict the essential nature of knowledge. If the lower levels of knowledge have objectivity and 'reality,' most certainly the highest must have: and since knowledge is an expression of reality in the lower stages, it must be so all along the line. In fact it would be paradoxical to say that subject and object imply each other at the lower levels of knowledge, but that when we get to the highest the objective aspect suddenly slips from our grasp; and still more paradoxical to say that intuition has no objective content when the Absolute it professes to reveal is the very ground of the objectivity in all the pre-intuitional levels of knowledge. Intuition is merely the

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., pp. 196-198.

highest point of fusion of subject and object in human knowledge. Moreover no matter how complete the fusion, the distinction of subject and object is still maintained; for, as our author points out, the vision, the intuition still implies an act of 'will' on the part of finite personality,<sup>1</sup> and thus preserves in a certain sense the essential distinction of subject and object.

But when so much is said regarding this function of intuition, we must not forget that there is an important distinction between an intuition of the Absolute and an intuition by the Absolute. Rational intuition which makes possible ontology is the consummation of the knowledge of finite human mind, and remains within the limits of the "man-plane" of being. This intuition of the Infinite Whole is a function of the finite being; it is a finite intuition. It can only produce an "absolute synthesis," not a "synthesis of the Absolute". But while the intuition of the Infinite is not an Infinite Intuition, it is equally important to bear in mind that a finite intuition is not a mere intuition of the finite. Man's mind does transcend in a real sense the bounds of finiteness, but only does so in a certain way: the restriction lies not in the fact of doing so but in the extent and degree to which he can do so. He only does so in such a way that what he says or sees of the Absolute is necessarily abstract, general and, as we may put it, perigraphic in character: it is never comprehensive and complete. What man says is, as we shall find, none the less absolutely true and universal: it is neither merely symbolic nor merely diagrammatic.

The consideration of the second preliminary question above mentioned—the consistency of an "absolute synthesis" with the subject-object relation characteristic of knowledge—brings out a serious difficulty in the argument. On Prof. Laurie's view, subject and object are indissolubly united in man's experience, and, as we saw in the previous article, are both necessary for the attainment of knowledge. But the Absolute is described in the course of the ontology as the "universal Object" which "includes man":<sup>2</sup> it is the "absolute Actuality" which becomes "subjectively" what man finds it to be:<sup>3</sup> it is the "synthesis of one and many," the many of which each man is a unit: it is the synthesis of "noumenon and phenomenon,"<sup>4</sup> whereas man's individuality and experience have their being amidst the negations which constitute phenomenality. In other words, the ultimate object of man's knowledge is at the same time the ground of all his

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., p. 196.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 69.

experience, and contains man as a certain type or plane of being. It seems clear from this statement that the *relation* of subject and object as constituting man's experience, the relation of subject and object at man's plane of being, falls within the Absolute. How, then, can the Absolute be termed a 'universal object,' since object is always relative to subject and, in the present case, the subject is contained within this "universal object"? And even if this be understood, to whom is that universal object now relative, when man's subject has, by hypothesis, fallen within the 'universal object'. Is the Absolute at once universal subject and universal object? On this last point Prof. Laurie seems in one passage<sup>1</sup> to hint that the Absolute is both Subject and Object: "the universal Subject is Absolute Being as immanent purposely determining itself," while "objectivity" (as a whole) is "subjectivity externalised". But this still leaves the first point unsolved; and even, in a manner, increases the difficulty; for we cannot see what the relation is to be between the 'universal object' as such and man's 'object' on his specific plane, nor what the relation is between the Absolute as Universal Subject and man as subject. If man's experience, subject with object, falls within the one Absolute Synthesis, it is difficult to understand why such a synthesis should be called an "object" at all. If, however, it is not an 'object' to man, then it is impossible that it can be apprehended in any sense that is relevant to man's experience. While, finally, if the Absolute "in its lonely self-identity" is a universal object to itself as Universal Subject, then it seems illegitimate to treat man's experience, man's plane of being, as falling solely within the universal object; it must also in some sense have to do with the 'Universal Subject'.

From the fact that Prof. Laurie has not discussed this difficulty,<sup>2</sup> we may assume that it is not so insuperable as it at first sight appears, and that it does not seriously imperil the coherence of his argument. If we take the phrase 'universal object' very literally, and insist on the object being kept rigidly distinct from the subject, in the way Prof. Laurie has maintained in the first volume, then no doubt the difficulty just mentioned may well seem insuperable. Nor can we urge in defence that there has been some looseness in the phraseology adopted. For it is certain that the Absolute must include the finite subject, and it is equally

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., p. 75.

<sup>2</sup> The paragraph on p. 278 hardly meets this difficulty.

certain that if the Absolute is to be known at all it must in some sense be an object, the "universal object".

We may perhaps escape from the difficulty in this way. The ultimate question really is whether the Absolute as such can be an object at all. If it can be an object for a finite subject, then the problem as to its being known is at once solved, on Prof. Laurie's theory; for given a subject-object relation *ipso facto* we have knowledge. Our author is of course far from committing the obvious fallacy of asserting that the Absolute is an object and so can be known. On the contrary, he insists that the Absolute in its totality cannot be known by man: a "synthesis of the Absolute" is beyond us.<sup>1</sup> The Absolute in a certain sense is thus not an object at all for us. At the same time "All is One," and our finite individuality exists within the "one-all". The forms which the subject-object relation sustains within our experience are thus within this "one-all," and *are* the Absolute at our "plane of being". This was established in the epistemology. Hence the object world we find or form in the course of knowledge is the Absolute as finitised in the various moments or stages of knowledge; and at these various stages the Absolute is as completely known as our subject-activity is capable of knowing it. Thus the Absolute is our object only in the sense in which the various stages of knowledge, formed as a matter of fact in finite experience, possess an objective content. In other words, when we are realising the function of knowledge in any of its forms, we are expressing the nature of objectivity, and to express objectivity truly is to reveal the Absolute. Only to that extent is the Absolute our object in so far as in finite experience the subject-object relation is found as a matter of fact to hold. Beyond this we do not know, and in any other sense the Absolute is not our object at all. What we know in finite experience is indeed truly known, and is the concrete realisation of the nature of the Absolute "at our plane"; and so far the Absolute is truly our object. But beyond that there is no knowledge and no object. To this, there is one qualification, which Prof. Laurie is at pains to emphasise. While we know nothing of what the real nature of the Absolute is outside the above limitations, we do know that our finite individuality is within the "all-one," and that this "all-one" is the whole, a "transcendent" whole immeasurably beyond us.<sup>2</sup> But all that this knowledge amounts to is the bare fact that there is such a whole—a fact of vast import-

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., pp. 32, 50 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50 ff.

ance doubtless, and one which delivers us from the perils of mere pluralism, but not a fact whose fullness of content can possibly enter our reflective experience. It is a fact that enters knowledge in the form of feeling, and is only present at the emotional level of experience.

We may perhaps point the contrast between the epistemology and the ontology of these "meditations" by saying that in the former our author reads the meaning of human experience from the point of view of the subject, and finds it consisting of certain kinds of truth about the Absolute; in the latter he reads the same experience from the point of view of the object and finds it consisting in certain kinds of content of the Absolute.

What we have above stated regarding the all-important question of method has partly anticipated the development of the argument in the ontology. It is clear that such a way of approaching the problem of the nature of the Absolute very closely resembles the method of anthropomorphism: it is equally clear that the method does claim to supply objective universal knowledge of the Absolute. In stating the content of the notion of God, Prof. Laurie frankly takes the finite as the "necessary *πρὸς τὸν*,"<sup>1</sup> and therefore has in some way to furnish this objective knowledge in spite of the apparent limitations which anthropomorphism implies. It is thus not surprising that at an early stage in his argument he finds himself constrained to face this problem and to discuss the significance of anthropomorphism.<sup>2</sup> As a matter of fact he keeps this problem in view throughout his whole argument in the ontology. And he must do so; for undoubtedly his interpretation of the nature of God and of the relation of finite individuation to the Absolute is controlled from first to last, as we shall see, by what constitutes and determines the nature of man's life.

From anthropomorphism he admits there is no escape.<sup>3</sup> The only question is, does this prevent us from attaining positive and objective knowledge of God? The term anthropomorphism almost invariably implies a limitation, not merely in the extent of man's knowledge of the Absolute, but in the quality of that knowledge. This restriction is very often taken to mean that any kind of statement about the Absolute, because derived from man's human apprehension, must be the expression of his peculiar needs and nature, and therefore is bound to ascribe to the Whole a character and content admittedly peculiar to a part of that Whole, *viz.*,

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., p. 55.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, *Med.* 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

man. If we are to admit any statement as necessary or legitimate for certain purposes, it is asserted that we can do so only on the understanding that the result be regarded as symbolic at the best, and for the most part as illusory.

Prof. Laurie does not directly meet this conception of anthropomorphism, which would certainly be fatal to any objective knowledge of God. He circumvents it by a line of argument as ingenious as it is penetrating.

The above conception of anthropomorphism rests on the position that the knowledge of God is a separate process of knowledge which takes place when man, it may be at the end of his knowledge of the finite facts of experience, asks himself the question what God means. Before this question could arise, it seems assumed, he must have known other things, things which he may know with complete certainty, but among which there is no such object as that of God. To face the question what is God is thus to face a new, unique, and distinctive object of knowledge. But since the only kinds of knowledge he is used to, are those which deal with perception and inference, he will proceed in dealing with this new object too, by way of perception or inference, or both. Hence, on the one hand, the so-called "proofs" for the existence of God are brought forward as the only way of answering the question put, and, on the other, it is pointed out that, since even the very idea of proof starts from our finite human experience and its needs, the attempt to apply to this unique transcendent object the terms, methods and results which any such process of proof involves, settles *ab initio* the essentially inadequate character of any conclusion we may draw or statement we may make.

Prof. Laurie corrects the cardinal assumption on which this whole view rests. The Absolute, as he maintained in his epistemology, is the ultimate object of our knowledge all along the line of experience, whatever the kind of knowledge may be and whatever stage of knowledge we take. And here, in vol. ii., he repeats that the "need and quest for God" is the goal of all man's striving towards the attainment of his end in the plane of being which he occupies. Man's very consciousness of his "singleness" of being carries with it a sense of "dependence"<sup>1</sup> on an unconditioned ground, a Universal-Being; for only so could the 'isolation' and 'solitude' of his being be supported and maintained. This sense of 'dependence,' or of 'oneness,' is in its simplest form only found in feeling, but it none the less carries reality with it;

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., p. 8.



it is a feeling of oneness with all being, and this remains with man from one end of his conscious experience to the other. The "objectivity" characteristic of knowledge at any stage, the "necessity," or again the "universality" of knowledge is in every case constituted by the same ultimate Reality; for the activity of reason involved in establishing such knowledge is the realisation in man of the nature of the Absolute. Hence we are not facing a new and separate object when we seek to know the Absolute as such; we are merely reconstituting and reaffirming at the highest stage of knowledge, an object that has been with us, and is with us, at each of the distinct levels of knowledge which our experience contains. And, therefore, in the second place, our knowledge of God specifically is only anthropomorphic in the sense in which all our knowledge of anything whatever is anthropomorphic. In other words, our knowledge of God is not anthropomorphic in any sense which precludes it from being objective and universal. Partial and general, a mere 'outline' our knowledge of the Absolute may be and is; but a partial thought is not an erroneous thought.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, the mental necessity to look at our experience as a whole is just as well founded as that which compels us to know any part of it. We may say, in fact, that the 'universals' of thought in knowing are the points of arrestment in the process of satisfying that mental necessity which lies behind the process. This necessity comes from our being aware of our existence as individual parts of a Whole. That our knowledge of God should be progressive thus lies in the nature of the case:<sup>2</sup> it means no more than that our knowledge is an activity of a type of being that grows towards its end. But our knowledge is none the less valid at each stage of the progress; and the progress is not radical change, but alteration of a conception that remains in its essence the same in the least and in the most advanced type of mind.<sup>3</sup>

Further, we cannot rest satisfied in the mere fact that our knowledge has or may have objectivity and necessity. We must interpret for ourselves this objectivity characteristic of knowledge, so as at once to show its source in what is beyond ourselves, and at the same time account for its compelling force in ourselves. The problem, in short, is not so much whether by our knowledge we know God, as to give an intelligible account of the fundamental character of our own knowledge.<sup>4</sup> In our knowledge we are carried beyond our-

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., p. 30.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7-23, 30.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

<sup>4</sup> As our author says, p. 70, the 'knowledge of knowing is knowing God'—precisely the position adopted by the post-Kantian idealists.

selves: What is this "beyond ourselves," and how can we express it? Prof. Laurie answers the question by simply synthesising the objective aspects involved in our experience, unifying them into one single totality, which thereby constitutes and determines the knowledge we actually have. So interpreted the Whole as such merely expresses itself in man's activity on his plane of being; the Whole or Absolute "subjectivises"<sup>1</sup> itself in man's mind, and thus gives his knowledge that objectivity and necessity which it possesses as a fact.

At first sight it would seem as if the objectivity of man's experience were here simply taken *per se*, were treated as a separate fact, and then straightway identified with God or the Absolute, the source from which man's experience arises and to which that experience returns. But such an obviously mechanical and external relation between man's experience and God Prof. Laurie is far from adopting. The relation between man's knowledge and God is as intimate as the relative holding between subject and object within any region of the finite. As subject and object in the latter case are continuous and inseparable, so man and God are continuous and inseparable. This is the essential principle of the argument. But it introduces a certain ambiguity. The ambiguity appears in the statements Prof. Laurie himself makes. At one time the Absolute is spoken of as the "unity of man's experience—the sum of the Actual on the grade and within the orb of finite man-mind":<sup>2</sup> God is the "reflection of the distinctive man-being himself":<sup>3</sup> God is the "sum of ideals".<sup>4</sup> At other times again the Absolute as a totality is held to be "transcendent,"<sup>5</sup> "infinite" and "immeasurable," and as "immanent and unconditioned ground"<sup>6</sup> the system of "individua"<sup>7</sup> of which man is one.

The ambiguity here is more one of expression than of principle. God is not taken to be either the mere hypostatisation of the objective content of man's experience viewed as a whole, nor simply the reality left over after man's specific experience is exhausted and complete. Prof. Laurie's point is that the unity or totality of man's experience is God *for man*; but that this very experience is at the same time consciously conditioned, related to what transcends its individuality, and so implicates the unconditioned whole of Being. All planes of being are continuous with one another, and the one Absolute is immanent in each and all. The continuity

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50 ff.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.

is no doubt the most general feature of the Absolute, and as such has no more content than that of bare Being, or "being unconditioned" as our author calls it. But this continuity is a component constituent of each plane, along with all the other content that makes up the concrete fullness and specific character of each stage. Hence, while to each plane God is primarily the complete realisation of that plane, yet God is not, even to that plane itself, confined within the four walls, so to say, of its individuality, but is also that continuity of being which unites all planes of individuality. Thus, in man's case, God is the unity of man's experience in the first instance, or man "receives the totality of God at his plane";<sup>1</sup> but within man's conscious experience there lies this continuity with all being as a fact, a fact of 'feeling,' a 'felt continuity'. Hence God is for man this continuity of man's being with all being *as well as* the concrete fullness which constitutes man's specific plane: God therefore means to man both the totality of man's own experience and the continuity of man with all being whatsoever.<sup>2</sup>

These two essential moments in the meaning of God are distinguished as the immanence and the transcendence of God. The immanence of God in man's life is simply God as realised in the total range of man's specific plane of being, or, as we may say, God humanised: it means 'continuously repeated pulsation' throughout all the manifold activity of his life. The transcendence as such is for man *God's* concrete reality as realised in planes and forms of being other than man's. Since God is the "Absolute Whole," the Absolute is the immanent substance of *all* planes and kinds of being, of all individua. The distinction between immanence and transcendence is one which has validity only from the point of view of the individual planes of being. From that point of view they are aspects of Absolute Reality. But to the Absolute *per se*, so to say, the only essential function is that of immanence. Transcendence is entirely relative to a given plane of being, and only holds as between one plane of being and other planes. In other words, the Absolute is not transcendent to Itself; but solely immanent. The Absolute is transcendent only for a specific individual type of being; for that concrete content of the Absolute, in virtue of which and

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., p. 59.

<sup>2</sup> The history of man's religious life confirms this analysis, for now the former is emphasised and now the latter: when the former is emphasised to the exclusion of the latter we get *forms* of religion that are crudely anthropomorphic: when the latter is exaggerated we get the most abstract attitudes of religious mysticism. *Syn.*, ii., pp. 111-112.

in regard to which It is transcendent to a given plane of being, *e.g.*, to man's plane, is immanent in the other planes of being.

To man's apprehension, then, God is both immanent and transcendent. We apprehend God as both, but the apprehension in the one sense is different, almost in kind, from that in the other. It is only in regard to the former that we can be said to know God at all; it is indeed only as immanent that we want to know God.<sup>1</sup> And God can be known in this sense;<sup>2</sup> in fact, since God immanently constitutes the very universals of man's knowledge, we may be said to know nothing else but God as immanent. God "speaks through man"; the God of man is God-man;<sup>3</sup> and the knowing of man's own knowledge is the knowing of God.<sup>4</sup> But as transcendent we can hardly be said to 'know' God at all: we merely apprehend 'that' God is but not 'what' God is *quâ* transcendent.<sup>5</sup> We only know God as finitised in our own human experience. All the rest is immeasurably beyond our grasp. To know *that* God is transcendent is no doubt much, and we apprehend this much in 'feeling': but it is entirely unequal to the fullness of God's Reality *quâ* transcendent. If we could know God both as immanent in our experience and as transcendent we should contradict our own nature.<sup>6</sup>

Thus the above ambiguity referred to is removed by this theory: we are delivered both from the sinister limitations of anthropomorphism and yet confined, for all the satisfactory knowledge of God we have, to the 'totality of man's experience'. By the line of thought above indicated we are directly led to the interpretation of the positive content of the notion of God. It is impossible fully to convey in a few sentences the range of ideas covered by the profound analysis of this conception given in *Meditations* vi.-xi. But the main elements can be stated in such a way as to be intelligible in spite of brevity.

"If I am exiled from God, how can I hold converse with Him? If I am in identity with God, how could the question of God ever arise?"<sup>7</sup> In this sentence, typical of so many in Prof. Laurie's analysis, there is indicated the ultimate factors involved in the notion of God. God is One, and the same One, in all phases and forms of reality; but finite individuation, distinct, nay, separate from this one, is equally an essential moment in the Absolute. As one, God is Being-

<sup>1</sup> *Sym.*, ii., p. 94.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 59-62.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 30-33.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52.

unconditioned, the ultimate continuum, the all-pervading substrate of the conditioned many, which our finite experience reveals to us as inexplicably 'given'. This Unconditioned Being is directly apprehended in feeling at the basis of our experience, and is directly reaffirmed in intuition as the final achievement of human knowledge. It is the first and the last moment in the conception of God. But the dialectic activity of reflective intelligence, of "will-reason," affirms the positive existence of the independent individua, the distinctions and connexions amongst which it seeks to establish. Without such individua its movement could neither begin nor end. Their distinctiveness is implied in its very process, and that process is the necessary development of the life of mind. The independence of finite individua, and the positive subsistence of the conditioned, are thus as ultimate as the unconditioned unity and continuity of the Absolute revealed in feeling. The 'separateness,' 'limitation,' 'conditionedness' of individua is due to the factor in the Absolute which our author calls 'negation'. An individuum is the union of affirmation and negation, and these are indissoluble moments in its composition. The individuum insists on the one, just as much as the other: it must 'affirm' to be an entity at all: it must 'negate' so as not to be anything else but itself. It is the Absolute in it that affirms its being; it is the Absolute that equally compels it to negate, by giving it a specific character and content to affirm. The sum of individua gives us the "many" of the universe. The totality of the individua is the 'phenomenalisation,' the 'externalising' of God. But however essential individuals are to the life of the Absolute, they are not as such, nor is the sum of them,<sup>1</sup> the Absolute. They are the Absolute in the form of 'difference,' in virtue of its function of negation. Finite individua are God's 'opposite,' God's 'other,'<sup>2</sup> 'they are and they are not' God, or, as our author characteristically puts it, they are 'God and God-not'.<sup>3</sup> The first and last word about the Absolute is unconditioned Being, continuous and one. Of this all individuation is an expression. The Absolute as such is solely affirmation; the Absolute is *present* in negation as 'Being': but negation is a qualification of individua only. Hence God is not an individual.<sup>4</sup>

Again, because the Absolute as pure affirmation is the positive substance of individua, the plurality of individuals is not the mere emanation of the Absolute; the Absolute is 'immanent'<sup>5</sup> in individua, It is their being. *Quā* immanent God is

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., p. 67.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 66, 86, etc.

in the world, not merely the external 'creator' of the world. In this aspect individuals in affirming their own nature are affirming God's being: they are 'on the side of' God, are, *e.g.*, in man's case, 'co-workers' with God. They do not therefore exist so much *for* God simply; they exist *for* themselves: or rather in existing for themselves they exist *in* God. This is what Prof. Laurie means by his 'monistic pluralism,'<sup>1</sup> which he holds to be distinct from pantheism or from mere pluralism. On the other hand, in virtue of the factor of 'negation,' which is inalienable from the nature of an individual, the individual, so to say, subsists in his own right, even it may be as against the Absolute. To insist on the element of negation is just as necessary as to insist on the positive content. In the exercise of the function of negation the finite individual is quite capable of, and in a certain sense cannot help, 'resisting'<sup>2</sup> God. This expression is no metaphor in Prof. Laurie's theory. It is taken quite strictly and literally, and is regarded as the logically necessary consequence of negation being constitutive of the nature of the individual. We shall see the part it plays in the discussion on immortality. Meantime it is important to notice that negation is an element of opposition (not necessarily contradiction)<sup>3</sup> inherent in all finitude. Only by negation, in fact, is finitude to be 'saved':<sup>4</sup> saved, that is, from ultimate or approximate annihilation in an Absolute which is a mere neutrum. To 'save finitude' therefore is essential even in the interests of the Absolute; for only so, is it a concrete Absolute, instead of a mere abstraction. Negation brings with it what Prof. Laurie calls 'cosmic sin'; it brings 'casualty,' 'contingency,' 'disorder' into the world.<sup>5</sup> But these are 'facts' which have to be reckoned with, even though they may not be attributed to the Absolute.<sup>6</sup> With all the difficulties involved in the fact of negation, it is better to admit that finite individuals can and do 'resist' God and 'God's purposes,' than accept the conception of a 'fated world'.<sup>7</sup>

When we ask what further God means for man in particular, as distinct from what God is in individuals in general, the answer is easy to find. God is immanent in man's individuality, for man is one amongst many individuals; and God is there the positive substance and source of man's nature, in the sphere of feeling as well as the moving principle of the dialectic of 'will-reason'. God is immanent in all the life of feeling, 'the basis and terminus of mind';<sup>8</sup> in the higher forms of

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., p. 76.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 133-134.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 75, 99.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 82, 128.

<sup>6</sup> *Cf. Syn.*, ii., p. 128.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 123-125, 117 ff., 130 ff.

'rationalised feeling' which we have in the sphere of artistic beauty, in the system of rational comprehension, evolved from the basis of sense life, in that harmony of man's emotional life which is the consummation of his moral activity. God, in short, is the End in the form of Beauty, Truth and the Good; God is 'perfection,' the 'sum' of human 'ideals'.<sup>1</sup> Feeling is the basis of experience in the case of 'art,' 'knowledge' and 'morality'; and God is present in feeling: the end is the ground of all these processes; and God is that end. God 'affirms' these ideals as man's true being, as constitutive of man's nature.<sup>2</sup> God is thus 'mind' in all its grades, and is not mere 'reason' or 'thought'. God indeed is more present as feeling than as thought, which is the 'servant of feeling,' the servant by 'being master' of feeling.<sup>3</sup> And, again, God is self-conscious, is ego or spirit; but in an 'infinite sense'.<sup>4</sup> God must be at least as concrete as any of the finite individua, and, being immanent in man who is self-conscious, spirit, God must be in that sense self-conscious spirit. But God is not any individual, even the highest we know, *viz.*, man. Hence the qualification in an 'infinite sense'. For a similar reason God is 'personality,' but not a personality.<sup>5</sup>

These, then, are the primary moments in the conception of God. They are necessary and sufficient to justify the religious life, which is the 'personal emotional attitude to the highest,'<sup>6</sup> the sole basis of which is the 'feeling of God' (not the recognition of the fact of God),<sup>7</sup> and the consummation of which in a 'thinking man's religion' is 'his philosophy vitalised by feeling, and inspired with emotion'.<sup>8</sup>

Before passing to consider Prof. Laurie's meditations on the problem of evil and the problem of immortality, we may pause to make a comment which will partly anticipate any further criticism of his views regarding these problems. It is extremely difficult, in the light of Prof. Laurie's own statements, to accept without qualification his conception of an Absolute 'resisted' by finite individuality. One cannot but have every sympathy with his attempt to maintain the claims of finitude in the system of things. And as a matter of principle it is undoubtedly sound to treat the problem of human individuality as a particular case of the general question regarding the nature of finitude; for what holds of finitude in general will be true of the human individual.

<sup>1</sup> *Sym.*, ii., p. 110.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 138-139, 98-100.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 96-97, 177.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 130.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 133-134, 142.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 176 ff.; cf. p. 94.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 142.



Negation is doubtless supremely important and may rightly enough be held to 'save finitude': but it is pushing the function of negation, and the claims of finitude, too far when he speaks of the finite individual as 'resisting' God. He states expressly that we cannot understand negation any more than we can understand being:<sup>1</sup> that our knowledge even of individua is surrounded by ignorance:<sup>2</sup> and he insists that we have no 'synthesis of the Absolute,' but at the best only an 'Absolute synthesis'. He holds, too, that affirmation, which the Absolute essentially is, 'overpowers' negation in such a way as to make an orderly whole of all the strivings and oppositions of finitude, and to realise in the long run the end or 'idea' immanent in each finite individual:<sup>3</sup> that differences are not absolute differences:<sup>4</sup> and that 'negation negates itself'.<sup>5</sup> Add to this that he repeatedly asserts that God is in large measure incomprehensible, and that even our reason at its best has to be supplemented by a 'faith' which anticipates the goal of reason and is its consummation<sup>6</sup>—and surely, in the light of these various expressions, we are not entitled to admit the position that 'resistance' of the Absolute is either an essential attribute of finitude or a consistent interpretation of the nature of the Absolute. 'Resistance' as a necessary and essential attribute implies an opposition that never is and never can be overcome: whereas Prof. Laurie's positive assertions regarding the Absolute, combined with his admission of the vast field of ignorance regarding the Absolute which surrounds any knowledge we have, precludes us from maintaining such a doctrine. It seems certainly paradoxical to 'save finitude' at a price which destroys all hope of that reconciliation with the Whole wherein lies the peace that comes of understanding.

The danger of this over-insistence on the element of negation appears very forcibly in our author's treatment of the question of evil and the problem of immortality. These two may be conveniently taken together. For, in a manner, we may look upon the meditations on these topics as respectively the development of the implication of the negative and affirmative aspects of human individuality. Evil in all its forms is the result of the negative element specifically; immortality is ultimately due to the affirmative element in human individuality. In Prof. Laurie's treatment, however, the aspects are discussed as if they were separable; but the result of his discussion is to show that the latter is necessary to

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., p. 100.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 81.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 78, 115.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 137.

supplement the consequences of the former, that immortality is demanded by the very existence of evil in experience. No doubt the two aspects are distinct; but on his own showing they are not separate; and to separate them for discussion creates quite unnecessary difficulties in his treatment of these topics.

He introduces the problem of evil by again emphasising the fact of negation as constitution of the sphere of finite individuality. Negation is the *principium individuationis*; <sup>1</sup> all determination is a synthesis of affirmation and negation: individuals are the union of opposite factors, foci of contradictory elements. This is true, not merely of individuals in the Whole, but also of the constitution of each individualum, whether 'thing' or 'man'. The component elements of each are opposed to the unifying 'idea,' which is the complete meaning or end of each; they resist the attainment of this 'idea'; they are, relatively to the idea, the negation of it. <sup>2</sup> This resistance, opposition, negation, operating in each individual and among individuals *inter se*, if allowed to have its way, leads to chaos and confusion. And, but for the priority of affirmation, the controlling agency of the end or idea in each individual, and ultimately of the Absolute as the affirmative idea in each and all, chaos would be the result of this necessary resistance. In any case the opposition is irremovable, even though the idea or end is triumphant, and is the source of casualty and contingency in the finite 'created' world. Strife is of the essence of individual existence, a striving to attain the ideal end through incessant opposition. In this activity the Absolute is involved; the affirmative element, and the ultimate triumph of the idea, mean the immanence of the Absolute in the individual, whether inorganic, organic or man. The striving of the creature is at the same time the striving of God. <sup>3</sup> God, so to say, has realised so much of absolute reality in each finite centre, e.g., man, and that finite individual affirms or reaffirms this much on his own account and for itself. The individual strives against the Absolute, but the Absolute also strives *in* the individual. The negation is *in* the Absolute; and hence the seriousness of the struggle and its issue.

It follows from this intimate association of the Absolute with the struggle of the finite that the judgment on the result cannot be one thing for the individual and another for the Absolute. The process must be judged as we find it, at the "man-plane of being," to use our author's expression.

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., p. 264.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 265.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 267.

Now it is transparent that the process of finitude reveals contradictions unreconciled, more or less constant disorder, contingency and even anarchy. Hence Prof. Laurie concludes that the Absolute does not succeed in realising a harmony of reality, at least so far as the actual plane of being, which man knows, is concerned.<sup>1</sup> There is an irrevocable element of the 'non-rational' in things as we know them: God is in process of attaining His end or idea, but so far He has not yet attained it. Not that the contingent irrational element is to be strictly attributed to God: it is the individual's doing: it merely *opposes* God, but does so by the very conditions of God's creative method. The Absolute is thus the *source* of the contingent of evil, though not the *author* of it.<sup>2</sup>

What applies to individual existence in general applies with full force to man's individuality in particular, where, indeed, we see opposition, negation, taking a peculiarly unique and intense form—individual freedom. This freedom, says our author, is the 'standing protest' against abstract monism,<sup>3</sup> the typical and highest mode of asserting the rights of individuality. Man has to realise his own idea and end for himself, as his own conscious task, a task assigned to, but not performed for, man by the Absolute. Man, like all other individua, contains necessarily contradiction, and this is not and never can be removed.<sup>4</sup> Indeed the higher his individuality the intenser and deeper is the contradiction in his constitution. Man is 'God's greatest, strangest, divinest and most deplorable work'.<sup>5</sup>

It is not difficult to see where, in this theory, evil is to appear, and what its nature is to be. Evil finds its possibility in the fact of negation. But negation *per se* is not necessarily evil or the source of evil: if negation could be overcome at every plane of being, more particularly at the plane of man, or could be removed in the long run and give place to affirmation, it could not be properly designated 'evil'. Evil only appears where negation remains as a constant irremovable factor in the process of individuality; for then it is not an accident, nor an incident in the constitution of the individual, but its necessary destiny. Now we have seen that negation is never removed at our plane of being, that God's purpose is not realised but perpetually being opposed. The permanence of the negation is thus the essence of evil, for then negation militates against the fulfilment of the individual end, resists its true nature, and to that ex-

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., p. 266.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 271.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 278.

<sup>4</sup> *Cf. Syn.*, ii., p. 284.

<sup>5</sup> *Syn.*, ii., p. 275.

tent lowers or lessens its individuality. The permanence of evil is to be ascribed in the long run to the Absolute, and indicates a failure to achieve its end. Hence our author's definition of evil as "the failure of God-creative to realise the ideal of the individual and of the whole on the plane of being man occupies".<sup>1</sup> He adds as a further definition, that we have evil when 'the process of attaining the end in the case of sentient beings involves unnecessary pain'. But this latter seems a subordinate form of the fundamental principle. The assertion that the Absolute does 'fail,' is primarily made of man's plane of being as this appears in the living present. But since this plane is the only one we now occupy, and the only one we know truly, the assertion is held to be absolutely true of actual experience as we have it. For given that the Absolute is, as our author holds, a "God of Love," a God whose purpose is the good of all individua, and given the facts of struggle, incompleteness and pain which we find on every side, and there is only one term to describe the glaring contrast between these two and that term is 'failure' on all sides.

The failure or evil is not so great in certain kinds of individual existence as in others. In inorganic existence in spite of conflict 'we have no reason to suppose that the creative end is not attained'.<sup>2</sup> In the organic vegetable world, and the organic animal world, while failure is evident (*e.g.*, a plant does not have always its proper conditions of subsistence, and yet is allowed to be: an animal, again, suffers pain, often needless pain), yet on the whole we may say of both these realms that 'the good' or 'end' is dominant, perhaps triumphant, through conflict and negation, largely in virtue of the individual being subordinate to the species whose end it furthers.<sup>3</sup> Even in man's life "it is false to represent man's destiny here as wholly miserable," 'the good as measured by fruition is dominant in the world'.<sup>4</sup>

But while this is admitted, and in spite of the fact that much of the suffering can be shown to be necessary, yet 'misery and pain are operative to an extent in excess of what is needed to attain the purposed result': and, in man's case in particular, evil is found which is irremovable, inexplicable and entirely unjustifiable. Man is ever inadequate to his own task of fulfilling himself. Nature is too strong for him. His very ideals are impossible of fulfilment, and must ever remain so: they elude him: his very demands make failure necessary and inevitable.<sup>5</sup> In the case of man the Absolute

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., p. 286.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 291.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 293-294.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 301-305.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 288 ff.

has failed and hopelessly failed, if we take life as we find it.

In support of this contention our author in Med. xvi. and xvii. brings forward an eloquent indictment against the method by which man's world is controlled and directed, remarkable alike for its grasp of the concrete facts of life, its fearless incisive criticism, and its intense human feeling. His attitude is that of a captive stoic prince of intellect whose dignity is insulted by the scheme of 'government' in which he is forced to acquiesce, and who refuses to give up his claims to the best even when he has to surrender to the worst. He finds no alleviation against the evil in the consolations of a speculative outlook; for this is but man's 'sad distinction of having assigned to him a share in vindicating for God as for himself the supremacy of spirit,' is but a 'fatal power of more fully comprehending the universal sorrow'.<sup>1</sup> Taking our life in time as we find it, the system of things with its needless and superfluous suffering, struggle and pain, is evil, and cannot be justified. Without hesitation, therefore, since we cannot give up the 'irresistible instinct of Hope,' and must somehow 'remain loyal to the God whom we knew in part,'<sup>2</sup> he maintains that the only conclusion we can draw is that "the negation has been too strong for God";<sup>3</sup> 'God is a spirit but a spirit in difficulty,' 'from which he is slowly extricating himself'.<sup>4</sup> Our task as men is to co-operate with Him, and 'sympathise with Him' in His struggle as He sympathises with us in ours. 'If we are not only fellow-workers but fellow-sufferers with God, we then become reconciled to the universe.'<sup>5</sup>

Such an indictment against the system of things makes man's position as well as God's apparently hopeless; and there would indeed seem something of mockery or something of irony in man's attempt to overcome the defects and imperfections of his own situation by trying to remove those of God. But more remains to be said. Our author has so far taken the factor of negation and evil *per se* as a separate element in our temporal-spatial experience; and perhaps has thrown this so prominently into relief in order to prepare the way for a reassertion of the positive side of individuality which still remains to be considered. His indictment is only true if we confine our attention to the sphere of finite temporal existence. But that existence has a term put to it by the process of the world, and it may well be that this

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., pp. 308, 320.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 275, 302.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 330, 332.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 336-337.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 337.

very term contains at once the condition of putting an end to these dire results of negation, and the suggestion of a further and final triumph of the affirmative factor in human individuality. 'God's honour is concerned' in seeing that 'our ethical perplexities and inevitable failures shall to and for us be ultimately resolved'.<sup>1</sup> The last stage in the process of negation may therefore hold the secret of the ultimate domination of the Good. This last stage, this final term to the negative process, is Death. This, if it is not the 'master-key of the problem' of negation and evil, is nothing but a 'grim sarcasm on man's ideals and aspirations',<sup>2</sup> a 'profoundly immoral and glaringly irrational event'.<sup>3</sup> Out of this worst form of evil our author draws the secret of the lasting good of the individual: in the most relentless type of negation we are to find the possibility of the completest affirmation: from the extremity of annihilation we derive the hope and opportunity of immortality.

This may at first seem the great paradox of Prof. Laurie's argument. And certainly one feels that if the affirmative significance of the human individual is so great as he insists in his defence of immortality, so great that its reality far outweighs the significance of the worst form of negation, then the previous indictment against the Absolute loses much of its force. For surely if the positive aspect of human individuality is so firmly established in the plan of the Absolute that it can survive the shock of earth's final catastrophe, one may fairly assume that human individuality can not after all be so gravely affected by the afflictions of its mundane career as to justify our author's tirade against the management of the world. And if God can carry man through the ordeal of the portentous negativity of the tomb, and plant him safely and for ever, with all his self-conscious completeness assured, in a realm of eternal life, it seems an extravagance of statement to speak of God being in a 'difficulty' and 'failing' in the accomplishment of His purpose. The truth seems to be that the strength of Prof. Laurie's accusations against the evil in the temporal system has somewhat over-reached itself, if his defence of immortality is to hold good. For if these accusations are true, then we seem hardly warranted at all in supposing that the individuality which is so bad here can ever be improved by a continuance of individual existence, that a God who 'fails' here can ever succeed anywhere else. While, on the other hand, if immortality, with all that this implies, can be established as at least highly probable in

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii, p. 321.<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 314.<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 315.

spite of the present evil in things, then there can be no ground for making such accusations against the Absolute as destroy the very basis on which all hope of immortality might rest. Our life's imperfections may be held to demand immortality, but immortality is not to be had by threats. If it is childish to beg for immortality, it is certainly futile to thunder imprecations against the denial of it.

The statement of the arguments in favour of individual immortality in his last Meditation gives Prof. Laurie his opportunity of showing his rare dialectical skill and fine speculative insight in dealing with ultimate problems. Whatever can be said in support of this conception is made the most of in this masterly treatment of a topic, the discussion of which seems as everlasting as the subject itself. It would be difficult to find in the field of philosophical literature so complete a defence of immortality in the sense of individual immortality, and certainly difficult to find this statement surpassed.

We need not rehearse the various 'proofs'. In principle they consist in a sustained effort to justify by specifically distinct arguments dealing with detailed aspects of individuality the general position that the human individual has an affirmative or absolute factor in his constitution. The arguments therefore seem to amount to no more than an emphasis in detail on that positive substance which the individual derives from the Absolute, and which gives him, as our author previously showed, his affirmative content as an individual. All affirmation in individuality means the immanence of the Absolute in the individual. That is a fundamental position of Prof. Laurie's metaphysics. The arguments for immortality are in the last resort different ways of bringing out this immanence of the Absolute in the individual, in spite of the facts of change, negation and evil, which seem to imperil the security of man's substantial nature.

The cogency of such arguments is always tainted by the logical defect which is inevitable when we try to proceed from the parts as such to the whole, or from the whole as such to the part. If we establish the essential importance of different positive factors in our whole nature we do not thereby prove the inherent importance of our whole nature itself; and conversely if we admit that a whole as such has value we do not thereby prove that the same applies to the part. To apply this to the case of immortality. In the Absolute, value and existence are coincident: hence the futility of attempting to 'prove' the 'existence' of the Absolute, for this very proof must imply a contrast between value and existence which does not hold of the Absolute. In the case



of man value and existence are heterogeneous and stand contrasted; so much so that, *e.g.*, in the moral life, existence is determined by and derived from value. Hence we have the attempt, legitimate in the case of man, to demonstrate an essential and necessary connexion between our value and our existence; such a connexion is precisely what immortality means. The basis of the argument is either our value or our existence: in general the basis is our value, when we seek to 'prove' immortality. That value doubtless is permanent, is the 'affirmation' in us of the Absolute. But when, because the Absolute is the complete unity of value and existence, we try to argue that our value involves our existence too, we commit the fallacy of concluding that what is true of the Whole is true of the individual part: or again when we argue that, since our existence is determined by our value and our value is permanent, therefore the permanence of our value ensures the permanence of our existence, we are once more surreptitiously borrowing to assist our own case a truth holding only of the Whole, which by hypothesis we are not.

Prof. Laurie is well aware of the inherent difficulty of finally proving individual immortality, and admits in so many words that 'coercive demonstration is impossible'. He goes even so far as to justify this inherent impossibility, by saying that 'it would have been a contradiction of the essential characteristic of the present system had immortality been put beyond all possible question'.<sup>1</sup> It seems a little paradoxical to make so strenuous an effort, as he has done, to demonstrate that man is immortal, and then to conclude the argument by maintaining that the impossibility of a complete demonstration is itself an additional reason for the proposition to be demonstrated. But the fact is, the proof is impossible not because this is for our good, but because the premises and conclusion must in this case be logically incoherent, for they are heterogeneous. It is ironical to make a merit of our inability to solve a logical fallacy. No doubt the impossibility of proof opens up the way to 'faith' on which he insists as an essential constituent of spiritual life.<sup>2</sup> For what is regarded as 'a postulate of self-conscious ethical activity'<sup>3</sup> can only be practically efficacious through the agency of faith. But so far as the concrete question is concerned,—as to whether the human individual is, as a particular entity, immortal, and what that immortality consists in—this 'faith' leaves the matter absolutely undetermined.

In other ways, too, Prof. Laurie reveals the sense of the insufficiency of the 'proof' of individual immortality. He

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., p. 389.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 384.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 388.

points out that 'each Ego has its eternal destiny in its own hands,'<sup>1</sup> and that a given man may not be worthy of immortality at all. "The continuance of life beyond the grave *may* depend on the extent to which the potential in each man has here become actual": 'he who has not found eternal life here will not, it may be said, find it hereafter':<sup>2</sup> 'for aught we know one of the very marks of personal fitness for the life eternal is the living conviction which man has of the necessity and truth of that eternal life'.<sup>3</sup> But a proof which is to be accepted can admit of no qualifying exceptions. The only hope of immortality on the basis of a rational demonstration must consist in the universality of the conclusion. A probable conclusion may perhaps admit of exceptions; but a universal conclusion cannot; and a probable conclusion is not 'proof'. To admit that certain individuals may not be immortal is, once more, to make all logical coherence in the argument from the very start impossible; for we have thereby destroyed the universality of our *premises*, and, moreover, no one can settle what individuals are to be rejected.

The truth is that the only safe ground on which Prof. Laurie's arguments can rest is the general proposition on which he insists so strongly throughout his metaphysics—that being is one and continuous throughout all its manifestations. The permanence of the individual stands or falls with that position. For immortality is a specific case or form of continuity, and the problem of immortality arises in relation to this fundamental fact of continuity of being. The meaning we attach to immortality will depend entirely on the significance we attach to this fact of continuity. Continuity is not merely a matter of time, for time is an aspect of continuity. Continuity may perhaps best be realised through the value and quality of spiritual life, and that is not a matter of time or of particular existence. As Prof. Laurie says towards the close of his great argument, "a man striving after union with God here and now is *ipso facto* making himself immortal, inasmuch as he is bringing his finite spirit within the very life of the eternal spirit, and is being borne along in the current of that which cannot die".<sup>4</sup> This is finely said, and seems the last word on the subject. For thereby we make immortality a quality of the life of the present, a quality essential to the ideal ends controlling the present, and as enduring as these ideal ends themselves. This is all man wants to make it worth while to surrender even his existence in the interests of the best, in the assurance that he is not throwing his life away.

<sup>1</sup> *Syn.*, ii., p. 384.<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 383.<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 389.<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 387.

### III.—ON CERTAIN OBJECTIONS TO PSYCHOLOGY.<sup>1</sup>

BY T. LOVEDAY.

THERE is a remarkable difference between the attitude of philosophy towards the physical sciences and the attitude which, in England at any rate, it is still apt to adopt towards psychology. The physical sciences, so long as they do not attempt rashly to universalise their procedure or their results, are free to pursue their own business without interruption, but psychology is not so fortunate. Her claim to freedom is too recent, and her relations to the normative disciplines and to metaphysics are in fact too close for any expectation of peace. To some it may seem actually better so; such near relationship to philosophy must, it may be thought, cause danger of improper exaltation; if psychology's first business is to get on with her work, she must also bear in mind her own limitations, a task which involves clear apprehension, though not criticism, of her presuppositions; and it conduces to clear apprehension to be baited by metaphysicians. But as a matter of fact it does not appear that psychologists are particularly prone to exalt their special study into a metaphysic; in claiming vehemently to be free of philosophy they recognise explicitly that, as psychologists, they are not dealing with first principles. Moreover, it is curious to note that they are not accused so much of being as of failing to be metaphysicians; an incautious biologist will be charged with trying to be a philosopher when he ought not, but the psychologist with trying not to be a philosopher when he ought. The purpose of the following pages is to examine some objections of this kind more or less commonly advanced against psychology, and in part they have special reference to Mr. Prichard's interesting article in *MIND*, N.S., 61, where several of these objections are fully and adequately stated; but I

<sup>1</sup> This paper was already written before I had the benefit of reading Mr. Joachim's article on "Psychical Process" in *MIND*, N.S., 69, concerning which I have appended a few inadequately brief remarks at the end.

have also considered one or two criticisms which would not, if I understand him aright, commend themselves to Mr. Prichard.

Before one proceeds, however, to consider objections in detail, it is desirable to comment on certain difficulties due to the form in which they are taken. It might conceivably be argued (1) that psychology cannot, and therefore does not, exist at all, except as a tissue of deceptive and useless fictions; (2) that it cannot and does not exist as an empirical study or natural science, but only as a branch of philosophy; (3) that parts of it may constitute a science, but other parts are impossible or possible only as a branch of philosophy. I am not aware that any one actually holds the first position, but, as I shall try to show, it represents the conclusion which should follow from some of the objections actually taken if they were valid. The second position is Mr. Prichard's, if I follow him rightly, for though the limited purpose of his article prevents him from dealing with the empirical study of feeling and conation, his concluding sentences seem to show that he regards all psychology as properly a part of philosophy. Still it is worth noting that his case is not isolated; objectors almost always concentrate their attacks on the treatment of cognition and leave their attitude towards other parts of psychology, and especially towards the psychology of feeling, unbecomingly obscure. Mr. Prichard, it has further to be observed, has added to the preliminary difficulties by a peculiarity of method. A great part of his article is concerned with arguments to prove, not that a scientific psychology is impossible, but that conceptions employed by certain writers in their exposition of the subject are ill-judged and misleading. He raises a very difficult problem on which I shall make some hesitating remarks in the second part of this paper, but he confuses it almost inextricably with his primary problem. It is one thing to argue that scientific psychology is impossible and quite another to argue that M.'s or N.'s method is impossible. The confusion is due to the fact that Mr. Prichard, taking one work of Dr. Ward's and two of Dr. Stout's, has made them "represent the attitude of current psychology". Whether he has rightly interpreted the passages that he quotes is neither here nor there; he has forgotten that in psychology, as in some other sciences, the greatest disputes rage round fundamental notions and not round results; and so, assuming a fictitious "current attitude," he has confounded general objections to empirical psychology as such with objections to particular views held—if they are held—by certain eminent

psychologists.<sup>1</sup> It was necessary to remove this cause of obscurity before proceeding to consider objections in detail.

I. It has been argued that since the world as a systematic order is the work of knowing mind, psychology has no right to assume such a world in its attempt to trace the development of knowing. This argument, thus baldly put, is nowadays less often read than heard, and it is, of course, not put forward by Mr. Prichard. If it is accepted, the conclusion must be that all psychological statements about knowing are based on a fallacy, empty, and in the end meaningless; psychology is blotted out. For take one or two examples, putting them in any form you like, whether strict or loose: "The sense of smell is less acute in men than in dogs," "Recognition is facilitated by repeated perception," "If one looks at a white surface after looking at a strong red light, one sees the surface tinted green," "The child only gradually comes to distinguish even its bodily self from things external to its body"; all these statements involve a reference to the temporal order at least, and therefore on this view they ought to be, not perhaps partly or wholly incorrect, but simply without worth. They belong to a kind of statements that no one in his senses would make if he realised their lack of reasonable basis. But this conclusion seems to be not altogether free of absurdity, and the error in the argument is near at hand. The objection would be good only if psychology pretended to be metaphysics. If psychology forgets its own limitations—if, for instance, it attempts to explain knowledge in general—then the retort is possible that the conditions by which it explains broaden themselves out almost at a glance into a world which is what it is by reason of knowledge. But as it happens the psychologist is less often a headlong-plunging metaphysician than the biologist or the physicist or the journalist. He is generally quite well aware that he is looking at things from a "common-sense" point of view which is not final. His position is that of a spectator of what one may call Mental Behaviour. It is among the facts of the world as a systematic order that men and

<sup>1</sup>For my part I am in several places quite unable to follow Mr. Prichard's interpretation of his authors, and it is perhaps unlucky that he did not consult other writings of theirs. Anyhow, one cannot but agree with Mr. Herbst's comments on the severe limitations which Mr. Prichard has imposed on himself (*Zeitschrift f. Psych.*, 46, 276). If anyone thinks, for example, of Münsterberg's *Grundzüge*, then of Pfänder's *Einleitung*, then of any of Titchener's books, and then of those of Miss Calkins—I mention these authorities as being in every one's hands—he will hesitate before speaking of a "current" doctrine of psychological fundamentals.

beasts do mentally behave in various ways. As a "common-sense" person in the world of "common-sense" I am quite within my rights in observing Smith and his dog and noticing that the dog has the keener sense of smell (or at any rate makes more use of it), or that Smith recognises me more rapidly than he recognises Jones whom he has rarely seen. I am not less within my rights in observing my own mental behaviour, or in attempting to generalise about the mental behaviour of all men or even (perhaps) of all finite animates. I am not concerned with knowledge in general but with the mental behaviour of individuals—in the end of a typical individual or of typical individuals. This procedure does not give one an ultimate view of the universe; it involves pre-suppositions which are taken for granted, as does any special science; but, though the metaphysician may think the occupation dull and narrow, it is a legitimate and not a senseless way of passing the time.

II. It is argued that knowing, being "the relation in which a knower stands to" an object, cannot itself be an object, and therefore cannot be treated by psychology. The same odd conclusion ought to follow here as from the first objection; but Mr. Prichard, holding that it is possible to be aware of our knowing by reflexion, qualifies his conclusion to the effect that knowing cannot be an object "in the same sense in which anything else can be an object," and so (by some rather obscure connexion) is prepared to admit that it can be treated by a faculty psychology, but not in any other way. As I said before, it is not quite clear to what limbo he would relegate feeling and conation and also sense (to which he seems to attribute an unexpected independence); nor is it clear whether on his view reflexion is confined to being "aware of" knowing or can also qualify knowing by predicates. This latter point seems to be of some importance, for if we can judge about knowing, then (unless our judgments are by some unexplained necessity confined to predicating values) knowing can be an object in the sense in which psychology requires it to be an object. If I can reflect and judge about my knowings and their conditions, and Smith can judge about his, surely we may compare notes; and then we are beginning to psychologise. We do not require that our knowings should be objects in the sense in which our tongues or our words or the British constitution or the dishonesty of politicians are objects, but only that they should be convertible into objects of intelligent consideration; their essential subjectivity is itself one of the characteristics that we thus assign to them. We need not ask how many mean-

ings the words "reflexion on our knowing" may have, but certainly in one mode of reflexion we can and do regard ourselves and others as performing acts of knowing in time. These acts of knowing essentially involve the unique relation of subject to object; they are each the private act of an individual; they are inaccessible except by inference to any but the individual that executes them. In all these ways they are subjective, but they also take place in time. In ordinary life it is legitimate to ask, At what time did you see me pass? and to answer at 2.30, and to add, I took longer to recognise you than Smith did. We are all of us constantly treating knowings as events, and it is thus that the psychologist treats them. He is not concerned with the internal implications of knowledge in general, but with acts of knowing and their position in the series of acts and feelings that constitutes the history of the mental behaviour of individuals. He takes, as was said above, the "common-sense" spectator's attitude. Acts of knowing for him stand in temporal and conditional relations to one another, and to other psychical events, and to events that are not in the same sense psychical.<sup>1</sup> He takes the temporal order for granted, no doubt; so do we all in the common-sense world with which alone he is concerned.

III. It is objected that the instrument by which the psychologist investigates knowing is itself knowing. In principle this objection is the same as its predecessors, and the reply is the same. Psychology is not an attempt to explain or to evaluate knowledge, but is only concerned with knowings as acts of individuals in time. That the very act of reflecting on one's other acts of knowing is not at the moment of its occurrence in any sense the object of one's reflexion is of course true, and not at all to the point.

IV. We have already anticipated to some extent the answer to the contention that psychology, if it be at all possible, cannot be an empirical or natural science, and have indeed contended that just because it has this character it escapes the foregoing objections. At the same time I should not agree with those psychologists who, fearing the bondage of their study to particular metaphysical theories, speak as if it became non-metaphysical by merely starting from the common-sense view of things, for the common-sense view of things is extremely metaphysical, though it may not be very good metaphysics. The point is rather that psychology becomes non-metaphysical by recognising that the common-sense

<sup>1</sup> "Not in the same sense," because it may well be that whatever is real is in some sense psychical; but that is a metaphysical problem alien to the purpose of this paper.



assumptions from which it starts constitute a limited and partial position and are open to criticism by a more ultimate discipline. It is empirical because it deals with observed events, and non-metaphysical because it recognises that starting thus it cannot claim the last word about knowledge and the rest.

But Mr. Prichard argues that psychology cannot be a science (1) because it cannot have a subject-matter similar to that of any other science, and (2) because science involves explanation, and psychological explanation is impossible. With regard to the former of these points, as I have said already, he confuses the issue by confining himself to an attack on particular statements of two authors. It is not my purpose to attempt their defence, for it is really conducive to clearness to keep the issue as broad and free of detail as possible. The broad answer, it seems to me, is once more just this that mental behaviour does take place in time and can be observed,<sup>1</sup> and its development can be traced. We all of us constantly observe and argue about our own mental behaviour and that of others in ordinary life, and about the conditions under which it has this or that character; and it is difficult to see why the attempt to systematise our observations and arguments should be condemned as from the beginning unreasonable. However partial the truth it may reach—that is not for it to decide—psychology has in mental behaviour a peculiar subject-matter, no less than any other science.

Moreover, to pass on to the second point, this subject-matter admits of scientific treatment. Of course, if you limit your conception of science in an arbitrary way, you can deny this, but your denial is valuable only if you can justify the limitation you impose. Mr. Prichard appears to hold that if psychology is to be rightly called a science, it must aim at explanation of mental behaviour in the particular sense that it must derive the later stages of mental life from the earlier, and he objects that "the various terms of mental process" (by which I take him to mean what I should call modes of mental behaviour) are "ultimate" and "*sui generis*" and "incapable of being derived from or stated in terms of anything else". The argument is: "Empirical science = explanation = derivation of a later from an earlier stage of a process = showing that the later stage is not unique but only

<sup>1</sup> I do not mean to exclude inference from observation. All concrete observation includes some element of inference, at any rate in adult human beings, and of course observation of the mental behaviour of others is essentially inferential.

a complex or combination of more rudimentary processes. But every mental process is unique, and therefore not to be derived, and therefore not to be explained, and therefore incapable of scientific treatment." We need not be led away into a discussion of the exact meaning of explanation, or of the truth of the successive identifications which Mr. Prichard somewhat dogmatically asserts. The important question is what psychology does, not whether we should call what it does explanation.<sup>1</sup> It has been held that co-ordinated and systematic descriptive generalisations have a place in science, which does not seem to be always explanatory, and certainly not always explanatory in Mr. Prichard's sense; but the genuine problems that his argument raises are, whether every mental process is "*sui generis*" and "ultimate," and whether, if this is so, the very fact precludes both analytic and genetic treatment of mental behaviour. As to the former of these questions there is, I think, a lack of explicitness in the work of many excellent psychologists. The associationists' attempt to describe some processes (or, as they preferred to say, states) as simply congeries of other more elementary processes or states is now pretty generally discredited, and it is recognised that mental growth is not a coming together of mental atoms; but one is often left in doubt what conception is substituted, or whether any has been substituted at all. In what follows, therefore, though I could cite good authorities in my support, I shall not venture with Mr. Prichard to speak of a "current view". It seems to me not only that every kind of mental process, but that every moment in the history of every mind, is unique and ultimate; indeed one might, perhaps, go further than this and say that in a sense every mental process and every mental moment is simple. For as a direct experience it is a unity which cannot be re-constituted after analysis, although the least reflexion on it involves some amount of analysis of it. No doubt, reflexion is thus analytic of it partly in virtue of complexities which it presents to reflexion; but it is as characteristic of direct experience to be a unity before reflexion as to afford a grip to analysis when reflexion comes. Neither the uniqueness nor the simplicity of direct experience forbids analytic and genetic treatment of it. Analysis, which is necessarily the first step in psychology, depends upon this fact that what as direct experience is simple may yet to reflexion appear more

<sup>1</sup> I do not, of course, mean to deny that questions whether psychology can really "explain" or whether that power is reserved for a future cerebral physiology, and the like, are important in their place; but they are apart from my present purpose.

or less complex. I am annoyed by hearing a man crying milk in the street and am inclined to go out and address him profanely. Here is an experience simple in itself but extremely complex as soon as I begin to reflect on it and put it into words. One need not be a psychologist to perform so much analysis of it as is involved in thus stating it; every one performs psychological analysis to this extent, and the basis of the analysis is obviously resemblance. I can hear other noises than that of "milk-oo!" be annoyed in other ways, and so on; analysis rests on comparison of similar features in different experiences. And the case is not altered when we pass to the more precise and systematic analysis of psychology. The differences between psychological and physical analysis have been emphasised a thousand times and it is not necessary that the more "elementary" processes reached by analysis should be able to occur separately: still less is it necessary that they should be more primitive in order of development. If they do occur separately, then as thus occurring they are not the same as in the complex, though there is a resemblance; or in other words, when you have analysed a complex mental process, you have not got a number of separate parts which you can reconstruct into the whole. Thus perception of things is commonly held to involve sensation,—or for sake of peace let us say that perceiving is held to involve sensing, though not sensing alone,—and sensing, since it cannot be again analysed in a similar way (if that view is taken), is said to be an elementary process; but it is not implied that sensing is possible apart from perceiving, nor that it is prior to perceiving, and if those views are held, they have to be supported on other grounds than analysis. Still less is it implied that perception is a congeries of sensations or of these and other processes. Or take a case from the emotions. Every one speaks of some emotions as more complex than others; yet as immediate experiences they are all simple. "Reproach," says Dr. McDougall, "seems to be a fusion of anger and tender emotion,"<sup>1</sup> and, whether one agrees with his analysis or not, reproach seems to reflexion to be complex. Yet as directly experienced it is "*sui generis*" and, I should say, simple. In any case it is not merely anger *plus* tender emotion—this is expressed in the word 'fusion,'—but it is a condition distinct from both and yet resembling both. Anger as it occurs in reproach is not the same as anger unfused with tender emotion, and tender emotion fused with anger is not the

<sup>1</sup> *Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 139.

same as tender emotion by itself, and reproach is not the two added together; and yet if we accept this particular analysis, we can recognise that reproach does involve both anger and tender emotion, and if we reject this analysis, it is because we think another preferable, or at any rate because we think this in some way inadequate, and not because we think analysis impossible. In this case it happens that anger and tender emotion can exist otherwise than in reproach, and it also happens that, according to Dr. McDougall, they are more primitive than reproach; but these points are accidental to, and not consequences of, the analysis. That we can thus reflectively recognise complexity in acts and feelings which as immediately experienced are simple, is a fact about them which has to be accepted, and there follow, of course, the two consequences that when we have broken up the immediate experience we have thereby passed from immediate experience to the use of conceptual 'counters' or 'symbols,' and that an enumeration of these 'counters' is not a reconstitution of the immediate experience but a substitute for it. An enumeration of all the processes involved in recognition and of their relations does not give us the original act of recognising; we have actually to recognise in order to get that: but it would give us a construction which for descriptive purposes we could substitute for the original act. Such a construction would, as against all less complete attempts, be and be recognised as adequate; it alone would be the correct description. Now the attempt to obtain such correct descriptions of the different kinds of mental behaviour seems to be both empirical and scientific.

It was convenient for simplicity's sake to speak as if in psychological method analysis always came first, for it seems to me that analysis is the most difficult part of psychology to justify, and that if it is justified, there is little room for further dispute. As a matter of fact too, analysis does come first, though it is afterwards reacted upon by the results of other lines of inquiry. Next it seems natural to consider the attempt to ascertain the conditions of the various mental functions. We may ask not only what processes are analytically involved in perceiving or recognising or in the emotion of reproach, but also under what conditions we perceive or recognise or feel reproachful. And again we may distinguish various kinds of perceiving and various degrees of recognition, and inquire about the conditions of each. These conditions need not all be in the ordinary sense mental, and whether mental or not they do not "explain" the function examined in the sense that it can be deduced from them.

When we push matters far enough, we come in the end to the fact that the soul (or mind, or consciousness, or whatever you like to call it) does behave in this or that way. But all the same the attempt to ascertain the laws of the conditions of different modes of mental behaviour, and to work from less to more general principles, appears to be a procedure rightly called scientific. Whether it should be called explanation or not is a question for logic that need not trouble psychology.

There remains the genetic problem, the attempt to trace the development of mental function in the individual, in the human species, and finally in all observed animate life. This is the aim which Mr. Prichard singles out as above all others "impossible". He ought strictly to have called it "meaningless," for what is in his mind is not that the conditions do not happen to allow of an answer, as most psychologists would agree is the case with regard to a great part of animal and child and savage life and perhaps with regard to some parts of adult human life, but that the problem itself is wrongly stated and is in effect not a problem at all. But plainly enough the problem is no problem only when it is mis-stated. Put the question very simply and ask: Is any development of mental behaviour observable as from beasts to man, from savage to civilised people, and in a single individual from child to adult? If so, and that it is so will not be denied, the attempt may surely be made to trace this development, both with regard to mental behaviour as a whole and with regard to selected features of it, and to discover where and under what conditions alteration, whether advance or degeneration, has taken place. But Mr. Prichard imagines that the problem is to show that the later processes are only the earlier in a more complex form, meaning by this that the later are to be reduced to the earlier. "In particular in the case of knowledge," he writes, "psychology seeks to show how it is that a life which begins with sensation and feeling comes to acquire the articulated knowledge of the world which we now possess." If we leave aside the assumption about sensation and feeling which is illicitly introduced, this sentence does express very fairly one side of the problem of genetic psychology, so long as the word "how" is taken to mean "under what conditions". Why then does it appear to Mr. Prichard to state a damnable heresy? His approving reference to faculty psychology, which he looks upon as particularly "philosophical," seems to provide the answer. He cannot, one imagines, mean to deny that in the temporal order a development does take place, but he wishes to insist

that the most important condition of the character of this development is the nature of the soul itself. If this is so, he has no doubt signalised the strong point in faculty psychology. As Pfänder well says, we may avoid the word faculty as meticulously as we can; "Jede individuelle psychische Wirklichkeit enthält ja doch tatsächlich die dauernden realen Bedingungen für bestimmte Arten psychischen Geschehens; oder, anders ausgedrückt, sie ist dauernd so beschaffen, dass unter bestimmten hinzutretenden Umständen immer bestimmte Arten psychischen Geschehens in ihr stattfinden".<sup>1</sup> Mr. Prichard's error is to suppose that this is generally denied. He is misled, perhaps, by the polemics against faculty psychology, which are really directed at the appeal to faculties as a veil for laziness, and by the fact that, since we can but say once for all that it is the nature of the soul to behave in certain ways, writers on psychology devote most of their space to the "hinzutretende Umstände". And after all, these remaining conditions are just as necessary as the nature of the soul. Take the perception of space, for instance, as Mr. Prichard does. It is no doubt ultimate, *sui generis*, an expression of the nature of the soul, not to be resolved into anything else. But it is also the outcome of a process of development which involves other conditions besides the soul's nature in general, and it is not a meaningless or impossible aim to trace the development and to determine these other conditions. And so throughout, the attempt is not to resolve the later into the earlier, but to ascertain the conditions necessary to actualisation of the later. Once more, it is a matter of indifference whether the procedure is called explanatory or not; but it does not seem to be unscientific.

The conclusion of the whole matter seems, therefore, to be that the philosophical objections to psychology are based upon a mistaken notion of what psychology attempts to do. The foregoing paragraphs, so far as they deal with Mr. Prichard's paper, have, I trust, done no injustice to his arguments. It is possible that, had one the advantage of an exposition by him of his metaphysical position, some points would have appeared in another light; but so long as that unfortunately is not the case, one can but deal with his arguments as they stand.<sup>2</sup> And indeed, although the state of

<sup>1</sup> *Einleitung in die Psychologie*, pp. 176-177.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Prichard's work on *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* has come into my hands almost simultaneously with the proofs of this article. Had it appeared earlier, I should have expressed myself somewhat differently in one or two places; but I have left the text unaltered because neither knowledge of, nor agreement with, Mr. Prichard's metaphysical views

psychological fundamentals at the present time is seriously unsatisfactory, one may doubt whether it will rest with metaphysics to effect an improvement; for as there is no study so alluring as psychology, except metaphysics, so there is no line of thought so misleading as psychological metaphysics, except a metaphysical psychology.

## II.

At the beginning of this article I pointed out that Mr. Prichard in effect devotes the greater part of his space, not to a general attack upon psychology, but to objections against a terminology which he finds in the works of Dr. Ward and Dr. Stout; and though he seems in several ways to misinterpret those authors, it cannot be denied that something more or less like the hypotheses and conceptions which he discusses may be found in the writings of most psychologists, though not without very important variations. It is admitted on all hands that the doctrine of representative perception and of what one may call representative cognition in general is false, and yet in psychology we are constantly using terms which seem to imply that between the mind and its object there intervenes some third thing which represents the object and which is indeed itself the immediate object of the mind. In what follows I do not propose to go into the details of Mr. Prichard's arguments, but merely to put forward some considerations suggested by his remarks.

Such limited justification as is possessed by the representative hypothesis is derived, I suppose, from the region of imagination in both its reproductive and its constructive forms. The radical error of the hypothesis lies in connecting with cognition the notion of "states of consciousness". A feeling may fairly be called a state of the self or subject or of consciousness, but cognition—I reserve the difficult case of sensation till the end of this article—involves a subject's act and a subject's object, and even if, as in imagination, the object is in a special way a mental product private to the particular imaginer, it is not properly described as a state of consciousness, and still less so the act of cognising it. The peculiar position of imagination is best seen in its purely reproductive form, as *e.g.*, in visualisation of a thing once perceived but not perceived at the moment. If in this sense I image to myself Table Mountain, the image is the object

would seem to invalidate the contention that the position and problems of psychology are genuine and that the objections to them depend for plausibility on misunderstanding their actual character.



of my act. No doubt I do more than image it, since imagination is normally accompanied by conception and judgment. Even when an image comes uncalled for into my mind and I cannot remember of what it is the image, I do nevertheless refer it vaguely to 'something,' and evidently my visual image of Table Mountain will be accompanied by a reference to Table Mountain itself. Still there does seem at first sight to be intervention of a third thing here in a way in which there is not in perception and conception. No doubt this is due to defective analysis. In perceiving my table, in conceiving any universal, I am dealing directly with the objective world; the object of my cognising act is some part or aspect of the real order of things, and as a plain man I take it to be so. Even in memory the same is true; my object belongs to the real order of things, even though not to that part of it which exists at this moment. But my object in visualising is my own image, which has to be referred to that of which it is the image; what I *quâ* visualising cognise is the image. So far what one may term the hypothesis of ideas is justified, but there is no intervention of a third thing. Nothing intervenes between me and the "real thing," because it is not *quâ* visualising that I cognise the real thing, but by an act of conceiving or judging I refer the image to the real thing as an image of it. An image, then, may be called subjective in one sense of the word, as being an object essentially private to a single subject; but it is a subjective object, and therefore not subjective in the same sense either as an act or as a state (*i.e.* a feeling) of the subject. Again, in the case of constructive imagination, the same limited justification of the hypothesis of ideas holds good, but there imagining and conceiving are as a rule so closely interwoven that the process is less easy to dissect.

Before passing on to consider the uses of the ordinary terminology, it may be worth while to consider very briefly certain other cases besides imagination in which the representative theory might seem to find some support, though by this time the ground has been trodden almost bare. Confusion arises in these cases, if it does still arise, either from unwillingness to accept a genuine distinction, or from undue readiness to accept an ambiguous one, or from both causes combined. The genuine distinction is that which Mr. Hoernlé noted in *MIND*, N.S., 61, page 87, between real and unreal objects. (I hasten to add, with Mr. Hoernlé, that I am not talking metaphysics.) My table, when I perceive it, is in this sense a real object of mine, and so is virtue when I think about it, whilst a fictitious object is unreal. But not

all objects fall into this division, for an image, as the object of an act of imagining, is neither real nor unreal, though as an object of psychological reflexion it is of course real. The obscure distinction, on the other hand, is between real and merely mental objects. My table, no doubt, as perceived will again be real, an image will certainly be mental, and there is an ineradicable tendency to class all conceived objects as mental, whether fictitious or not. But it seems difficult to find any ground for this division. In one sense all objects of mind as being objects of mind may be called mental. But how are some more mental than others? Some objects, it may be said, are private, others not. Certainly an image is private in a way in which a perceived object is not, but virtue is not a private object, and a fiction need not be. The notion at the bottom of this distinction can only be that presence to perception makes an object real and not merely mental, and what is not real in this sense tends to be considered as only a "state of consciousness". But this division is mistaken in principle, and if we can distinguish real from merely mental objects, it must be according as they are common or essentially private. This being so, there is no special difficulty in dealing with any instances that might seem to support the hypothesis of ideas. Take first the cognitive aspect of wishing what we do not expect to be realised, and thinking of what is fictitious, in both cases leaving out of sight any part that may be played by imagination in its narrow sense. We are here dealing with unreal objects, though to a greater or less extent we determine them by conceptions of the real world. But these unreal objects do not help the representative theory; for, whilst we may say that they are ideal, we cannot say that we know them by means of ideas. Or again, take illusion. In illusion I perceive a real object, only I perceive it "wrongly"; that is, the object of my present perceiving act fails in certain respects to correspond to the object that I normally perceive under the same external conditions, or to the object as others tell me they perceive it under the same external conditions, or to the object as I apprehend it in other kinds of perceptual experience in which I have reason to put greater trust. (It is necessary to say "in other kinds of *perceptual* experience," because the contrast of illusion and correct perception does not go as far as that of apparent and real even in respect of the world of possible perception. Thus you may account only primary qualities real; but it would be forced to call perception of secondary qualities illusion.) What illusion

brings out is not that there is a third thing between the subject and his object, but that the character of his object, as an object of actual perception, is partly determined not only by the character of the objective thing and by the general nature of the soul, but by mental bias, accidents of physiological structure, and other psychological conditions. The same holds good of all error. I need only quote a couple of sentences from Dr. Stout's incomparable article in *Personal Idealism*. "All error," he says, "consists in taking for real what is mere appearance. . . . But there is always mere appearance when and so far as the nature of a presented object is determined merely by the psychological conditions of its presentation. . . . It should be clearly understood that mere appearance is a qualification of the object apprehended and not of the mind which apprehends it" (pp. 15-17).

The representative theory, then, is doubtless to be rejected. At the same time it may fairly be maintained that Mr. Prichard greatly over-estimates the deleterious effect of its language upon psychology. One must admit that it has in the past led to serious misconceptions, such as the attempts to construct a mechanics of ideas, and to some troublesome absurdities, as, for instance, the notion that ideas when not consciously cognised retreat into a Hades of the unconscious, where they continue to exist and occasionally to gibber. But Mr. Prichard's contention that the psychology of cognition is vitiated by the "non-existence of the counters or units in terms of which it speaks" has force only if the psychologist is thus misled. A conception which is admittedly open to criticism may yet be convenient as a means of advance in many kinds of inquiry, and I should have thought that nowadays the majority of psychologists are quite well aware of the nature of their procedure when they speak in terms of the representative theory. It is obvious, for example, that "association of ideas" is really association of modes of mental behaviour or tendencies thereto; if on seeing Smith's dog I think of Smith himself, the association is between my acts of perceiving and thinking thus, and the "laws of association" are general statements of tendencies to behave in certain ways. But the terminology by way of ideas has been pretty well systematised, and it is at least open to question whether to revolutionise terminology would not do more harm than good. Moreover there are other advantages besides a systematic language in the customary way of speaking. In the first place, the psychologist is enabled to mark with sufficient plainness, if not with strict accuracy, the distinction between the object as it is in the objective order

and the object as it is an object of an actual cognition. By this form of words, to which I do not wish to commit myself, I am merely trying to indicate a distinction made by every one, but difficult to enunciate precisely because of the ambiguities of the word object. Every one believes that in perceiving this table he is dealing directly with the real objective world, but he also believes that, whilst his present object is this table in certain relations, the table really stands in many other relations which may or may not be "latently" known to him, but which are not actually cognised by him at this moment. Similarly with non-physical objects—virtue, or the character of Smith, or the comparative usefulness of a March Brown and a Red Spinner, or the toothache which you are now enjoying; they do not exhaust their nature in being objects of any actual cognition of mine or yours.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the nature of the object of an actual cognition may be determined to a greater or less extent, as the case of illusion showed, not by the character of the objective, but by subjective psychological conditions. Psychology therefore has to accept and insist on this distinction. It has not got to criticise or even to formalise it, or to develop its implications; it does not ask whether we should distinguish from the object of a particular act of cognition the reality as it is in itself, or the reality as the sum of possibilities of cognition, or the reality as common object, or whether all these phrases are unsatisfactory. But it has continually to signalise the distinction, and it does so conveniently enough by means of such terms as percept, presentation and idea.

In another way also the fiction is convenient. If it is granted that in cognising the mind has for its object in a narrower sense something objective in a wider sense, there is near at hand a danger of speaking as if the objective became such and such an actual object by its own virtue. It is in the abstract possible to conceive that all acts of cognition are homogeneous, and that differences lie wholly in the things that become actual objects, or in these and in the feelings accompanying the acts of apprehending. The psychology of cognition would then not correspond to the conception of psychology as the study of modes of mental behaviour, for on this side nothing could be said except that we do apprehend, and the only problem would be how things manage to be apprehended in this or that aspect. Even ordinary language so far avoids this error as to distinguish perceiving from conceiving, both from imagining, and so on;

<sup>1</sup> Plainly this is equally true of what we have called unreal objects.

but once we are past these striking differences, further distinctions are for the most part named from the objects, and it is here that the danger comes in of forgetting that a difference of object means a difference of act. Within perception, for instance, there are such differences as are indicated when we speak of perception of sensory qualities, perception of space, perception of time, and so on, and these differences are named from the objects.<sup>1</sup> Now the main psychological problems about cognition are, as we have seen, (1) What processes can analysis detect as involved in perceiving, conceiving, etc.; and within perception in perceiving this or that kind of object or these or those aspects of objects; and within conception and the rest similarly? (2) Under what conditions do these kinds of cognising acts occur and how are they connected; and within each kind what are the conditions of its different forms? (3) What is the history of the development of these kinds of acts and their different forms? And in a sort of a way, one cannot but feel, the language of ideas does mark the fact that such are the psychological problems, for by placing ideas as the immediate object of the mind and insisting that these ideas are mental and largely determined by particular assignable mental conditions, it makes the problem mental. No doubt it does so in a wrong-headed way, but it serves as a safeguard against a worse error. The worst position is to suppose that we have for our problem nothing but differences in the modes of behaviour of objects, or in other words different appearances. The right position, it seems to me, is that we have our psychological problem in differences in the modes of mental behaviour: only thus, for example, can we appreciate the influence of "subjective selection". The hypothesis of ideas leads to the right position because it regards objects as mental states, and so it is not useless, though inaccurate.

I pass on now to certain problems connected with sensation, which of all difficult notions in psychology is certainly the most obscure, the cause of its obscurity being that the term is used to group together a number of kinds of "experiences"—I use this as a convenient general term,—not because of their likeness to each other as "experiences," but because of the likeness of their conditions. In Baldwin's *Dictionary* sensation is defined as "that mode of consciousness which

<sup>1</sup> I take perception merely as a striking instance. Some hold that the term is no longer very satisfactory or useful; and if that view is taken, because the differences between the kinds of perception are so marked that a single term including them all is misleading, this only emphasises the point of the present argument.

can only be accounted for by the present operation of an external stimulus upon the nervous system, or some equivalent condition," and, as its authors note, "this definition is not strictly psychological". Now let it be a good definition or not, it is so far right that it makes the test of sensation relationship to certain physiological conditions, and no doubt this test provides a useful and important means of grouping certain data; but we have no right to assume that there is an internal resemblance between all things that answer to this external test.

So long as we keep to sensory qualities actually perceived, we are not confronted by any special difficulties. I see a mass of scarlet lychnis. Scarlet is evidently a quality of the flower-heads as actually perceived by me; it is one aspect of the object of my perceiving act. Reflecting on the conditions under which one sees objects scarlet, the psychologist with the physiologist points out that certain definite physiological processes are constantly and necessarily required if scarlet is to be seen, and so he calls scarlet a *sensory* quality, and the apprehending of it sense or perhaps 'sensing' or sensation. The sensory quality is thus an abstraction from the object of the perceiving act, and sense, sensing or sensation an abstraction from the act itself. So far the road seems plain enough; yet there are possible false turnings, and down one of them the psychologist is rather likely to turn his steps. I may notice for instance that though the mass of lychnis looks scarlet in a good light, it no longer looks scarlet when the light is very dim, and I may then be misled to inquire, Is the lychnis really scarlet? And I may answer, Impossible, since it does not always appear scarlet. And from this I may argue that since scarlet is not really a quality of the lychnis, and yet enters into my experience, it must be a state of my consciousness. And then I may talk of 'having' a sensation of scarlet, as if I could have the sensation in some other sense besides seeing scarlet. The fact plainly is that scarlet is a quality of my actually perceived object; it is not a quality of my act, of my mind, of me at all. I am no more scarlet from seeing the lychnis than round from seeing a cricket-ball. Sensations such as this scarlet must mean either aspects of my perceiving acts or aspects of the objects of these acts, *i.e.*, they must be either sensings or sensory qualities; when they are given any third meaning it is a sign that the psychologist has deviated outside psychology. Lychnis seen in a bright light is really seen as scarlet and in a dim light is really seen with a duller hue, and the psychologist has to inquire into the conditions under which a real objec-

tive thing is now perceived as a scarlet object and now as otherwise coloured. But it is not his business to ask whether lychnis as a real objective thing apart from being an object of perception is scarlet or another colour or no colour at all; he is concerned with it only as an object of perception and only from his interest in the act by which it is perceived as an object. With the distinction of primary and secondary qualities and suchlike problems he has no concern.

So far then sensations are either sensings and therefore subjective acts, or abstractions from such acts; or they are sensory qualities, and therefore objective in the narrow sense that they are aspects of perceived objects. Whether these sensory qualities can be attributed to objects apart from their being perceived, psychology says not and cares not. But sensations are not (so far) in any sense subjective states or states of consciousness. But now we come to a group of experiences also commonly called sensations which are neither abstractions from acts of perceiving nor qualities of perceived objects, but which have a right to be called states of the self or subject (or states of consciousness, if that term is preferred). I am not thinking of more or less discriminated organic sensations localised more or less definitely in some part of the body. If I cognise a bodily pain—a rheumatic twinge in my arm, say, or a sore throat—it is not a state of myself or of me as subject in the sense intended, but a state of my object—my arm or throat—though in another sense, in so far as I apprehend my arm or throat as mine, I apprehend their states as states of my self. It would, perhaps, be going too far to say that discriminated organic sensations are altogether on a par with the scarlet of the lychnis and with what we may call cognitive<sup>1</sup> sensations in general; but since it might be argued, for instance, that the difference is due to their setting, their relations to really subjective states, and the like, and it is not very germane to my present purpose to examine such contentions, I will class them with other cognitive sensations, to which they do belong in so far as they are the object of cognitive acts and these acts, if any one objects to calling them acts of perceiving, are at least on the same level as acts of perceiving. The case is not essentially altered when the organic sensations are not separately discriminated and not definitely localised, but are, separately or as a complex, apprehended vaguely as a state of some large region of the body or of the whole body,—as, for instance, with the shivering and general bodily malaise that mark the

<sup>1</sup> The word 'cognitive' would better express my meaning, if it were admissible.



onset of fever.<sup>1</sup> For they are still parts of an object of perception or some act akin to perception. But it is admitted by most writers that there are states of feeling which are not attributed to the body as its states, but are states of the self as subject, though they may be *made* into objects of reflexion; and it is commonly held that sensations enter into and at least help to constitute all concrete feelings. Here then we have sensations which not only are not separately discriminated but do not bear any direct relation to cognition. Now if the term sensation is used solely with reference to their physiological conditions, the presence of sensations in most or, I should agree, all concrete feelings cannot be denied. That is to say, if in mental malaise or vigour, mental depression, emotions and moods generally, you abolish the conditions of the "bodily resonance," as it used to be called,<sup>2</sup> you abolish or at any rate greatly alter the affective state itself. But it does not follow that we ought to group these affective sensations with cognitive sensations as "experiences". There is not the required similarity between the two groups, and it is no reply to say that *if* you turn your attention to this or that part of the body you will notice cognitive sensations there. No doubt, as soon as you try to attend to an affective state, you find more or less localised cognitive sensations; but in finding them you so far destroy the affective state. Granted that similar processes were occurring in certain afferent tracts and so on when you were not attending; you may justly say that such and such organic sensations were involved in the affective state, but they were not the cognitive sensations that you perceive now you attend.

We have now before us (1) cognitive sensations, *i.e.*, sensory qualities, and (2) affective sensations, or feelings so far as

<sup>1</sup> The localisation of organic sensations is certainly at times very vague indeed when they are evanescent, but in my own case at any rate this is largely dependent on defective visualisation. As to the alleged localisation of certain pleasures and unpleasures, there is little use in contradicting trained observers (see Titchener, *The Psychology of Feeling and Attention*, p. 45). I will only say that in my own case again I am unable, after much searching, to find instances in my own experience of such localisation. I can find experiences which might be rashly described in this way, but they always divide on further observation into localised sensations and an unlocalised residuum.

<sup>2</sup> It is indifferent to this argument whether the organic sensations are involved in the feeling from the first or gradually reinforce it. Titchener (*op. cit.*, p. 38) argues, if I understand him aright, that concrete feelings are not to be distinguished from sensations by their subjectivity because they comprise organic sensations. This seems to me an exact reversal of the truth. Feelings are subjective, and the sensations they comprise are grouped with objective sensations, not because they seem like them, but because they have the same physiological conditions.

dependent on certain determinate physiological conditions. These groups ought not, as far as introspection goes, to be classed together, but neither of them presents any difficulties in the way of criticism of the hypothesis of ideas; for sensations of the former class are objective, and those of the latter, though subjective, have no direct concern with cognition. But there remains a third kind of sensations which, as is frequently said, are not themselves the object of cognition, but are means to the cognitive determination of the object. Size, shape, distance, extent of movements and so on, it is said, are cognised by help of sensations many of which do not become part of the object of the cognition. Are they then objective or subjective? If subjective, are they not so as states of the subject, and yet are concerned with cognition? Whatever be the right view of them, and it is difficult to get a satisfactory view, two points seem fairly clear. In the first place, they do not stand between the object and the subject in the same way in which on the representative theory percepts and ideas were supposed to stand between the mind and its perceived or conceived objects, for they are not like the objects. And, secondly, they do not require us to modify our conclusion about the objectivity of cognitive sensations. For cognitive sensations are admittedly in the object as sensory qualities (even if it be maintained that they are states of consciousness as well), but these other sensations, which may perhaps be called notificant, are not in the object at all. Once again we have a common name applied, not from immediate resemblance, but on the strength of similar physiological conditions, and we have no right to argue through the common name to anything but these conditions and their consequences, etc. No doubt by an effort of attention we can discriminate many (though not all) of these notificant sensations, but we do not discriminate them in the object which they enable us to cognise. We do not by discriminating them cognise the object more accurately; on the contrary, we turn away from it and make them our object. Thus they do not necessitate a review of our previous conclusions. But it still remains to ask what their position is when attention is not turned to them. The facts about the part they play seem to be these. In order that we may now appreciate size, shape and the rest, (1) we must previously have had, at any rate in most cases, cognitive experience of these sensations—that is, they must have been cognitive sensations and objective, just as they are now when we attend to them, and this past experience must be effective; and (2) the physiological condi-

tions of these sensations must now be realised. But have we any right to say that (3) the sensations must now be present as psychical experiences? It might be argued either that they are present as dimly cognised, and therefore still objective, though this position can be supported, I think, only in a certain number of cases; or that they are present as feelings, when they could hardly be effective; or that the physiological conditions suffice and the sensations are not present at all, a view which seems to me in many cases to be true; or that they are unconscious, a doctrine which must certainly mean a great deal if it means anything at all. If we leave aside this last hypothesis as a mere mystification, the result is that these sensations like all others must be either subjective as feelings (though this is here improbable) or objective as perceived, or psychically non-existent. If they are objective, they are, though not the central object of attention, yet not altogether outside the range of cognitive apprehension at the moment, so that, whilst relatively to the central object of attention they are merely notificant, they are at the same time to be grouped with cognitive sensations. But in a great many cases, it seems to me, they are probably non-existent psychically, or (if they are present in some feeling as affective sensations) it is not as psychical but as physiological processes that they perform their notificant function. The same general argument applies also to those obscure or altogether unnoticed sensations which are supposed to guide movements.<sup>1</sup>

*Note.*—This paper is already so long that I can append only a few brief remarks on Mr. Joachim's valuable article, not hoping within such limits to do it adequate justice, but desiring to indicate roughly the relation of what has been said above to his criticisms of the notion of psychical process. The description of psychology as studying mental behaviour, which is a variant (adopted for reasons which need not be here discussed) from Dr. McDougall's definition of it as "the positive science of the conduct of living creatures,"

<sup>1</sup> It is, of course, possible to group together sensations by resemblance as experiences. In that case, as Dr. Boris Sidis has shown in two notable articles (*Psychological Review*, Jan. and March, 1908), we must class as sensations the elements in percepts which are generally said to be "re-produced" or "reinstated" by way of complication, and we must also class hallucinations with percepts as sensory objects and not images. There is much to be said in favour of taking this line, but if we do take it we must, it seems to me, throw affective and merely notificant sensations overboard and deny that they are sensations at all. We must keep to a single principle of classification: the attempt to combine two is bound to end in confusion.

is assailable by many obvious criticisms (though, as far as I can see at present, such criticisms would only impose limits, to be readily accepted, on the use of the conception, and would not impair its utility in the region for which it is intended); but it does not appear to be exposed to the particular objections so ingeniously developed by Mr. Joachim. And since most psychologists, whatever their language and however violent their disputes about fundamental notions, seem in the end to mean not altogether different things from one another, I doubt whether many have really held the view of psychical process which he condemns.<sup>1</sup> Their view is surely not as a rule so different as he assumes it to be from the view of such novelists as he mentions. It is not so much in the kind of their data as in the use that they want to make of their data that the psychologist and the novelist differ. For one thing, the novelist, wishing to give a relatively concrete sketch of a certain kind of character, has no need to simplify to the same extent as the psychologist, and the whole aim of analysis (with its concomitant synthesis) is simplification, as a step to the main problem of determining the conditions of occurrence or growth of mental behaviors. But the psychologist no more than the novelist supposes that he can catch a cognising act without a cognised object, —an act of seeing, for instance, without a seen object. On the other hand, it is equally impossible for him to catch a seen object without the act of seeing, and Mr. Joachim's phraseology at times seems to neglect this reverse side of the matter. The psychological interest, of course, lies not in seeing by itself or in a seen object by itself, but in the conditions of seeing objects.

Secondly, I cannot think that the difficulty extends as far as Mr. Joachim supposes. Surely it is in the main confined to cognition. For (i.) it does not apply to affective states as such at all. An emotion, of course, is complex and involves more than affective states; but, keeping to its affective side, does any one try to distinguish "the pain of parting from the psychical process of experiencing the pain"? And (ii.) as to conation, though I have purposely avoided the subject in this paper and do not wish to be drawn into it here, yet this much seems plain, that conation involves certain typical sequences of cognitions and affective states and that its course itself is felt, so that it always has an affective side which is free from the danger in question.

<sup>1</sup> The school which is best represented by Lipps comes, perhaps, nearest to this position; and it gives point to Mr. Joachim's criticisms that this school, by separating off activity from its conscious results, is driven to regard the former as unconscious.

#### IV.—REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT — THE HIGH-WATER MARK IN THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

BY R. A. C. MACMILLAN.

ALTHOUGH the *Critique of Judgment* has its place, historically, as an after-thought in Kant's system, the thoughts it contains were present to his mind from an early date. As far back as 1764, there is the short essay entitled *Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen*, in which he gives token of an artistic turn of mind with which he is seldom credited. Here Kant suggests that even scientific pursuits have an æsthetical character, so that knowledge may become the subject-matter of Feeling and subordinate to it; thus he speaks of the charm of which a Kepler was capable, who would not have sold one of his discoveries for a kingdom.<sup>1</sup> In an article in the *Kantstudien*,<sup>2</sup> there is an elaborated argument to show that as Kant's Æsthetical Philosophy is open to the charge of intellectualism, his Intellectual Philosophy is no more free from the influence of æsthetical ideas, as when he follows his prejudice in favour of logical Symmetry at the expense of Truth. One might say that his elaborate trichotomy is the result of the free play of his Imagination with his Understanding. It may not be readily believed that Kant wrote Poetry, but he actually did write five stanzas at least, each of which is devoted to the memory of one of five Colleagues in Königsberg University.<sup>3</sup> And the fact that Herder turned one of his lectures into verse, surely counts for something in favour of Kant's poetic turn of mind.

Facts like these, though slight, are sufficient proof that this third faculty of the human mind was within the sweep of Kant's reflexions before the *Critique of Pure Reason* was definitely planned. The *Critique of Judgment*, then, does not answer a newly-born demand so much as the renewed consciousness on Kant's part of what he had felt already. It is true that in the letter to Herz of 1772, he has already lost

<sup>1</sup> *Briefwechsel*, p. 4 (Kirchmann).

<sup>2</sup> Band 2, Anna Cutler.

<sup>3</sup> *Briefwechsel*, p. 299.

sight of the independence of Feeling, for he brings it in common with Morality under the heading, Practical.<sup>1</sup> But in this letter he is concerned with the central problem of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, how an idea can refer to an object; and, speaking roughly, one may say that from this time on till 1787, there are only two divisions of Mind for Kant, the Theoretical and the Practical. In his anxiety to subordinate Sensuous Feeling to Moral Law, moreover, he does not wait to distinguish the finer and higher emotions from those which are lower. But after the *Critique of Pure Reason* was lifted off his mind, we find the distinction again forcing itself upon him in the *Metaphysic of Ethics*, when he distinguishes "practical pleasure" from "passive satisfaction"; this latter is "not a pleasure in the existence of the object of the idea, but clings to the idea only," and this feeling of Pleasure "we call Taste".<sup>2</sup> Moreover he goes on to say that such a thing as Taste can only be treated "episodically" in a Practical Philosophy, "not as a notion properly belonging to that philosophy," thus removing Æsthetic Feeling out of the region of the Practical aspect of Mind. It was finally in 1787, in his letter to Reinhold, that Kant made up his mind about the independence of Feeling. There he recognises three parts of Philosophy, Knowledge, Feeling of Pleasure and Pain, Desire: and seeks to find *a priori* principles for the second as for the other two, though he formerly held this to be impossible; he hopes to be ready with this by Easter under the title, Critique of Taste. Here we have the *Critique of Judgment* coming to the birth; it was published three years later in 1790.

But though he now recognises three parts of Philosophy, this does not mean three sets of doctrine: there are three Critiques, but only two of them are doctrines. He insists on this in the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*.<sup>3</sup> But while he was formerly inclined to give a subordinate place to Feeling, he now excludes it from the dignity of a doctrine in order to raise it to a higher plane. By the time Kant had settled the problems of Science and Morality, he began to tire of Definitive Judgment, Determination, and felt the need of a judgment which could go as deep as the Moral judgment and have all its immediacy, but be as disinterested as Science without being Science. Meanwhile, Æsthetics were clamouring for a separate treatment and the unfinished woof of Teleology trailed across the warp of his system. Out of these coincidences across the Reflective Judgment, which

<sup>1</sup> *Briefwechsel*, p. 403.

<sup>2</sup> *Introd.*, Abbot, p. 267.

<sup>3</sup> *Bernard*, p. 16.

for Kant means a form of Experience which is not doctrine in itself but conditions whatever doctrine there is. Reflexion it is that has been guiding us all along; there is no knowledge but comes to birth with its inspiration in the anticipative feeling of unity with the object to be known; and even Morality is at best a form of reflective experience and only so far constitutive: "even Freedom . . . is for us a transcendent conception, and is therefore incapable of serving as a constitutive principle for determining an object".<sup>1</sup> We must not say, then, that Reflexion is a loose and therefore useless form of Determination, Scientific or Moral; it is Determination which is a fossilised or artificially restricted form of Reflective Experience.

It is time that this Fountain of all Experience were "critically" examined. It had already come under Kant's notice as the Hypothetical Function of Reason, and Kant, in so many words, deliberately speaks of this Hypothetical Reason as the *Urteilkraft*, the term he uses for Reflexion in general.<sup>2</sup> It is one and the same power of Judgment which we have in the *Dialectic* and in the *Critique of Judgment*. In this logical disposition of Nature (*logische Beurteilung*), the *Urteilkraft* exhibits a relation between Nature and the Supersensible: *i.e.*, even in knowledge, the Supersensible is present. But since the function of *Urteilkraft* is here purely hypothetical and therefore negative, it does not need special justification; it does not pretend to be a Science, it does not teach us nor equip us with knowledge, it is only an *exercise* of Reason ("der Verstand einer Belehrung und Ausrüstung durch Regeln fähig, *Urteilkraft* aber ein besonderes Talent sei, welches gar nicht belehrt, sondern nur geübt sein will"<sup>3</sup>). It is the specific quality in so-called mother-wit, the want of which no school can supply, or, as he said in the *Critique of Judgment*, the *Urteilkraft* is just "Sound Understanding" (*gesunden Verstandes*).<sup>4</sup> Every one feels the Absolute, the Whole, breaking in upon one's relative knowledge; one knows there is a Whole somewhere and proceeds on this assumption. This is the hypothetical function of Reason. But the need of a Critique arises when this Reflective exercise of Reason actually assumes the form of Science, professing to determine objects of its own, *without falling into antinomy*. Regulative Reason, whenever it pretended to be constitutive of objects, landed in insoluble contradictions, and therefore its exercise never rises above a form of inspiration; the Supersensible, in the shape of the Ideas of

<sup>1</sup> *C. of Judgment*, Watson, p. 336.

<sup>3</sup> Hartenstein, *Kritik d. r. Vernunft*, iii., p. 138.

<sup>2</sup> Bernard, p. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Bernard, p. 3.



Reason, is present in us as the anticipative feeling of Totality, indivisible Unity, a feeling, however, which is dissipated, and with it the real unity, in the exercise of Knowledge. As Kant puts it, "it has no immediate reference to the feeling of Pleasure and Pain".<sup>1</sup> But in Reflexion, as it appears in the *Critique of Judgment*, there is such immediate reference, the feeling of unity is not dissipated, and something, therefore, in the form of an *object* is determined by the *Urteilkraft*. "This reference is precisely the puzzle in the principle of Judgment, which renders necessary a special section for this faculty in the *Kritik*." Hence *Urteilkraft* in general, since it is purely hypothetical and negative, needs no special justification; it is the Judgment in the form of Immediate Feeling that must be established *a priori*.

Deduction, then, of Reflexion is the proof of the validity of this primary Immediacy of Consciousness which conditions all other forms of experience and is itself the highest form of experience. Of this *Ästhetik* provides the aptest illustration, but the problem itself is much wider. Reflexion, for Kant, covers all the different exercises of that free Consciousness, "I think," which lies in the back of the mind—i.e. all experience which is distinctively *personal*, as distinguished from Science which is largely *impersonal*, true for all and therefore for no one in particular, and also from pure Morality which for Kant must be depersonalised to the *n<sup>th</sup>* power.

Kant's Deduction is characteristically peculiar. It consists in carrying back this primary function of Mind which is covered by such names as Reflexion, Purposive Activity and Feeling, to what he calls the Power of Judgment. Ostensibly he professes to find in the formal Judgment of Logic *a priori* principles for this third faculty, just as logical Concepts stood sponsor for the categories. If Understanding and Reason have yielded a system of synthetic notions for Knowledge and *a priori* precepts for the Faculty of Desire respectively, "what more natural," he asks, "than to suppose that the latter (Judgment) will contain principles *a priori* for the former (Feeling of Pleasure and Pain) just as well?"<sup>2</sup>

Such statements are not to be taken literally. Kant is dealing with Formal Logic as an analogy or type of the real activity, and this is shown by the fact that the formal concepts in the *Critique of Pure Reason* become added to and change, in the process of Deduction, into principles of synthesis. Similarly we are to find the Formal Judgment in this last Deduction, changing in process of proof into that original Free Conscious-

<sup>1</sup> Bernard, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Über Philosophie überhaupt*, Rosenkranz, *Werke*, i., p. 588.

ness which conditions all experience, mediate or immediate. Kant significantly names it *Urteilkraft*, the Power of Judging in general, though he sometimes uses *Urteil* as equivalent for *Urteilkraft*.

There are two steps in Kant's curious proof. The one is found in the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, the other in the *Über Philosophie überhaupt*.

1. In the first step, Kant points out that Judgment and Feeling must be intimately related, because they bear a similar relation to the two remaining Functions of Mind in the respective groups to which they belong. He calls it a "new ground"<sup>1</sup> of proof. Feeling mediates in a very real sense between Knowledge and Desire, and also the Judgment similarly mediates between Concepts and Reasoning. The former had already been settled by the Wolffians and may be taken for granted, but the latter, which Kant simply states in the baldest way, does call for explanation. Probably the best way to account for Kant's statement is to say that here Logic is changing in his hands. If Judgment mediates in any real sense between the two, it must have common nature with both; concepts, judgments and Reasonings can no longer be distinct as was formerly assumed. A Concept is a judgment from which the appearance of Synthesis has vanished: Reasoning is a form of Judgment in which the original Synthesis is further developed or explained. But surely that has the right to the name of Judgment *par excellence* which is the distinctively synthetic activity of Mind, in which the relation of whole and part is seen in the making? Understanding is for Kant the Faculty of parts without the whole—to determine the Whole is to court antinomy: Reason is the Faculty of Wholes without the parts—there is no differentiation of content in the Concept of Freedom, it is a case of all or nothing; Judgment alone is the function of Mind in which Whole and Part are first *recognised* in relation. The Judgment, then, may be said to mediate between the microscopic judgment or the Concept and the Extensive judgment or the Syllogism, because it is the *original* synthetic activity of Mind. It is no longer the Concept but the Judgment that stands first in the scale of mental activity.

Now when Kant assigns to the Judgment this original power of Synthesis, he does not mean a *particular* or actual synthesis—that is a concept—so much as the *activity* of synthesis itself in general, without reference to a particular

<sup>1</sup> Bernard, p. 14.

product, in short, *the Power of Judgment*. He thus re-establishes the distinction between Concept and Judgment, but in a way which does justice to them both. They are no longer different in nature, for both are modes of Judgment. But Judgment may be of two kinds; for while it is "the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal,"<sup>1</sup> this subsumption may come about in either of two ways. First, both particular and universal may be to hand, *i.e.* the particular given is only such as can be determined by Concepts of Understanding; this is the Schematic Judgment: "the law is marked out for it *a priori*, and it has therefore no need to seek a law for itself".<sup>2</sup> Particular and Universal are adapted to each other by the pre-established harmony of the 'transcendental object,' and so the universal is applied to an intuition which can only be apprehended in that order which is necessary for determination by the categories. But, secondly, the particular alone may be given for which we have to seek a universal, and here the Judgment is no longer Determinant but Reflective. Thus, while the logical concept and judgment are both modes of judging, they are different, the one being the prototype of determinate, the other of reflective judgment. Why Kant calls it Reflective is not exactly clear. Probably he just means the activity in which the subject reflects on itself and its processes. The best explanation is given in the *Über Philosophie überhaupt*. "To reflect," he says, "is to compare and hold together given representations either with others or with its own Cognitive Faculty, in relation to an idea possible thereby."<sup>3</sup> That is to say, Reflexion is just the comparison of a representation with the Apperceptive Imagination. Kant goes on to give it a very homely meaning. We may call it, he says, the *Facultas Dijudicandi* (*Beurteilungsvermögen*), the term Baumgarten used to denote the Critical Faculty, the power of discerning agreement in difference, the answering of means to ends.<sup>4</sup> Nay, Reflexion even happens with animals, Kant continues, "if only instinctively, *i.e.* not in relation to an idea to be obtained thereby, but to an inclination to be somewhat determined,"<sup>5</sup> a sense of the term which seems identical with Aristotle's *δύναμις κριτική*.<sup>6</sup> In its basal form, then, Reflexion appears to be a sense of Want. But this may be of two orders. You may know what you are wanting, and then the Judgment is determinant; a category or "fundamental idea of the object prescribes the rule

<sup>1</sup> Bernard, p. 16.<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.<sup>3</sup> Rosenkranz, *Werke*, i., p. 589.<sup>4</sup> Erdmann, *Hist. Mod.*, p. 240.<sup>5</sup> *Über Phil. überhaupt*, Rosenkranz, p. 589.<sup>6</sup> *Anal. Post.*, ii., 99 B.

to the Power of Judgment,"<sup>1</sup> and therefore you no longer need a principle, its place being supplied by a rule. It is only for people who do not know exactly what they are wanting that a principle is necessary. The artist, having a great notion in his head, yet not knowing exactly what it is, casts about him for a principle, and in so doing lets his mind run free. This free-play of the faculties takes place when the mind is undergoing experience for which there is no corresponding category of knowledge adequate, whether it be in the apparently passive contemplation of æsthetic perception or in the originaive activity of artistic creation. Nor do we need to know what we are wanting, even after it has been realised. In Reflexion, it is the *satisfaction*, not the definition, of purpose or interest that is essential; the free-play of the faculties is its own end: the mind has no interest outside of its processes. The great difference, then, which Kant has in view between the Reflective and Determinant Judgment is that the one is free, working under a principle, the other is not free, working under a rule which is fixed. Reflective Judgment is a "mere faculty for reflecting upon a given representation, in behoof of an idea possible thereby";<sup>2</sup> i.e. an idea which may be the very thing you want and so an idea which is realised as the definite concept of a given representation, in which case the judgment would become determinant, both part and whole being to hand. Reflective judgment always works with a view to Determinant, or, as if a Determinant judgment were actually possible.

It must be clear from the above that Reflective Judgment is the wider function of which the Determinant is but a special case. All thinking is the subsuming of a particular under a universal, i.e. of a sense-datum under a form of thought. And Reflexion is Subsumption in general, Determination is Subsumption in particular. In the Determinant, Epistemological or Schematic Judgment, Imagination, which is the highest faculty of Sense, subordinates itself to the law of Understanding. In apprehending a line, or drawing it even in thought, the imagination must keep reproducing the successive perceptions in order to maintain identity of Consciousness and therefore unity of the object: the object is cognised to order, it is what we are "obliged to think". But in Reflexion it is quite otherwise. Here the Imagination proceeds, not under constraint, but in free play with the Understanding; it is no longer what we are unconditionally obliged to think, but what we are constrained to think for higher reasons than the laws of Understanding.

<sup>1</sup> *Über Phil. überhaupt*, Rosenkranz, p. 589.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

When Kant, then, says that the Judgment ought to provide this reflective Activity with *a priori* principles, he is looking to a certain feature in the Class-judgment which may serve as type for the freedom of Reflexion. The judgment in Formal Logic abstracts from all content, and therefore exhibits a quite contingent relation between S and P; and Reflexion is like to it in this, that the Subject (Imagination) is not fixed down to any definite Predicate (the Understanding), but maintains a free relation to it, whereas the transcendental or Determinant Judgment has for its predicate a certain unalterable rule, *e.g.*, the subject must come under the predicate of causal connexion. But in the judgment of Formal Logic, S may come under the class P or  $P^1$  or  $P^2$ . Kant expresses this distinction thus: "the Understanding is the Faculty of rules, the Urteilstkraft is the Faculty of *subsuming* under rules, *i.e.* of discerning whether something stands under a given rule or not".<sup>1</sup> Kant seems to speak here as if Reflexion were Formal Logic over again, but the latter is nothing more than a loose type of the former. For while the formal judgment abstracts from all content, Reflexion holds itself free rather because its content is so much deeper than that of the determinate judgment; thus, in regard to a living thing, it would be a mistake to bind S down to the Predicate of Causality, for it may be much more than that.

This seems to throw light on the title of the book, *Kritik der Urteilstkraft*. It is a point on which writers on Kant have loftily abstained from giving any satisfactory explanation to the bewildered student, for it is not a little disconcerting to find that Kant, who had already used Judgment in a purely epistemological sense, should without further qualification or comment, also use it to denote specifically the Reflective activity of mind. The *Critique of Pure Reason* might well have been called the Critique of Judgment, for it deals with little else, but Kant has so consecrated the term to denote Reflexion that he speaks of the *Critique of Pure Reason* dealing with Understanding alone "to the exclusion of Judgment and Reason".<sup>2</sup> The explanation, it seems to me, lies in this, that for Kant the common feature in both Reflective and Determinant Judgment is subordination. But the Reflective is the higher and wider type of subordination; far from being the empty tautology of Formal Logic, it is the subordination of Nature to Freedom, whereas Determinant Judgment is but a subordination *within* Nature, that of Sense to Under-

<sup>1</sup> *Kritik d. r. Vernunft*, Hartenstein, iii., p. 138.

<sup>2</sup> Bernard, p. 1.

standing: and it is Kant's final view that it is this wider subsumption of nature under Freedom which makes possible the lower adaptation of sense to thought; Determination, whether moral or scientific, is conditioned by Reflexion. Now the Formal Judgment provides the type for this higher form of Subsumption in the free relation it exhibits between S and P, and from it Kant would naturally take the name, *Kritik der Urteilkraft*. So we might read the above quotation as follows: the *Critique of Pure Reason* dealt with Judgment (*i.e.*, Subsumption in particular), to the exclusion of Judgment (*i.e.*, Subsumption in general without arriving at any particular determination) and Reason. Determination is fixed within definite limits, Reflexion has for its characteristic absence of determinate bounds; the Determinant judgment is like a land-path definitely marked, the Reflective is like the roadways of the open ocean: "thy way is in the sea, and thy path in the great waters, and thy footsteps are not known".<sup>1</sup> What Kant has secured for us, then, out of the Formal Judgment, is really a divine way of thinking, of which the forced subordination in Nature, *i.e.*, in the judgment of knowledge, is but the shadow. Hence the truth of Hegel's dictum, Freedom is the truth of Nature.

2. The second step in Kant's proof rests on the *Subjective* character of both Judgment and Feeling; "there is here already a certain conformity of the Power of Judgment to the Feeling of Pleasure . . . that whereas Understanding and Reason refer their representations to objects . . . the Power of Judgment refers *solely to the subject*, and by itself alone produces no notions of objects".<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, he points out, the Feeling of Pleasure and Pain is the only one of the Mental Powers which has nothing objective in its representations and is only the *empfänglichkeit* of a determination of the subject. In the first step it was shown how Judgment and Feeling respectively mediate in a real way between corresponding functions of mind. Now it is argued that their relative positions in the respective groups is so similar, in respect of their subjective aspect, that they must form part of one and the same mental function: "if the Power of Judgment should at all determine anything for itself alone, it can be nothing else than the Feeling of Pleasure, and conversely, if this (Feeling of Pleasure) ought to have at all a principle *a priori*, it will be found alone in the Power of Judgment".<sup>3</sup> Thus the object of the Judgment, in so far as it has one, seeing that it refers solely to the Subject, and the

<sup>1</sup> Psalm lxxvii. 19.

<sup>2</sup> *Über Phil. überhaupt*, Rosenkranz, *Werke*, i., p. 588.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

subjective determination which we call Feeling, are one and the same.

But what exactly can Kant mean by the Subjectivity of the Judgment? To begin with, as we saw above, Judgment has come to mean for Kant the original synthetic activity of Mind; and although the Deduction in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* consists in the proof that the subjective reference in the Judgment presupposes an objective reference and is only possible through consciousness of objectivity, we must remember that, in spite of this, Kant makes a reservation; he insists that the 'I think,' the subjective element in the Judgment, is itself an *analytic proposition*.<sup>1</sup> He means that there is such a thing as *Cognition in general*, consciousness of the subject without arriving at any particular determination; and further, it is this *Consciousness in general* which makes possible the knowledge of the Understanding. But this never means for Kant that a purely subjective function of mind lies at the basis of all knowledge. An enormous confusion arises for us here, because we are thinking of a totally different contrast from that which was before Kant's mind, as different as from the Cartesian use of the terms subjective and objective. Objective for Kant, it cannot be too strongly urged, means no more than the objectivity of external sense; the sensuous perception of Inner Sense, the sense of Time in Imagination, is not for him objective—the proof in the Analogies which appears to base outer on inner Sense, the permanence of Substance on the Permanent in Time, should not be regarded as an exception to this, but as a fault in Kant's argument. What Modern Logic, then, means by objective in the Judgment, is what Kant has in view in the analytical Consciousness, 'I think': which differs from the objectivity of the Modern Judgment only in this, that it is not itself so much a system of Consciousness, an objective Consciousness, as the *basis* of all objective Consciousness. Kant's position nearly veers round to the Cartesian use of the contrast. They called subjective what is independent of individual mind, what underlies the sense-object, and what is this but Kant's 'transcendental object'? And, as Kant admits, the 'I think' of apperception is really indistinguishable from this *independent* or objective Mind. We should, therefore, hit off Kant's view more accurately, in view of the above confusion of terms, if we said that the 'I think' of the Judgment is not subjective, for this implies a false contrast with objectivity, but Personal as dis-

<sup>1</sup> Watson, *Selections*, p. 69.



tinguished from Divine or Absolute Mind. The 'I think' shares the nature of the 'objective synthesis,' and therefore may be said to lie at the basis of all knowledge. It is subjective in the sense that it is personal and free from the obligation to think the objects of external sense.

The student is more and more impressed with the intimate relation which the third Critique bears to the first.<sup>1</sup> This subjective character of the Judgment may be put in yet another way. It is the same feature Kant is hinting at in the contrast he makes between Productive and Reproductive Imagination, in the chapter on the Deduction of the Categories. The Reproductive function belongs to Psychology, the Productive alone to Transcendental Philosophy, and "its synthesis is the expression of spontaneous activity".<sup>2</sup> Reproduction is an empirical synthesis of Imagination in accordance with the laws of Association, but Imagination in its original function is the "faculty of setting before the mind in perception an object that is *not itself present*":<sup>3</sup> *i.e.* though it may make use of association in its free activity, it is not led by it but leads it, "for unlike sense, imagination is not simply capable of being determined, but is itself determining".<sup>4</sup> There is no such thing as a purely contingent Fancy which outrages all the forms of knowledge, and certainly Productive Imagination is no such contingent activity; rather it conforms to the categories while it constructs its figurations without reference to any definite object, *i.e.*, without compulsion of external sense or fixed direction of association. Hence Kant calls it the "first application" of Understanding to Sense, and so "the condition of all other applications of Understanding to objects that we are capable of perceiving".<sup>5</sup>

There is, then, after all something profound in Kant's deduction of Feeling from the Judgment. He begins with the Judgment of Formal Logic, and this changes in his hands into the Reality of which it is but the type, the Original Synthetic Activity of Mind. The proof is really reversed and is, that Determination is a subordinate form of Reflexion. The usual criticism is that he has violated the nature of Feeling, particularly æsthetic, by reducing it to a form of intellectual cognition. In point of fact, he does quite the opposite. While in seeming he brings Feeling back to functions of knowledge, in the process of proof he lifts up knowledge into relationship with the Personal, free activity of Mind. Reflexion is not debased to Understanding

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Anna Tumarkin in *Kantstudien*, Band xi.

<sup>2</sup> Watson, *Selections*, p. 77.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.

but Understanding is elevated by its subordination to Reflexion. Kant, indeed, suggests that the fixed forms of the Understanding were originally spontaneous in their activity. When we go beyond the limits of Understanding as it is now known to us, *i.e.*, go beyond causal connexion, and freely classify Nature into genera and species "reflectively," our "reflexion" is characterised by the feeling of Pleasure, the mark of spontaneity. And though we no longer feel pleasure in contemplating the fixed corrections of Understanding, yet it must have been there "at one time," and "it is only because the commonest experience would be impossible without it that it is gradually confounded with mere cognition and no longer arrests particular attention".<sup>1</sup> Determinate judgments are fossilised "reflexions" upon Nature; these unchangeable forms and connexions of Understanding had to be discovered at one time, and their discovery was no doubt attended by the inseparable mark of all spontaneity, Pleasure. What takes place in the History of the Sciences is repeated in the growing consciousness. For the child each established law of Nature, when it first secures the attention, is a lucky hit of Reflexion, a fresh discovery.

There is a deeper suggestion here. The bounds of Understanding are not fixed but stretch with the advance of Science. Science feeds the forms of Philosophy with their content progressively. In the light of Evolution, we should now add to Understanding part of those forms of Teleology which for Kant were wholly contingent and reflective. Scientists largely destroy for themselves the pleasure which the forms of adaptation in Nature afford the unsophisticated mind, and later, through their knowledge, the general consciousness comes to feel

"that there hath passed away a glory from the earth".

But there must be a limit to the encroachment of Understanding. If it be the case, as Kant suggests, that the original function of Mind is the Spontaneous, if Productive is the condition of Reproductive Imagination, if the free, personal consciousness, 'I think,' be the condition of consciousness of the objectivity of sense-perception and independent of it, then it must lie in the power of this original function to maintain a distinct realm for itself, otherwise the Understanding would devour its parent. There is a limit to the encroaching of the land upon the sea, whose trackless ways best typify the judgment of Reflexion. Therefore Kant

<sup>1</sup> Bernard, p. 28.

is right when he makes Understanding, with its fixity, a distinct compartment of Mind from Reflexion. He may have drawn the limits prematurely, but, in the long run, its Kingdom has an end. It is not likely that the Mind will surrender its spontaneity in the realms of the Finer Emotions connected with Art, Morality, and Religion. Teleology may linger between the two worlds of determined and free activity, and it cannot wholly surrender to Understanding; the truth may be that it is the bond of union and transition between these two worlds: Kant seems to take this view in the half-hearted way he connects it with æsthetic purpose-ness. But the objects of the Fine Emotions are the private grounds of the Sovereign Freedom of Reason which Understanding invades only to court defeat. In this sense M. Basch is right when he says that Knowledge and Will are sterilised products of feeling: "the individual is more truly himself when he feels": habit, without doubt, blunts "le timbre sentimental de la sensation". But, he concludes, there is one sphere where Feeling regains its ancient empire, where man is concerned, neither to know nor to will, but before all to feel; where representations re-become what they have been from the beginning, the creations of Feeling, and that sphere is the Æsthetic.<sup>1</sup>

If this is what Kant means by Reflexion, if this is the Crown of his Philosophy, he has to offer us what it were well to accept, a way of thinking which has all the originality and immediacy which Pragmatism demands, without its vicious empiricism.

<sup>1</sup> *L'Éthétique de Kant*, par Basch, Introd., p. xiv.

## V.—DISCUSSIONS.

### MR. RASHDALL'S DEFENCE OF "PERSONAL IDEALISM".

THE reply of Mr. Hastings Rashdall, in *MIND* for January, 1909, to some remarks of mine on "Personal Idealism" do not seem to me to meet the difficulties which I found in his article on "Personality: Human and Divine" when I first read it. To examine in detail the twelve pages in which he has replied to my six of criticism would require much greater space than I could reasonably expect to be allowed, and, apart from that, I do not think that minute replies and rejoinders are likely to lead to any good results. The hypothetical biography which he seems to have constructed of me, when he says that he is "not disposed to think that philosophy has stood still since the days when Prof. Watson was a student at Glasgow," is hardly consistent with his expression of "sympathy, agreement and respect" for "most" of what appears in my book, or with his opinion that "the difference between us is less than I suppose," since I am "free or comparatively free from many of the tendencies against which 'Personal Idealism' is a protest".

It is a good many years ago since I first made acquaintance, in Prof. Pringle-Pattison's *Hegelianism and Personality* (1887), with a doctrine closely resembling, if not identical with, what is now known as "Personal Idealism"; and it seemed to me then, as it seems to me now, that, so far as it was true, it did not differ from what I had been accustomed to call "Idealism". For I have never understood that "Idealism" denies that there is a distinction, though not a separation, between self-conscious 'persons' and beings that are not self-conscious; nor is there any reason why it should deny that God is a self-conscious 'person,' provided the term 'person' is not understood to mean a being who in his existence is a separate individual, while in his knowledge he is somehow aware of the existence of individuals other than himself. But, while "Idealism" did not seem fairly open to the charge of abolishing 'personality' and logically leading to "a naturalism which for all practical purposes is indistinguishable from materialism" (*Personal Idealism*, p. 378), "Personal Idealism," unless I am entirely mistaken, does hold that 'personality' implies separation in existence, though it admits of comprehension or inclusion in the way of knowledge. This was the point to which I directed my short criticism, and Mr. Rashdall must forgive me for saying he has not convinced me that his doctrine

is not logically open to the objections I made to it on the ground that he separates between knowledge and existence, and thereby lays himself open to the charge of explaining the manner in which the subject is supposed to get beyond his own 'states' or 'ideas' by the doctrine that his ideas somehow 'represent' what is not actually within the circle of his consciousness. Why, otherwise, does he limit 'reality' to 'souls' or 'spirits,' apparently excluding from the title all inorganic beings? The objections that I made in my book are all logical deductions from this assumption, and are of the nature of a *reductio ad absurdum*. It is not to the point that other statements, inconsistent with the distinctive doctrine, are made, chiefly, as I cannot but think, on the basis of popular ideas. I may be wrong in thinking that one cannot separate the existence from the knowledge of the self without contradiction, but, until that objection is met, I do not feel that I have exposed myself legitimately to Mr. Rashdall's vials of wrath. "Idealism," as I understand it, has no need to maintain that "things" have no independent reality, because it holds that plants, animals and men, though in a less degree, have no independent reality either—in short, that there is no "reality" in the strict sense of the term except the totality of being, which includes all forms of existence. At the same time "Idealism" does not affirm that "things" have any existence apart from mind: it co-ordinates "existence" and "knowledge," unlike "Personal Idealism," the *raison d'être* of which, as I understand it, just consists in maintaining that there is a "difference between knowledge and reality" (*Personal Idealism*, *passim*; see especially p. 390, note).

Mr. Rashdall wishes to know how I could suppose that "Personal Idealism" is open to the objections raised against Solipsism? Passing over the remark in his article that Solipsism "like Scepticism admits of no decisive refutation, but carries no conviction" (*Personal Idealism*, p. 389)—which hardly agrees with his appeal to Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, all the arguments in which against Solipsism he claims the right to use (*MIND*, 69, p. 109)—my answer is that "Personal Idealism" makes what seems to me the fundamental mistake of reducing consciousness to 'ideas' which, when they are 'ideas' of other 'persons,' are not *identical* but only *similar* to the ideas in the minds of other persons. Mr. Rashdall (*MIND*, p. 114) invokes a cloud of witnesses in favour of what I suppose he would call "hard" idealism, among them Mr. Bradley. To Mr. Bradley therefore I may take the liberty of referring him for the distinction between 'identity' and 'similarity'.

"Personal Idealism" seems to me to rest upon the assumption that, because every mode of existence has a meaning only for a mind, it follows that nothing exists except mind. I am not prepared to endorse this assumption without a re-interpretation of the term 'mind'. Certainly a world not knowable by a mind—a world that is not the embodiment of mind—is unthinkable, because for

mind—any mind whatever—it would be absolutely unintelligible. A world of this nature cannot possibly exist, as I believe, because we should have to maintain that there were two different and uncombinable orders of existence, mind and nature, and that what is true of the one is in no sense true of the other. But what this shows is merely that any element of reality, when taken in abstraction from the other elements which go to constitute it, becomes unintelligible. But, while I admit, or rather contend, that nature has no independent reality, I am unable to see that it ceases to be 'real' when it is taken as merely an element in the whole; for then its self-contradictory character disappears. If "Idealism" denies the reality of inorganic things as elements in a rational or intelligible whole, I do not see how I can ever accept it. "Idealism," as I understand it, does not affirm that "all reality lies in souls and their experiences"; for 'souls' would have no 'experiences' apart from the not-self, whether the not-self assumes the form of inorganic things or of plants, animals and men. Is this "Dualism"? Mr. Rashdall says that "Dualism" is no less Dualism because we are told that the subject is as necessary to the object as the object to the subject, if the object be thought of as something that exists quite independently of being willed by the mind which is compelled to know it, but which may yet (for anything that such a philosophy has to say to the contrary) be constrained to pronounce it very bad. Such a view is none the less Dualism because the object is understood to be an 'object of thought' and not the 'matter' of the materialist" (*Personal Idealism*, p. 378). "Naturalism" or "Materialism," we are told, is "the natural development" of the philosophy of Green, "which really banishes the idea of activity, not merely from its idea of God, but in truth from its conception of the universe as a whole". I am not "going to lay hands on my father Parmenides," but I may go so far as to say that Green's refusal to admit that the ultimate principle of all things can be defined other than negatively, though we may legitimately infer by analogy that it is "spiritual," seems to me to have been due to a temporary lapse of reason on his part, and to be in fundamental discrepancy with the principles of his philosophy. In any case I think it may be shown that "Idealism" by no means leads to "Naturalism" or "Materialism," but on the contrary proves it to be an utterly untenable doctrine.

Much of current speculation seems to me to overlook the distinction between our first inadequate view of the world and a really comprehensive and self-consistent doctrine. To one who strives to be true to the highest form of knowledge, it seems obvious that there are three main ways in which existence or reality may be conceived. The first and most natural way is to look upon the world as made up of particular 'things,' each of which is 'real' or has an existence of its own quite independent of all other things. No doubt, when we come to consider that things are in the same

space and time, and exhibit resemblances, differences and orderly sequences, we do as a matter of fact connect them in our minds, but the 'relations' thus introduced are not at this stage regarded as in any way affecting the 'solid reality' of the things so compared. Nor does it matter that 'things' are made up of 'parts'; for it is assumed that these 'parts' must themselves be 'real' and independent; and therefore the 'things' that we ordinarily regard as 'real' are conceived to be simply 'aggregates' of smaller 'reals'. If this doctrine is pressed to its logical consequences, it dissolves the world into an infinity of disconnected particulars, each of which would be equally 'real' if all the other things were annihilated. The logic of this doctrine is the 'law of contradiction,' interpreted to mean that a thing is absolutely 'unique' or 'individual' (or whatever term is employed). And the same mode of thought, when applied to the mind, results in the doctrine that each 'self' is 'unique' or 'individual,' and therefore that, if the 'self' knows the 'object,' it must be because the 'object' is a 'part' or 'mode' of itself. I do not deny that "Personal Idealism" contains elements incompatible with this individualistic point of view—for in "Personal Idealism" I have not been able to find any one consistent doctrine—but it seems to me that its perpetual insistence upon the 'reality' of the 'personal subject' is due to the assumption, that if the subject cannot exist apart from the whole, it is not 'real' at all; in other words, that every 'real' self must, in 'existence' though not in 'knowledge,' be 'individual' in the sense of being absolutely impervious to all other individual beings, not excluding God; and that, as a logical consequence, "Personal Idealism" is bound to hold that there is no 'whole' except what the human intellect frames for itself as the result of the external comparison of a number of separate and independent individuals; or, what is the same thing, that the universe is not an organic whole but an aggregate. "The Absolute," says Mr. Rashdall (*Personal Idealism*, p. 392), "consists of God and the souls, including, of course, all that God and those souls know or experience." No doubt he adds that "the Absolute is not a simple aggregate formed of these spirits, as each of them is if taken apart from the rest, but a society in which each must be taken with all its relations to the rest"; but as this seems to mean that each soul as well as God is separate in existence, though it also knows other souls, I cannot help thinking that Mr. Rashdall has not freed himself entirely from the fallacy of separate or individual things. It is for this reason, as I conceive, that he practically denies that there is any "Absolute" or "Infinite Being," and as a consequence denies that it is another name for God (*Personal Idealism*, p. 392).

When by further reflexion it becomes apparent that the first view of things is untenable, since no object can be found that does not in some way depend on other objects, the doctrine formulated is, that there are no independent 'things,' and that 'relations' are



by no means due to external comparison, but are absolutely essential to the reality of anything whatever. This doctrine is implicit in the Newtonian law of gravitation, which insists upon the essential relativity or interdependence of things, and indeed it is the natural doctrine of those who are engaged in scientific pursuits, though they very rarely get rid of the imperfection of the first view of things and usually hold both side by side. Now this phase of thought, when pressed to its consequences, virtually denies, not only that there are 'individual' things, in the sense of separate or unrelated objects—which it has a perfect right to do—but that there are 'individual' things in any sense whatever. If A depends upon B, B upon C, C upon D, and so on *ad infinitum*, we shall in vain search for a principle which is the absolute source of anything. This mode of thought, therefore, is the basis of all phenomenalism, and if applied to mind it results either in its reduction to a series of 'modes' or 'states,' discrete or continuous—the former being the view of the older empiricists, the latter of such "radical empiricists" as Prof. James—or in hypostatizing it as something lying behind these 'modes' or 'states' which cannot be further defined. Seeing clearly that there are no separate and independent things, it naturally infers that no 'real' thing can be known, because nothing can be found which is not a passing phase in a perpetually changing world. No doubt it grants that changes occur in a regular way, but it denies that we are entitled to say there is any absolute law of those changes.

The revolt from this second stage of thought is very apt to lead to the doctrine that, as there are no separate *objects*, and as individuality must be found somewhere, we must, to preserve individuality, fall back upon separate *subjects*. Accordingly, it is admitted that there is no independent 'reality' in the world of objects, but it is contended that such 'reality' is found in 'souls' or 'spirits' or 'minds'. As I have already said, this seems to me an untenable way of defending 'reality'. It abolishes distinctions which are inseparable from the world as presented in our experience, and in so doing destroys any tenable defence of "Idealism". I should therefore attack the problem in a different way.

What is the mistake of the first view of things, which affirms that all 'reality' consists of separate, and therefore virtually of self-existent things? Its mistake is in overlooking the universal process which is involved in each thing, a process without which it could not exist or be known. This universal process is not due merely to the external comparison of one thing with another, but implies a vital objective activity which is essential to the 'reality' of the thing. This is the fundamental point. The principle of gravitation, for example, is not merely a "working conception," as some "personal idealists" seem to hold, but it is an actual cause, operative in each atom or particle of matter and constituting its very nature. Nor will it help us to say that each thing *resembles* another: for no

valid universal law can be based upon *resemblance*, but only upon *identity*. If it is said that the law of gravitation is an 'abstract idea' or 'conception,' and that no 'conception' can be adequate to reality, I answer that in that case knowledge is simply an impossibility. Mr. Rashdall refers me to Mr. Bradley's distinction between an idea as 'psychical event' and an idea as 'content' (MIND, 69, p. 105), and upon this distinction he seems to rely for an explanation of the knowledge of what is other than self. I am unable to accept Mr. Bradley's view, which seems to me to be based upon a confusion between an 'image' and a 'conception'. It is on this ground, as I believe, that Mr. Bradley finds the idea of space, time, cause, self, and indeed all the modes in which we characterise reality to be self-contradictory—though he partly withdraws his censure when he comes to treat of the "degrees of reality". It is perfectly true that it is impossible to comprehend space, time or causality when the attempt is made to do so by the imagination, *i.e.*, by an accumulation of 'images'; but it is just because imagination cannot represent the infinity of space or time, or the absoluteness of causality, that we are entitled to affirm their infinity and their reality as conditions of knowledge; for if our 'conception' or 'thought' of them is no guarantee of their real nature, we should not know that imagination cannot fully represent them. Certainly, if 'conception' is merely a "bloodless category," it must want the concreteness of 'reality'; but a 'conception,' properly understood, is the grasp by thought of a living principle which is the very soul of 'reality'. To frame an 'image' of an oak is no doubt to form an abstraction, but the 'conception' of an oak comprehends all possible individual oaks, which, however much they may differ from one another, must agree in being dependent upon the energy by which they are produced. A 'conception' therefore corresponds, not to the particular oak, but to the energy by which this, and all other, oaks are produced. Thus thought, and thought alone, comprehends reality: for only thought can grasp the living energy without which nothing whatever could exist. There can, in fact, be no perception of reality at all without the activity of thought in the formation of conceptions. To anticipate the usual common-place objection, I hasten to add that this activity of thought is independent neither of feeling nor of will. It expresses, however, the necessary conditions under which only the real world is possible or knowable.

To comprehend reality it is necessary to go beyond this second or 'relational' point of view; and Mr. Bradley is therefore right in maintaining that "all relational modes of thought are self-contradictory," or, as I should prefer to say, are self-contradictory when taken as ultimate. The mistake of this mode of thought lies in its assumption that all thinkable reality must be relational or dependent. For, when reality is so conceived, the mind is necessarily forced upon an infinite series in the attempt to characterise it, and obviously an infinite series can never be summed up or com-

pleted. If we could reach the whole, it is assumed, we should grasp reality as it is; but as the series of dependent particulars is endless, the attempt necessarily proves abortive. When, however, we look more closely at this method of conceiving reality, it becomes manifest that it has virtually refuted itself. If it is true that nothing comes within our experience except dependent beings, we can never reach a true cause at all, but only one that is a link in an endless chain, the first link in which it is therefore impossible to discover. Evidently, the reason why the mind cannot be satisfied with this view of things is that such a series does not take us beyond a 'reality' that is 'dependent,' and we therefore affirm it not to be true 'reality' but only 'appearance'. Thus we tacitly assume that only that which is self-dependent can be 'real'. Dependent being, in other words, presupposes self-dependent being. But there can be only one absolutely self-dependent being: and therefore man, like other forms of being, can only be self-dependent in so far as within him there is operative the same principle as that which manifests itself in all other modes of being, though in beings lower than man it never comes to self-consciousness. The whole force of this contention, however, seems to me to be vitiated when an attempt is made to show that in his existence man is self-dependent, while in his knowledge he is dependent upon what is other than himself. It is not surprising that one who adopts this point of view should hold that "God," as Mr. Rashdall puts it, "is certainly limited by all other beings in the Universe, that is to say, by other selves, in so far as He is not those selves" (*Personal Idealism*, p. 390), and therefore that God's "power" is "doubtless limited". I confess that a finite God seems to me the greatest of all absurdities; nor can I see how Mr. Rashdall can legitimately establish the existence of God at all on that supposition. The category of the finite presupposes the category of the infinite, as Descartes long ago perceived, just as that of 'relativity' implies the 'non-relative' or 'absolute'. Why, on Mr. Rashdall's view, should we stop with a single finite God, and not go on to infinity in search of an ultimate unity? Does not the finite necessarily presuppose something beyond it? I am not surprised that Mr. Rashdall should find himself "embarrassed" (*Personal Idealism*, p. 391) in his attempt to characterise a Being, who is not the "Absolute," but is at once omniscient and yet is limited in power—limited, we are told, because "in the frank recognition of the limitation of power lies the only solution of the problem of Evil which does not either destroy the goodness of God or destroy moral distinctions altogether" (*Personal Idealism*, p. 391).

This rough sketch of what I understand by "Idealism"—which, I fear, may appear too dogmatic from the necessity of compression—may perhaps serve to indicate wherein it differs from "Personal Idealism". The former maintains that there is no division between knowledge and reality in principle, and therefore no separation between any mode of existence whatever and any other. It denies

that there are 'objects' which exist only in the individual mind of this or that person, and indeed it rejects altogether the conception of 'reality' as divided up into separate 'things'. On the other hand, it denies just as emphatically that 'things' can be resolved into 'states' of the individual 'subject,' maintaining that external 'things,' or 'matter,' is as real in the *whole* as individual 'subjects' or 'minds,' and indeed that unless it were so, there would be neither matter nor mind. At the same time, while this form of "Idealism" recognises the relative truth of the second or scientific stage of thought, which interprets reality as a system of 'dependent' beings and therefore refuses to admit that there are any 'independent' things to be found in the world, it denies that this method of thought is ultimately satisfactory, maintaining that it unwittingly presupposes that true reality must be self-dependent, and therefore self-causing and self-differentiating. Thus, it reaffirms the individuality of things in the whole while denying their separate reality; and the whole it views, not as a mere aggregate, but as organic and spiritual. All forms of being, from the material particle to the most developed human intelligence, it regards as unreal and impossible apart from the whole, but as real and necessary in the whole. And it further maintains that the only perfectly self-dependent, self-acting, and self-differentiating unity must be self-conscious, not because it is isolated or independent either in existence or in knowledge, but because it is perfect intelligence which manifests its nature in all modes of being, but most fully in and to man. This unity may therefore be called the Absolute or God, according as we are viewing it from the reflective or the religious point of view, but it is Absolute or God only because it is infinite in the sense of involving all possible reality as its manifestation. No doubt there are difficulties connected with this conception, but they do not seem to me insuperable, while the separately existent and finite God of "Personal Idealism" I can only regard as a fiction of abstraction.

JOHN WATSON.

MR. HALDANE ON HEGEL'S CONTINUITY AND CANTORIAN  
PHILOSOPHY.

IN Mr. Haldane's interesting article on 'The Logical Foundations of Mathematics' there seems to be an attempt to institute an illusory comparison between two conceptions which are really quite distinct, —Continuity as understood by Hegel, and Continuity as understood by Dedekind. When Hegel claims that Continuity and Discretion are both Moments in Quantity, he appears to interpret Continuity as the unity of a class containing diverse members; it is the community of property which enables us to speak of a quantity of anything, provided this unity is not regarded as a mere isolated connotation (intension), but as a connotation realised in a denotation (extension). What else can he mean by saying,<sup>1</sup> 'Die Kontinuität ist dieses Moment der Sichselbstgleichheit des Auseinanderseins'. The Discretion, on the other hand, is the denotation regarded as realising the connotation. Discretion is the *diversity* in conceptual unity, Continuity is the conceptual *unity* in diversity. The illustration given in the *Smaller Logic* (Wallace's translation, pp. 189-190) supports this interpretation: the magnitude consisting of a hundred men (he says) is continuous as well as discrete, "and the circumstance on which this continuity depends is the common element, the species man, which pervades all the individuals and unites them with each other".

Kant's use of the term Continuity is different from this and is closer to—though less complex than—Dedekind's. He attributes Continuity to Space and Time on the grounds that there is no smallest part of either, and to Change for a similar reason, that between any two states of a changing phenomenon there is always a difference. This is fundamentally the same conception as what Mr. Russell calls 'Compactness' in a series, which means that between any two members of the series there is another member (*e.g.* points on a line or the rational numbers in order of magnitude). Hegel's Continuity is not however *serial* Continuity; it is rather the pure conception of cardinal number, in which there is no rank or serial arrangement made explicit. The distinction between cardinal and ordinal number comes later with Hegel (though he does not use this terminology) in the distinction between *intensive* and *extensive* magnitude. Intensive magnitude is *position* on a scale *e.g.* a speci-

<sup>1</sup> *Wissenschaft der Logik*, first chapter on Quantity.

fic degree of heat as marked by the thermometer. Surely Hegel does not assert that there must be a member between any two members of a series before the quantity involved can be said to possess continuity? The Hegelian Continuity would in fact be a property of Space even if straight lines and figures were composed of finite numbers of *minima sensibilia* (as Berkeley thought).

Dedekind's Continuity and all allied forms are predicated of series alone, and have no meaning as applied to a mere group of objects not arranged in order. As involving serial compactness they should perhaps be regarded as a development of the Kantian less complex conception, which, as I have said, is the same as Compactness.

It must be remembered, further, that the continuity of a *function* is not the same thing as the continuity of a *series*, although Mr. Haldane (I know not why) seems to think that they are both forms of Hegelian Continuity. One would like to know exactly, and without vagueness, the stages of the dialectic process by which the connexion is established.

There is another aspect of Mr. Haldane's article about which one would like some more information from him,—the implication, namely, that the Cantor-Dedekind movement has only a mathematical and not an epistemological significance. Until further light is thrown on the subject, I shall continue to believe that Cantor's theory of the Transfinite (in its earlier stages) is explicitly a new metaphysical departure, that it is one of the most remarkable developments of pure Philosophy, and that, as such, it must influence epistemology, unless epistemology will divorce itself from Philosophy, and from every exact inquiry. The philosophical work in this movement I should describe as the exact ideal conceptualisation of the immediately given, and this work I think both Kant and Hegel recognised as belonging to philosophy, if not exhausting it. One result, for instance, has been that the Mathematical Antinomies have been solved in a way impossible for Kant and Hegel, for precise analysis has failed to discover any contradiction in the conception of infinite number. Indirectly, too, the Kantian phenomenalistic intuitionism can be refuted by exposing its inner contradictions, and contrasting it with a theory which does not contradict itself. The usual escape from the Antinomy of *Theilbarkeit* is that given by Aristotle, approved by Kant and Hegel, and revived every now and then as a new discovery—that the infinite divisibility of Space, Time and Matter is only a "possibility". This theory, however, leaves us still in the frying-pan, since the 'possibilities' of subdivision must be actually finite or infinite in number, and thus we must vote for either Berkeley or Cantor. Hegel, indeed, gave the clue to the right solution of the Antinomy of the Limits of the World, pointing out that it arose from the contradiction inherent in finite intuition *per se*, not from a contradiction of the World with itself. But he failed to see that the concept of actually infinite number is required to justify his position. Kant's method of escape reminds one of the

gymnastics of the ostrich, who thinks that there is no danger so long as he does not *intuite* it. It follows logically from the Kantian solutions (in both antinomies) that the number of points or subdivisions of a line is the number that you choose to imagine, that the limits of Space are, say, the furthest visible objects (these limits varying with the light!), and that Time began at the *first* remembered event of your life. Intuition must fix such limits, but on the other hand cannot imagine them, and is thus in hopeless contradiction with itself. These antinomies, far from verifying (as Kant thought) Transcendental Idealism, are the strongest refutation of its cardinal doctrine, that Space and Time objects exist only as objects of perception.

R. A. P. ROGERS.



## VI.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

*Structure and Growth of the Mind.* By W. MITCHELL, Hughes Professor of Philosophy, University of Adelaide. London, Macmillan & Co., 1907. Pp. xxxv, 512. Price 10s. 6d.

THE sincere apologies of the present reviewer are due to Prof. Mitchell for the long delay in the appearance of this review. Prof. Mitchell may be assured that his book was not laid aside and forgotten; on the contrary, it was read with the greatest interest and appreciation immediately on its receipt, and it was only an unforeseen change of position, bringing with it greatly increased work under unfamiliar conditions, which has until now made it impossible for me to put this appreciation on paper. Fortunately, there cannot be much doubt that any competent reader will have recognised the splendid qualities of this book without any recommendation on my part. And the delay has had one advantage: it has given me time to make some use of the book in actual teaching. And, judged by this severest test of a text-book, the good opinion formed of it on the first reading has been abundantly confirmed. I have no hesitation in saying that Prof. Mitchell has written one of the very best books on Psychology that it has been my pleasure to read. It stands out head and shoulders above the level of ordinary text-books. In method it is singularly free from the lifeless abstractions which make the 'science of the soul' so often tedious and unconvincing, because one finds it impossible to recognise in it a description, let alone an explanation, of the procedure of living minds. And as for matter, though it is a book concerned with principles rather than with details, it deals with masses of facts which most books on Psychology completely neglect. Even the expert in Psychology will, I think, find a good deal to learn from this book, both where it treats psychological problems in a novel way, and where it merely sums up accepted doctrine in a neat formula. And I know of no book which I would put with greater confidence into the hands of a capable Honours student, after he has made himself familiar with one or two of the more elementary text-books. But it must be an advanced student, for this is no book for beginners. Of that the author rightly warns us in the Preface: 'It is not an introduction to psychology in the usual sense of an elementary survey, but in the more technical sense of an introduction to a work with which

we are more or less familiar' (pp. ix, x). In fact it is an introduction to psychology where we regard psychology itself as the 'proper introduction to philosophy,' and mean by it 'knowledge of the system of experience, or of the structure and growth of the mind' (p. ix). The book does not try to supplant other text-books, but to supplement them, by furnishing a fuller discussion and criticism of psychological principles.

In a book where almost everything is good, it is hard to single out special points for praise. But four recurrent features of the general treatment are specially valuable: (1) the constant pointing out of errors and confusions, both such as we are betrayed into by the metaphors of current speech, or the superficial theories of popular thought, and those more subtle ones which are due to the adoption of false scientific conceptions by psychologists themselves. Thus chapter ii. 'The Explanations of Experience,' contains some trenchant criticisms of the attempts to split up the mind into 'elements' and then to apply conceptions borrowed from physics or chemistry to the explanation of their combination. Prof. Mitchell will have nothing to do with a psychology which treats 'perceiving, conceiving, believing and expecting, interest and attention' not as 'functions of our mental life whereby it thrives in the world' (p. 318) but as mere 'fusions' or 'colligations' of sensational elements. (2) The frequent references to education, both by way of illustration of true psychological doctrine, and by way of criticism of false educational theory and practice. As a typical example of the former sort of reference we may take the distinction between *instruction* and *discipline* in education as based on the psychological distinction within a thought 'between the thinking and what is thought' (p. 64). 'By instruction a teacher communicates a definite subject-matter, a doctrine, a fact; by discipline he communicates his ways of thinking and knowing,' in short his intellectual handling of the subject-matter, just as in moral education, instruction gives ideas of what is right and wrong, but discipline only can give an 'effective desire to do what is thought to be right'. Again the remarks on the use of literature in education (p. 149) deal tersely and lucidly with a subject famous since Plato's *Republic*. Psychologically the question is of 'Einfühlung,' the application to education comes in because 'what is read of people is not merely understood, it is always more or less lived as we live with the people in a novel or on the stage, needing no moral nor epilogue to point the lesson. It serves for a rehearsal of realities to come; it is a way to reverence and aspiration, and the only way of presenting evil with safety, and as a thing contemptible and detestable, and not only liable to punishment.' And this is followed by: 'In this living ["Einfühlung"] there is also the best discipline that the study of nature offers in the education of the young'. Interesting is the remark (p. 340) 'it is not a bad notion that an intelligent youth should be able to read the newspapers intelligently'; interesting also the warning not to 'confound general

intelligence with general information' (*ibid.*) against which we must put the supplementary caution (p. 382) against a purely formal training, a sharpening of the wits with a minimum of knowledge of facts 'as if cleverness can be clever without material'. Very excellent too are the decisive criticisms of the idea that education must follow some abstract logical scheme, such as a classification of the sciences (p. 344). Again: 'it is doubtless wrong to begin formal apart from material studies, *viz.*, language apart from literature, mathematics apart from things, and to begin the study of nature from the point of view of any of the sciences; and the shortest way is not always the best for knowledge and interest, let alone for mental discipline' (p. 445). The proper principle for the order of studies is *growth of the mind* as ascertained by psychology. 'Every teacher will frequently let his pupils feel their own errors' (p. 445) is another good remark. And the whole chapter xvii. may be recommended as containing a most useful discussion of the relation of 'nature' and 'nurture' in the growth of the mind, and a much-needed protest against the fashionable modern doctrine of *laissez-faire* in education, as if the task of parents and teachers were merely negative, *viz.*, to remove obstacles and dangers to natural growth. 'For not only is nature in the young not always right . . . but there never was a nature . . . that did not need the spur and a driving from good to better' (p. 438). I have, so far, merely singled out a few of the passages in which education is explicitly mentioned, but the whole of the book is full of discussions which can be made to bear on education, as *e.g.* the constant references to child-psychology; the discussion of curiosity (pp. 245 and 287); stupidity (p. 376); originality (p. 350); and in fact the whole treatment of the development of mind from sensory to perceptual and conceptual intelligence through 'learning'. And, on the other hand, the author does not overlook, as so many psychologists writing from the same point of view have done, that there is a mental growth *not due* to learning but to years, and temperament, and vigour, just as not all mental decay is due to nature, but also to nurture (p. 434).

(3) The third valuable feature is the very full and instructive analysis throughout the book of æsthetic experience—in fact, Prof. Mitchell in chapters vii. and viii. on 'Fellow-feeling and Individuation' and 'Absorption in an Object' gives us the only full account in English of the important doctrine of 'Einfühlung' with which I am acquainted. But as I have to say something by way of criticism on his treatment of this doctrine, I will go on at once to mention as fourth point:—

(4) The delightful discussions, particularly in chapter xvi. of the psychological facts from the region of intellectual, moral, emotional character, self, will, or whatever we may call it,—the sort of facts for the penetrating analysis of which we are wont to praise the psychology of a novel or a drama, but of which so little ever appears in the text-books of psychology. The only scientific treatment of them

that exists is generally to be found in the psychological parts of ethical treatises. Perhaps it is that the very use of these facts in literature has given rise to a prejudice against them as merely popular and incapable of scientific treatment. In that case we can learn from Prof. Mitchell that these facts need not be scamped by psychologists but can be made to take their place in a perfectly scientific account of the growth and structure of the mind, for they have their 'laws' like other psychological facts, and are capable of explanation and not merely of popular description. Thus Prof. Mitchell achieves in this chapter some remarks that are not commonplace even on topics so well-worn as that all our feelings must be necessarily selfish on the ground that 'since we do what pleases us, we must aim at our own pleasure, even when we think our care is for the pleasure of others' (p. 392). Again his account of the 'defect of intellectualism' in moral and æsthetic experience, and of the fatal 'sentimentalism' of the weak will, which 'may go not only with a knowledge of what is right, but with great emotion in the thought of ideals, deep sympathy with suffering, much resolving, and great remorse' (p. 397), strikes me as very excellent. And be it noted, that the description of the facts is never merely metaphorical, and the explanation always in terms of the fundamental conceptions which Prof. Mitchell had laid down in the earlier chapters. Similarly, the discussion of 'strength' of will (*e.g.* p. 399 ff.) is full of good things, such as the general principle that preference in actual conduct, not the comparison of pleasures and pains abstracted from their basis, is the measure of strength; that what we like best is determined not by violence of feeling, but by readiness to sacrifice other things for its realisation; that the will is weakened by letting the imagination habitually dwell on the unattainable. And who is not reminded of the ineffective idealist of Ibsen's 'Wild Duck' when he reads of the aspiration which turns to building castles in the air, so that 'There is more pleasure in achieving great deeds in idea than common things in reality' (p. 399). Nor could the thought that 'it is essential to an emotional life that a man should be taken out of himself in idea, just as it is essential to a practical life that he should be taken out of himself in reality' be more neatly expressed. Even on the 'freedom of the will' Prof. Mitchell has something to say that does not at once weary the reader by its familiarity: 'We are free against any of our likes, if we like to do something better, just as we are free against error and prejudice, if we know better. But the better liking, like the better knowledge, needs learning' (p. 403). I should like also in this connexion to direct attention to what the author has to say of the psychological conditions of morality (p. 285).

But I must resist the temptation to quote further—though it is itself but a testimony to the excellence of the book—in order to say something about the introductory chapters in which the foundations are laid for the subsequent account of the growth of the mind.

These chapters seem to me exceedingly important, both for the sake of the principles, and of the details of their analysis of experience. To justify this judgment I shall mention the author's discussion of three problems, *viz.* (1) the relation of mind and brain; (2) the 'direct explanation' of experience by reference to the 'occasion' on the one hand, and the 'structure' of the mind on the other, containing a re-introduction of the conception of 'faculties'; (3) the analysis of experience into subject-experience and object-experience, together with the conception of subject-experience as 'self-activity'.

(1) The problem of the relation of mind to brain is the problem of the 'indirect explanation,' *i.e.*, of the explanation of psychological events in terms of nervous structure and process. It is based on the assumption that 'whatever is possible to the mind, is possible to the brain' (p. 6). It presupposes all through the independent analysis and direct explanation of psychology, for we cannot inquire about the physical correlate of a certain feature of experience until we have determined its nature in psychological terms. The inference therefore is always *first* from the mind to the brain, and only when we have thus found the meaning of the nervous processes shall we be able to reverse the inference. Granted this assumption, the question is: Parallelism or Interaction? The author decides for Parallelism, *not however as a metaphysical doctrine* of an unknown reality manifesting itself simultaneously as consciousness and brain, but as a *mere working hypothesis*: 'except for clearness it does not make the least difference whether the assumption is right or wrong' (p. 7). Parallelism is to him mainly a protest against interaction, 'a hybrid process consisting partly of visible movements and partly of invisible feelings' (*ibid.*). Alike in the interests of physiology and psychology he assumes that a 'physical cause becomes a continuous physical effect which is broken at no point to become or receive a mental influence' (p. 6). And his ultimate reason for rejecting alike interaction and parallelism as a metaphysical doctrine is interesting, *viz.*, that both theories treat mind and brain as *co-ordinate*, overlooking that 'an abstraction is made [*viz.* from experiencing subjects] in the notion of physical events and things which is not made in the notion either of experience or of the mind' (p. 22). \*

I have gone into Prof. Mitchell's account of Parallelism at some length, because his adoption of it as a mere working-hypothesis is the most ingenious defence that could be made to meet the objections which are nowadays commonly brought against it. However strong these objections may be against *metaphysical* parallelism, we all know that a working-hypothesis need not be metaphysically true, and that its serviceableness for the purposes of science is the only thing we have to consider. It follows that the tendency in favour of interaction, which is undoubtedly on the increase among modern psychologists, can prevail only on the ground that interaction is the better scientific hypothesis. Now when it is sometimes said that interaction fits the facts of experience better, such as the

relation of stimulus and sensation, or the realisation of the will in external action, it is worth pointing out, that not only is the relation of sensation and stimulus not a 'fact' in the sense in which the realisation of the will is, but rather a scientific inference; and, secondly, that the question is not of the interaction (in some sense) of the mind with the body or the material universe, but of the interaction of mind and *brain or neural system*. And this interaction is certainly not a fact of experience but an inference from facts. And further, there is the complication that the two orders of interacting realities are not simultaneously accessible to the same observer; the one has only his experiences, but sees nothing of his neural processes or of their supposed action on his experiences; the other observes the neural processes, but can see nothing of their relation to a mind. Under these conditions, a division into a science of the neural facts, observable by sense and belonging to the common physical world, and another science of the psychical facts accessible to each observer primarily by introspection, seems to be the obvious division of labour demanded by the 'facts'. And this means Parallelism as a working-hypothesis.

On this basis, chapter xviii., the last in the book, carries the correlation of mind and brain into detail, so far as our present knowledge will permit. It points out that we may not assume a modification of experience for every modification of brain-process, for the brain has other functions in the life of the organism beside that of being the physical correlate of consciousness. On the other hand we must assume 'a brain-change for every change in experience' (p. 474), but without saying that the one is like the other (*e.g.*, that the sense of time mirrors the actual time taken by the corresponding brain process), or that to every detail which we can by analysis abstract in the mind, there must correspond a detail in the brain (*e.g.*, that every sensation is represented by a single specific cell). On the contrary, the correlation is rather between the brain *as a system*, and the mind *as a system* (p. 451). Hence it is an error to think that *e.g.* the correlate of our sense of the sameness of two things is that 'the same or similar parts of the cortex are excited'. In thus sweeping away much picturesque but false analogy, Prof. Mitchell shows himself familiar with the most up-to-date physiological teaching, as he does also in preferring the 'avalanche-view' of neural organisation to the 'army view,' *i.e.* to the theory that complex thoughts uniting many details must be represented by a pyramidal arrangement of neurones he prefers the view, held by McDougall and others, that higher levels are achieved by more complex *systems* of neurones. But into the details of the discussion of the neural correlates of thought, will, and emotion, we need not enter. Suffice it to say that Prof. Mitchell relies on the best authorities for his physiological facts and that he succeeds in compressing into a comparatively short space a vast amount of matter, ranging from the Neo-Müllerian law of specific energies

(p. 455) to a very excellent criticism of the theory that æsthetic interest is merely a complex of motor and organic sensations (p. 501).

(2) In contrast to the 'indirect explanation' of experience by means of the correlated neural processes, the 'direct explanation' uses only psychological factors, *viz.*, actual experiences and the 'structure' of the mind inferred from these. Prof. Mitchell starts (still in ch. i.) by regarding the mind as an individual growing thing: 'the mind is like a thing in respect of its individuality' (p. 16), this individuality he conceives neither as being due to an idle soul-substance, nor as a mere conglomerate of cohering experiences. Rather he finds it in the *structure* of the mind, which together with the occasion accounts for the occurrence and character of each experience. The structure has to be inferred from the experience and, except in so far as it is inherited, it is developed mainly in and by experience. 'If we say that the mind grows, it is because there is a growth in experience; and if we say there is a mind at all, it is because the nature of experience demands it' (p. 8). Again: 'the mind grows by its own working, and its way of working reveals its organisation' (p. 107).

This doctrine of the 'structure,' 'organisation' or 'faculties' of the mind seems to me to be one of the most important and valuable points in Prof. Mitchell's book. All mental action, in his view, is reaction on an occasion, developing that occasion. In sensation, the occasion is a physical stimulus, and only a physical explanation is possible in this case. But the sensation may itself become the occasion for higher developments, and with that we are within the province of psychology proper, and have to look for explanation to mental 'faculties' inherited or acquired.

But there are two kinds of 'faculties,' *viz.*, those that have at best only a descriptive or classificatory use, like the faculties of memory, will, reason, which are open to all the familiar objections against 'Faculty-psychology'. And, secondly, there are the faculties which we must assume for purposes, not of description, but of *explanation*. Such a faculty is a 'power to achieve experience by means that we do not experience' (p. 119), in other words, they are the mental conditions, other than the experience serving as 'occasion,' which must be assumed to account for the nature of our reaction to the occasion. Examples will best make clear what Prof. Mitchell means. Inherited faculties are *e.g.* 'our power of forming associations, and of forming habits of skill, thought, interest, conduct. For, in forming these, we are usually occupied with the present, and not with forming them; but, whether we wish it or not, our mind is thus forming itself at the same time in a manner that we can trace' (p. 119). And we have an example of an acquired faculty when we compare the working of the trained mind, achieving a result, *e.g.*, a calculation or a comparison, immediately and without effort, and the pains and troubles which the untrained mind has to reach the same result. A faculty in short is a kind of



skill, of which we can trace in experience alike the manner of its growing and of its working when fully grown. And the greater the number, development, and systematic connexion of such 'faculties,' in short, the more highly organised a 'mind' is, the more efficient it is in the three main modes of mental activity, *viz.*, thinking or knowing, feeling or taking an interest, willing or seeking. It will be seen that the 'faculties' of Prof. Mitchell are really nothing more than the 'dispositions' of other psychologists renamed. But we are rarely reminded that a disposition is after all nothing but a 'power to produce a certain experience' on occasion, and the term 'faculty' is valuable as insisting on this side of the matter, and bringing out the connexion of mental structure and mental function. And the whole doctrine of mental structure is valuable as disposing of the fiction of *unconscious* ideas and feelings.

(3) There remain to be mentioned a few points in Prof. Mitchell's 'Analysis of Experience' in chapters iii. and iv. I have just alluded to the fact that he accepts the traditional distinction of thinking, feeling, and willing, but I should like to add that he is careful to point out that these modes of activity, though separable by abstraction, are not separate in fact, and that every actual 'course of experience,' from the first instinctive movements in reaction to sensation to the most complex forms of conduct, thought, or aesthetic appreciation, contain all three kinds of activity, though generally one is dominant and gives its name to the whole experience. And the details of his analysis, especially of 'interest' (pp. 64-70) and volition (pp. 70-82) are excellent and deserve careful study. But the points to which I wish specially to draw attention, are (a) the analysis of *every* experience, whether cognitive, emotional or volitional, into an 'object-experience' and a 'subject-experience,' *i.e.* every experience is 'experience of an object by a self, and so of the attitude of a self towards an object' (p. 58), the attitude being felt, but not itself turned into an object. And (b) the view of this subject-experience, or attitude of the self to the object (whatever it may be, fact, imagination, general concept, law, etc.), as being always *experienced self-activity* (pp. 99 ff.). This is an interesting contribution to the vexed question of 'mental activity' in psychology. In effect, Prof. Mitchell distinguishes *three* uses of the word. First, we can speak of activity of the mind in the sense that every experience is due to the 'reaction' of the mind to a stimulus. But this activity is not experienced. We say that an experience is 'due' to it, from the point of view of psychological science, but it is not *felt as part* of the experience. Secondly, felt self-activity in the most general sense is common alike to thinking, feeling, willing, inasmuch as all three involve an attitude of the self towards, or an occupation with, the object. Thirdly, in a special sense, we apply activity to the volitional attitude, 'doing' as distinguished from feeling and thinking. Prof. Mitchell's distinctions certainly help to clear

the air, though they would perhaps have been more useful still if he had referred explicitly to some of the discussions in current literature, e.g. Mr. Bradley's article on the subject in *MIND* (N.S., 41).

If I have succeeded, by singling out these points, to give some idea of the wealth and interest of Prof. Mitchell's book, and thereby gaining for it fresh readers, the main purpose of this review will have been fulfilled. But I would like it to be clearly understood, that I have only picked a few good things at random, to whet the reader's appetite for more, and send him to study the book for himself. There are many important discussions which I have not had room to mention at all, e.g., the excellent remarks on attention (e.g. p. 269), on 'taking for granted' (p. 254), and on the different senses of 'implicit' (p. 251). It is hard to think that any one can fail to read this book without profit.

But I have one serious complaint. There is no index, and there is no marginal analysis. In a book of 512 closely-printed pages, dealing with such a vast material, both are really indispensable to assist the reader in orientation. There is indeed an elaborate table of contents (pp. xi-xxxv), giving a detailed analysis of each chapter. But in the first place, it is most inconvenient to have to refer back to it as a help in following the argument (often very complicated) of a chapter. And, secondly, it does not help one to collect all the scattered passages in which the author refers to a given subject. A reader who wishes to put together e.g. the remarks on emotion, or attention, or volition, has to face a wearisome search through 500 pages for about half a dozen widely separated passages, without, or with only parsimonious, cross-references. In a second edition, I hope Prof. Mitchell will remedy this defect, which seriously impairs the practical usefulness of his book for students. And, in any case, to do all one can for the convenience of the reader is surely a part of the 'good manners' of authorship.

As regards criticism of the subject-matter, there are a number of points which I should like to discuss, but space does not permit. I will only refer shortly to two: (1) from the excellent chapters on 'Einfühlung,' I carry away the impression that Prof. Mitchell lays too much stress on the *generic* character of the 'Einfühlung,' and rather slurs over the specific differences which go with different objects, and different attitudes towards them. The 'Einfühlung' in specifically æsthetic perception, for instance, is, as Lipps's elaborate analysis has shown, a very different thing from the Einfühlung of ordinary perception; and the same applies to Einfühlung in relation to nature, and to fellow-men. Sameness there is, of course, but also difference, and Prof. Mitchell seems to me to dwell too much on the sameness, with the result that a student, not familiar with the subject, will carry away a somewhat lop-sided impression. And, now that we have got the psychology of Einfühlung, would it not be better to abandon the absurd and misleading term 'inner imitation' for sympathy and emotional response? The author's criticisms

of the term (p. 140) are admirable, but the term had better go altogether.

And (2) it is probably my fault, but I am left puzzled by the exact relation of the 'immanent' and the 'real' object of a thought (pp. 66 ff.). Perhaps, if Prof. Mitchell had made the distinction clear by showing its application to *judgment* (of which, throughout the book, he says exceedingly little), all difficulty would have been removed. I gather from one of the several passages on 'truth' (p. 228) that Prof. Mitchell rightly holds that all thought (including perception) is concerned with a 'single system of reality': 'there is true knowledge of the one real world at every level of thought'. In all thought, then, I take it, *what* we think is some real object—with varying degrees of truth, no doubt, but still a real object. And when we distinguish the object *as it is* (cp. 'object as real, or as having such and such a nature,' p. 65) from the object *as we think* it, the reference, I should say, is to more complete as against more imperfect knowledge, *e.g.*, to the object as it is for science compared with what it 'seems' from a particular point of perception. But Prof. Mitchell describes the 'immanent' object, as distinct from the real one, in just these terms, *viz.*, as 'object as we think it,' as '*what* we think' in distinction from the act of thinking (p. 61). But were we not told that what we think is the real object? There is here a verbal ambiguity, to say the least of it. Of course, one can see the distinction which Prof. Mitchell is driving at, *viz.*, the distinction between thought as judgment, or thought in its logical function, and thought as a psychological process. To distinguish an object as we think it and as it is, is to distinguish degrees of knowledge and truth; to distinguish real and immanent object is to distinguish thought in its function as judgment, from thought in abstraction from that function. Or, if this is not the distinction intended by Prof. Mitchell, we surely are left with the problem how much of the immanent object which we are said to think coincides with the real object which we are also said to think.

Possibly my difficulties are due to having misunderstood Prof. Mitchell's meaning, but even so I can plead that his language is inclined to be ambiguous and his exposition lacking in clearness.

As for 'Truth,' Prof. Mitchell must be called a Pragmatist. A particular belief no less than the whole system of knowledge is true only when 'it works' (p. 334). And this 'working' consists in 'economising trouble and risk by prophecy' about reality (p. 222). 'If the expectations are disappointed, the beliefs are thought to have been false; if they are realised, the beliefs are found to be true' (p. 229). These quotations will show the Pragmatic character of his views, which are stated, however, without any reference to the current controversies about truth, and without a criticism of other views. The absence of polemics is not to be deplored, but surely some of the objections to the Pragmatic view, with which Prof. Mitchell cannot be unfamiliar, were worth an answer?

R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ.

*The Development of Greek Philosophy.* By the late Prof. R. ADAMSON. Edited by Prof. W. R. Sorley and Mr. R. P. Hardie. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1908. Pp. x., 326.

THE Editors of this volume say in their Preface: "The author did not live to write out any part of the book. But for many years he had been accustomed, as part of his university work, to lecture upon some period of Greek philosophy. He used few notes in lecturing, but he made constant reference to the text of the writers with whom he dealt; and he spoke so slowly that a rapid writer could take down almost every word. The material placed at the disposal of the editors has been preserved in this way; and they have endeavoured to present it to the reader in a form which does not obtrude its origin in the class-room. They are encouraged to believe that it is not an impossible task by the reception already given to the author's *Development of Modern Philosophy.*"

I should like to begin this Notice by saying that the Editors seem to me to have succeeded admirably in their presentment in book-form, of lectures which must have been singularly informing and stimulating to those who had the good fortune to hear them—lectures, on the one hand, spoken slowly by a remarkably clear and methodical thinker, and, on the other hand, demanding the constant co-operation of the hearers by way, not merely of 'taking notes,' but of perusing texts referred to at every step of the exposition. This is consequently a book which not only ought to "prove," as the Editors hope, "of value to students as an introduction to Greek Philosophy," but is also one from which lecturers on that, and indeed on any part of the History of Philosophy, may learn much concerning the method to be followed if their hearers are to be both informed and stimulated—a conjunction, I think, particularly difficult to effect in the case of lectures on the History of Philosophy, where the danger of 'cram' is always so great. It is not the least of the services rendered by Adamson to education that his lectures, as presented in this volume and its companion, illustrate so clearly for lecturers on Philosophy, especially on the History of Philosophy, the method by which this all-important conjunction may be effected.

Having said thus much about the general value of this volume, let me now refer to a few matters in it which seem to me to be of special interest. It covers so much ground—the whole of Early Greek Philosophy, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics—that this is all that I can do within the limits of a Notice like the present.

I think that it is a very true, and a very important remark which is made on p. 77—that Plato's sense of a certain "deficiency in the Socratic ethics"—the failure of Socrates to answer the question, 'What is the Good?'—"lay at the foundation of much of the theory of Ideas". This being so, the Earliest Dialogues—the *Euthyphro*, *Crito*, *Charmides*, *Laches*—which it has been the

fashion to rule out of court as evidence for what Plato meant by his 'Ideas,' are seen to be of the first importance. Adamson does not make this development, but it is involved in the remark quoted.

The most important passage for Adamson's view of the Doctrine of Ideas is on pp. 110-113. The knowledge and hard thinking behind this short passage are, indeed, most remarkable: one sees behind it Plato's own account of the Doctrine of Ideas and the views—often contradictory—of the leading exponents of that account all clearly realized by the lecturer as material; and this material one sees him forthwith shaping into his own form with masterly ease. The impression, however, which the passage gives of Adamson's learning and ability is not, to my mind, incompatible with, at least qualified, dissent from his actual conclusion. His conclusion is that the earlier conception—that in the *Republic* and other Dialogues of the same period—of the relation between generated particular and 'Idea' as one between individual and class, particular and universal, many and one, is modified in the *Sophistes* and *Philebus*:—"in the *Republic* "the Ideas are contemplated from the point of view of generalisation" and the interconnexion between them is "of the external kind which is dependent on the play of our thinking"; whereas, in the *Sophistes*, their interconnexion is determined by their intrinsic natures. This view of their interconnexion seems to Adamson to prepare the way "for excluding from the realm of real existence much that would have been included in it from the earlier point of view," and it is in the *Philebus* that he finds this result brought about, where, he holds, the *αἰτία*, not the *πῆμα* or the *μικρόν*, is the realm of the 'Ideas'—that is, the 'Ideas' are causes of the imposition of quantitative definiteness upon the indefinite, and particulars, so far as they realise quantitative definiteness, obtain "a certain conformity to the Ideas, and therewith a certain share of existence." It is as quantitatively definite in this way, rather than as an individual belonging to a class, or a particular falling under a universal, that the sensible thing is related to its 'Idea'. Let me offer two remarks on this view. First: The difference noted by Adamson between the *Republic* and the *Sophist* seems to me to be sufficiently accounted for, without distinguishing an 'earlier' and a 'later' view, by the fact that in the *Republic* the 'Ideas' dwelt upon are notions or scientific points of view specially belonging to their respective departments of inquiry (e.g. *Justice*, *Bed*, etc.), whereas in the *Sophistes* they are the general notions or categories of thought (*Same*, *Different*, etc.) employed in all departments of inquiry, i.e., wherever the 'Ideas' of special application are being sought for. The *κοινωνία* of these general categories happens to be the subject of the *Sophistes*, a subject which is not before Plato in the *Republic*. Secondly: I think that the *αἰτία* of the *Philebus* is not coextensive with the realm of the Ideas, but is simply the 'Idea of the Good'—the one rational cause which differentiates itself in the various 'Ideas,' which, as objects of

science—'laws of nature'—exhibit definite numerical ratios: they are not, indeed, simply these ratios—here I agree with Adamson—but it is as belonging to the *μικτόν*-class—here I agree with Prof. Henry Jackson—that they exhibit them. In the *Republic* the Good is *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*, therefore not an object to be scientifically determined; in the *Philebus* it is presented as capable of being so determined. But there is no inconsistency between these two positions; for the Good of the *Republic* is the *αἰρά*—the Universal Good; while in the *Philebus* we are mainly concerned with special manifestations, in the *μικτόν*-class, of the Universal Good. Prof. Jackson, indeed, places sensible particulars in the *μικτόν*-class along side of the 'Ideas' of 'natural kinds'—the *παράδειγματα* of these particulars; while Adamson restricts the contents of the *μικτόν*-class entirely to particulars—"the individuals in their imperfection," he says, "constitute the mixed class". I prefer to restrict the contents of the mixed class to the 'Ideas' other than the 'Idea of the Good'. Particulars of sense, I take it, have no place in the scheme *ἄπειρον—πέρας—μικτόν—αἰρά*. We have to do only with logical entities.

In the Aristotelian Philosophy Adamson finds a hiatus which runs through its psychology, epistemology and ontology: *Νοῦς* in man stands out of all relation to *Ψυχή* on the one hand, and to the Divine *Νοῦς* on the other hand, and the Divine *Νοῦς*—the Prime Mover, God—out of all relation to the world which is moved—"The Divine Mover is put beyond all conceivable connexion with the world of the concrete; and one can hardly regard as a sufficient explanation the reference to the striving of all things towards the Divine. From this striving it must also remain impossible to derive their characteristic natures. Thus it seems impossible to reconcile the unity and absoluteness of the Divine mind with the multiplicity and relateness of even the intelligible essences of the world of generation. The two worlds still, as in Plato, fall apart without the possibility of rational connexion (p. 248)"—"No means of connexion is supplied between the pure unmixed energy (and, therefore, the continuous and systematic character of the intelligible) in the first cause, and the variety of forms embedded in matter in the world of generation. Such forms so far share the character of the original cause that they are eternal, uncreated. The causal energy transmitted to the world of generation is exercised not in producing such forms, but in effecting the constant variation of individuals. Neither, therefore, can the eternal forms find explanation in the supreme reason, nor is there furnished any ground of explanation for the other factor, the condition of all plurality, individuality, development—namely, matter. One is almost inclined to characterise the theory as a mistaken attempt to turn a purely abstract theorem into a concrete and apparently scientific explanation of facts (p. 226)."

Here, I venture to think, Adamson, with Zeller and others,

applies the standard of logic to that which, from its nature, does not admit, and is not regarded by Aristotle as admitting, the application of such a standard. Had Aristotle regarded his First Philosophy or Theology as a system against which logical objections such as those brought by Adamson were relevant, we may be sure that he would have presented it otherwise than he has done. How does he present it? In this form: 'God, as Final End of appetition and intellection, moves the universe and all that is therein, Himself unmoved'. That is all: to this dictum Aristotle's 'teleological account of the universe' is strictly limited. How, and why, God moves the universe just as He does move it, Aristotle does not attempt to determine. His 'teleology' here is certainly not 'scientific' (there is a 'scientific teleology' of which indeed he is the master), nor is it 'unscientific' like that of 'the Argument from Design,' but it is what may be called 'supra-scientific.' It appeals, not to the scientific understanding, but to that 'faith' which transcends and sustains the operations of the scientific understanding. Instead of deploring, with Zeller and Adamson, the lack of logic in Aristotle's First Philosophy, I consider it a great merit.

The lack of logic in the great logician's First Philosophy, together with here and there phrases disclosing high imagination and deep emotion, seems to me to determine, once for all, the true character of that Philosophy or Theology. It is not science. The Final End which its 'teleology' posits is one of which no 'constitutive' use may be made in science. But there are ends—subordinate ends under the Final End—of which a 'constitutive' use may rightly be made. Here we have what I alluded to above as that 'scientific teleology' of which Aristotle is the master—the method of biology. The method of biology, as Aristotle adumbrated it, and we now understand it, is to take each whole animal or plant-organism (not of course *per se*, but in environment) as End, and from that Whole as End to work back to the explanation of its parts; then, from the parts so explained to return to the Whole, and revise one's original conception of it, repeating this double procedure till the given organism is seen clearly as a connected system. The advance which has been made in biology during the last fifty years has been mainly due to the consistent employment in detail of the 'teleological' method which Aristotle recognised as proper to the subject. Characters which were once regarded as merely 'accidental' or 'ornamental' are now shown to be *useful*—are explained in relation to the survival of the specific form, their End. But this is possible only where, as in biology, the 'Wholes' or 'Ends' are definite objects of observation, and the 'parts' or 'means' are capable of being clearly and distinctly seen as parts of, or means to, their respective Wholes or Ends. Here we have 'scientific teleology,' and logic rules. But the universe is not a 'Whole,' nor is God an 'End,' to be thus made object of scientific observation. If we bring in logic to explain 'parts' or 'means,' in relation to such a 'Whole'



or 'End,' our 'teleology' is 'unscientific'. The only 'teleology' which is admissible is that which I have ventured to call 'supra-scientific' and to vindicate for Aristotle. As logician and biologist he viewed nature as a great system of specific forms or εἶδη, each one sharply defined, each one a morphological whole, or organism, repaying much careful examination of its parts, as parts of that definite whole: and his 'teleology' as *scientific* method, does not go beyond the relations of the parts of each εἶδος to that εἶδος itself as whole: if he attempts to group the various εἶδη into one κόσμος, that κόσμος is regarded by him as End for a supra-scientific, not for a scientific teleology. It was perhaps fortunate, when we consider the state of knowledge in Aristotle's day, that he held so firmly to the view that biological species, or εἶδη, are *fixed*. Had he, with his insufficient knowledge and means of investigation, believed that species are not fixed, but fluid, he would doubtless have been tempted into the path of speculation regarding their *future*; he would have been tempted to make some form not yet achieved, rather than the existing form, the end from which to derive his teleological explanations. Fortunately all the evidence available was in favour of fixed species of plants and animals. To social forms, on the other hand, he did apply the conception of evolution; and shows a tendency to read the future into the past. His conception of πόλις as goal of social development rather overshadows him when he investigates the Family, and causes him to see the history of the domestic relation of master and slave in a wrong light. I think, therefore, that Adamson's criticism of the fixity of specific forms in the Aristotelian system does not hit the mark (see passage from p. 226 quoted above). Aristotle, I take it, as naturalist, simply did not speculate about the *origin* of species; and, further, although regarding them as fixed, he did not regard them as fixed in the static sense, but as dynamic agencies (specific manifestations of the one force communicated to the universe by the Prime Mover) always operating in the same way—ἄνθρωπος, ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ.

On page 260 the following remarkable *obiter dictum* stands in a footnote: "Carneades, by far the acutest mind in antiquity—a regular Hume". One regrets much that Adamson did not indicate the reasons he had for this judgment on a philosopher whose significance has been strangely overlooked. I have myself long held the view which Adamson expresses in this note; and I think that I understand what his reasons for it must have been. At any rate, if they were at all like mine, they were pretty much the following: Carneades relieved (or rather, if he had 'caught on,' would have relieved) Platonism of an incubus which the Academy had put upon it—the incubus of the Doctrine of a World of Realities cut off from a World of *Sensibilia* which are not Realities at all. Plato himself, in his Dialogues throughout, and doubtless in his oral teaching, protested against the separation of

the two Worlds; but his disciples found it more conducive to 'philosophical discussion' to maintain it—'philosophical discussion' they preferred to 'research' as prosecuted by the Peripatetics and the Stoics—the latter, as Adamson points out (p. 258), largely influenced by the former. The natural result of 'philosophical discussion' preferred to 'research' was the 'scepticism' which eventually captured the Academy. The world of sensible phenomena, it was urged, is unmeaning unless it can be seen to resemble, or reveal in some way, the World of Real Substances. But how can it be seen to do this? These Real Substances are incomprehensible and their so-called sensible manifestations are consequently unmeaning. Now Carneades opened up this *impasse* of Academic scepticism by substituting for the 'category' of *substance* that of *nexus*. His position was thus very like that taken up by Berkeley. Instead of the insoluble problem of making out the conformity of our impressions—*πάθη* or *φαντασίαι* with real substances—*πράγματα*, their causes, we have the soluble one of ascertaining the ways in which, as a matter of fact, our impressions are connected with one another—for our impressions "hang together like the links of a chain," *οὐδέποτε φαντασία μονοειδὴς ὑφίσταται ἀλλ' ἀλύσειος τρόπον ἄλλη ἐξ ἄλλης ἡρτῆται* (*Sext. Emp.*, vii., 166). The nexus of impressions or phenomena is the true reality—not a static reality hidden behind them (whether that static reality be figured as Eternal Idea or as Material Substratum makes no difference), but a dynamic reality penetrating them, and, moreover (our present-day 'Pragmatists' may take note of this anticipation of their doctrine), a reality to be defined *in relation to the conduct of life and to happiness*—*πρὸς τε τὴν τοῦ βίου διαγωγὴν καὶ τὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας περίκτησιν* (*Sext. Emp.*, vii., 166). It is in this form that Carneades reinstates, or tries to reinstate, in the teaching of the Academy, the doctrine, at once epistemological and ethical, of the primacy of the Good which Plato found it so difficult to get his pupils and other critics to grasp. Carneades was indeed, as Adamson says, "a regular Hume"—but unfortunately Ancient Philosophy produced no Kant to follow and develop its Hume.

J. A. STEWART.

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*The Philosophy of Loyalty.* By JOSIAH ROYCE, Professor of the History of Philosophy in Harvard University. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1908. Pp. xii, 409.

It is somewhat equivocal praise of a brilliant writer to say of his book that it "gives new names to old ways of thinking". In this latest work of Prof. Royce's there is much to invite such a verdict. His task—that of presenting an ethical doctrine at once philosophically sound and practically applicable, within the limits of eight popular lectures—was indeed both a fresh and a bold one. And, we may say at once, from the "homiletic" point of view the enterprise

succeeds. No reader of the type the Author means to address is likely to lay down the book without feeling that it has cast some light on the actual problems of life and duty. But to the philosophical section of his audience, Prof. Royce's "way of thinking" will not be new. His solution of the ethical problem is just what, in this country at least, would be understood as the ordinary idealistic solution. He claims indeed that the moral end is to be "loyal". But the fundamental assertion on which he bases the claim is the characteristic doctrine of idealism. Through Loyalty alone will a man be able to realise his own rational will in a good which yet transcends his private individuality. "If you want to know what is good for you," he says in Chapter I, "bring your own will to self-consciousness, . . . this is a first principle, of all ethical inquiry"; but yet "I can never find what my own will is by merely brooding over my natural desires"; and the solution of this paradox—the realisation of my true will—can only lie "in some happy union between the inner and the outer, between my social world and myself". This happy union is what takes place wherever mere social conformity turns into exactly what in these lectures the Author calls "Loyalty".

Yet old and familiar as Prof. Royce's real standpoint is, his work is more than an idle shuffling of terms. The new form given to the old truth at once charges it with fresh power. It enables the philosopher to preach. It enables him to put to his reader, in a single, definite, terse statement, an applicable doctrine of the chief end of man. "*In Loyalty*," he prints in italics, "*when Loyalty is properly defined, lies the fulfilment of the whole moral Law*." The simplicity of the conception transforms the philosophic doctrine into a kind of message. "Loyalty" is something men know—something, therefore, that they can be called to. There is more than a renaming, there is a genuine rejuvenation of idea in Prof. Royce's presentation of the idealistic doctrine of the moral end.

Now, to catch a popular word like this and proceed to find in it all the law and the prophets might have been quite a cheap and easy process. It is the characteristic device of the woolly-headed preacher everywhere. The danger to a thinker is that a term so serviceable as a moral rallying-cry may need some torturing before it can be taken to express the philosophic truth. It is the triumph of Prof. Royce's popular lecturing, however, that he can be faithful to his term. He has brought forward a conception—Loyalty, or "the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause"—which, simple as it is, not only expresses the underlying idealistic truth that the moral end is the common good, but seems—at first sight at least—to meet the familiar difficulties which surround that doctrine in a remarkably adequate way.

For what is—at first sight—the standing difficulty of idealistic ethics in connexion with its theory of a common good? Is it not simply that of ensuring the double condition, first, that the good

shall be really good, and, secondly, that it shall be really common? The difficulty with "Duty," *e.g.*, is that it is common without being clearly the doer's good; with "Self-realisation," that it may be good, but is not so obviously common. Now "Loyalty" seems to have the necessary double front. It is "common"—in at least this simple and obvious sense, that common people are capable of it. "It is no aristocratic gift of the few." It is a good, if good it be at all, equally open to the humblest and the highest. On the other hand, that Loyalty is a good, "viewed merely as a personal attitude" and "quite apart from all question as to its object," is the burden of three of the Author's most convincing chapters. By giving the individual a cause to which he can commit himself, Loyalty reconciles him to himself—gives him at once a will of his own and a field for its expression. Objections to Loyalty come mostly from the side of individualism, but they all presuppose the thing they object to. True it is that, in past history, the blind loyalty of men has been the food on which oppression and tyranny have thriven, but the alternative—freedom—is itself a cause which calls for loyalty. Narrow loyalties—to class honour and the like—may lead to conduct eccentric, preposterous and unjust; but when such action is condemned, it is condemned in the name of loyalty to some wider cause. Of the claim most characteristic of individualism—and echoed in so much of our modern literature—that we should before all things be autonomous individuals, the same is to be said. So far as its form goes we admit the demand. Autonomy is morally essential. "Only your own will brought to a knowledge of itself can determine for you what your duty is." But individualism errs by seeking it in the wrong place. Neither in personal pleasure, nor in personal might, nor in personal serenity of soul can that being be truly autonomous whose very nature is social, and who therefore craves for an extra-personal and super-personal to which he can be "freely loyal".

Loyalty, then, is an accessible good to all and a supreme good to each; and so far, Prof. Royce's conception is promising. But here it threatens to fall foul of the requirements of a real theory of the moral end. Is this which is said to be "accessible to all" really one good? Are all the actual loyalties of men genuine examples of one thing, or are they a mere collection of things utterly diverse, united only by the thin identity of a specious name? There are facts which seem to favour the latter view. Causes conflict. Loyalty to a clan at feud, for instance, or to a civilised nation in a state of war-fever directs all its force towards the death of the enemy's loyalty to his clan or nation. Loyalties seem to differ, indeed—and mortally. We assume that Loyalty is one when we call it the one supreme good. If so, we must call it self-destructive. And a self-destructive supreme good is simply supreme evil.

What is at stake is the identity of Loyalty; and Prof. Royce saves it by pointing out that its self-destructive character is accidental.

The essential fact is that Loyalty is self-generating and self-supporting. Within the unity of a common cause its appearance in one member strengthens and promotes its manifestation in another. "Brother strengthens brother." This essentially unifying character of Loyalty makes an adjustment conceivable whereby all causes shall subserve one universal cause. To the crucial question, what shall be the universal aim? under what universal idea shall the adjustment be realised? the answer is at hand in the conception of Loyalty itself. If the loyalty of A is a supreme good for him and that of B a supreme good for him, the collision of the two means ultimate waste of good. Make it the ultimate aim, then, to prevent such collision. Make the promotion of Loyalty in all other men the ultimate cause, and in all your loyalty be loyal to that.

It would be petty criticism to dwell here on the fact that there is a circle involved—to object that the maxim "be loyal to Loyalty" could always be confronted by the question "loyal to loyalty to what?" After all, there must be a circle somewhere in human affairs, and in ethics if the circle be but big enough it is all that can fairly be demanded. That it is so in Prof. Royce's case is shown by the finely illuminating discussion in the central chapters of his book where he turns the light of his principle upon practical problems—problems of the individual conscience, of modern American social life, and of education.

A more serious criticism, however, lies just behind. Is this one good which is accessible to all, the same thing as that Loyalty which is said to be the good of each? or rather, has the Author shown it to be so? On the surface, he has not. His argument seems to be simply: "Loyalty is a good, hence the more of it the better; promote, therefore, the maximum of loyalty; choose your private cause with a view to that". The argument seems dangerously near to Mill's famous *ignoratio elenchi*, "each person's loyalty is a good to that person, the loyalty of all therefore a good to the aggregate of all persons". Yet, though the Author has not raised this difficulty explicitly we venture to think he has implicitly met it, and in doing so, has met it in the only way compatible with the character of his book.

What is wanted is some proof that maximum loyalty in others is supreme good to that particular private being who finds his own good in his own loyalty. Now, it hardly needs to be proved that the virtues are loyalty. Further, it has been proved by Prof. Royce—it is a thesis central to his whole position—that the virtues are loyalty to loyalty; and that the way to be virtuous in highest degree—the way to define our duties and find our moral path in the most effective way—is to follow the maxim "be loyal to Loyalty". These two statements together, provided both are sound, seem to make the point. The more loyal I am to loyalty the more virtuous I become, for thereby I find my moral path better: which means, the more loyal I am to Loyalty, the more loyal I become as an individual,

for to be virtuous is to be loyal. In other words: in proportion as I give myself away to the service of the universal good, in that proportion do I reap the "Loyalty," which is my individual good. Explicitly, Prof. Royce's popular statement has not gone further than to say that in Loyalty I *both get and give* good. His argument required more. It required that I get *in proportion as* I give. But his data really yield that conclusion, provided the latter of the two premises is right; that is, provided his principle furnishes the key to moral perplexity which he supposes it to furnish. This final question could only be answered by a critical examination, longer than can be undertaken here, of the cases to which Prof. Royce thinks his principle can be applied with success. It is important to note, however, that the issue all turns on the applicability of the principle—on the simple question whether the maxim "be loyal to loyalty" is good practical advice or no. In concentrating on this question the Author was giving the only "proof" of the idealistic conception of the moral end compatible with the popular character of his undertaking—ultimately, perhaps, the only proof it is possible to give.

Despite his able defence, throughout the first six chapters of his book, of the view that Loyalty contains all the private good that the individual can really want, the reader still feels that something more is needed before the ghost of individualism has been laid. Is it certain, after all, that the giving of oneself away in loyalty to a cause never means loss—that it never means curtailment of freedom or of power, or of any genuine individual good? These questions seem to demand some sort of religious philosophy to support the ethical structure. This is what the Author in the last two lectures tries to furnish. And his endeavour leads him into direct conflict with certain recent metaphysical tendencies represented pre-eminently by his friend and colleague Prof. James.

Prof. Royce would not come into conflict with Pragmatism unless it implied a truth for him. That the truth is no insignificant one becomes apparent from his problem. If Loyalty is to be the ultimate good, then loyalty to a cause however poor must never be sheer lost labour. Where are the grounds for such a belief? The Author finds them in the fact that there is one cause to serve which is to be ultimately successful, namely, Truth; and in the further fact implied therein, that all service, in so far as it is directed to a cause which is true, is similarly successful. And all causes have some truth. Now in order to see how Truth can be regarded as a cause at all, we must recall just such facts as Modern Pragmatism has brought into prominence. Truth, it has insisted, is an active attitude. There is no mere theoretic truth. The search for truth is an active seeking for practical congruity between our principles, and our attained empirical results. Principles are true if they "succeed" and they succeed if they are true. All this is a necessary part of Prof. Royce's own position. It remains for him only to

push the last statement further, and ask what "success" means. To this he answers that success, in the sense in which truth is success, is not a merely private subjective experience. Neither is it any possible number of such experiences on the part of one individual or any number of individuals. "Success," in this application, is only where that state of facts towards which the individual's mind is directed—that which in the moments of his insight and devotion he becomes—is in itself verily and permanently real. This conception of an ultimately real, all-inclusive individual experience—the reality of that rational common spirit which appears wherever men try to think truly or serve loyally—is what the Author calls the "Eternal World". From it he derives his final definition of Loyalty. "Loyalty is the will to manifest, so far as is possible, the Eternal, that is, the conscious and superhuman unity of life, in the form of the acts of an individual self." This conception closes the system. In the universal Life the ultimate success of our loyal life is assured, for in it all our finitude and imperfection is completed.

Without these closing chapters the claim of Loyalty would not be stated in its most convincing form. The Author's metaphysic is no mere addendum to his Ethics. Until a philosophy of religion has shown where every imperfect effort comes to rest in "a conspectus of life which includes all temporal happenings and strivings in a single consciousness and fulfils all our actual purposes together and is all we seek to be," the fulness of the *good* of Loyalty is not disclosed. It is here, perhaps, that, to many readers, the greatest difficulties of the book will be found. It does not seem satisfying that even "in the end" our failures should cost us nothing—that a miraculous forgiveness should wipe out all error at a stroke and put saint and sinner together—and in the final "conspectus of life" such seems to be the result. If, in the Eternal, all our fragmentary efforts are to be caught up and fulfilled, where are we to find any ultimate distinction of result between the good among them and the bad? Still, it is perhaps hardly a blemish in a popular book, that it abstain from offering a solution of the problem of evil, if only it do not put obviously insurmountable barriers in the way of any possible solution. This reflection has the greater applicability to a writer who has worked out a theory of the evil will elsewhere, in view of which his present position is adopted. In seeking the missing distinction, it must not be overlooked that the will which finds ultimate fulfilment is "the will to manifest the Eternal". The will to thwart an Eternal which necessarily prevails—or any other will in so far as it cherishes this evil aim—must of necessity find its undoing.

The most serious difficulties, however, are likely to be found in that attempted union of voluntarism and realism—that mutual involution of will, thought and reality—which the conception of the eternal itself means to express. It is comparatively easy, with Pragmatism, to invest reality with the "dynamic" of living thought and purpose if we are willing to sacrifice everything to that. It is a different matter



to try, as Prof. Royce does, to invest thought and purpose at the same time with the objectivity of reality. Yet the significance of the book as a statement of the idealistic view of life for a popular audience would seem to lie not a little in the fact that it has dared to put forward such a conception. There has been almost too much militant idealism in the air of recent years. For some reason, it has not rung sound. The very eagerness with which Pragmatic writers hasten to defend their claim to *make* our moral and religious postulates true, has tended to cast suspicion on their truth. There has been a lack of true philosophic humility, an absence of patient logic, an unseemly proneness on the part of many who deal with the ultimate nature of reality and life to report things not as they are but as they and we want to see them. Despite speculative difficulties, it will do something to restore the confidence of the educated mind in the spiritual view of the world, to meet for once a "recent idealist" who claims no subjective right over the reality he interprets, but dares avow from the outset that he believes in the Eternal and is in quest of it. Moreover, the very fact that his metaphysical speculations are so capable as they are of yielding the ethical system and the penetrating criticism of life which he has extracted from them, is itself no mean indication that the inherent difficulties they contain may in the end prove surmountable.

J. W. SCOTT.

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*Geschichte der Griechischen Ethik.* MAX WUNDT, Erster Band, *Die Entstehung der Griechischen Ethik.* Leipzig : Engelmann, 1908. Pp. ix, 535.

THE present instalment of Dr. Wundt's learned and careful work brings the history of Greek ethical ideas down to Plato ; the second volume, which is to complete the book, and to deal particularly with the influence of Hellenistic ethics on the development of Christianity, should be warmly welcomed, if the author fulfils in it the expectations which his treatment of the rise of ethical science arouses. Dr. Wundt's general position may be summed up briefly by saying that he sees in Greek ethics the result of a fusion between the Ionian and the Attic character. Ionia contributes the element of restless intellectual curiosity and determination to comprehend the facts of human life as a rational system, Attica, as might be expected from the more settled agrarian character of its inhabitants, that of moral backbone and religious earnestness. There is a great deal that is attractive in this analysis, and probably no one will doubt that the contrast upon which the author lays such stress does exhibit itself on a comparison of Ionic with Attic literature, though one may be permitted to doubt, at least until we know more than we do at present of the racial antecedents of the people of Attica, how far the explanation is really to be found in an ethnological difference.

With respect to particular points, I would specially commend the

chapters on the Attic drama, and the account of the "Sophists"; it was an excellent thought to call special attention to the connexion of almost all the prominent figures of the sophistic movement with Ionia or Ionian colonies. I am not so clear about the satisfactoriness of the author's treatment of "Homer" as a characteristically Ionian product. It is at least rash to infer, *e.g.*, that the absence of pictures of home life from the *Iliad* shows that the "restless Ionian spirit" was indifferent to the attractions of home and native land. After all the *Iliad* does not profess to give an account of the everyday life of the society it describes; its characters are all placed in unusual surroundings; they are "on the war-path," and we cannot infer much from their behaviour as to the kind of existence they would lead in more normal conditions. Besides, if they do not indulge in rhapsodies about "home," they are all, at least, represented as sick of war, and only anxious to have done with it. "A good return home" is the first thing which a person peculiarly anxious to win their favour thinks of wishing them. Dr. Wundt, indeed, describes them as only living for war, and actually calling it by a name which means "*Wonne*," but surely this etymology of *χάρις*, which is at variance with the spirit of every epithet ever applied in the poem to the works of war, must be a false one. So I doubt very gravely whether *φιλοπτόλεμος* is really a eulogistic term in the *Iliad*. In one of the two passages cited by Dr. Wundt it is used by Hector about the besieging Achæans, and is thus more likely than not to be the reverse of a compliment, in the other, where it is applied by Achilles to the Myrmidones, it need not be complimentary. Nor does "Homer" really say, as Dr. Wundt makes him say, that "war is dearer than home": what he says is that on a special occasion Athene miraculously made it seem so to the Achæan host. The whole point of the passage lies in the monstrosity of the delusion. It is a curious omission that nothing should be said about the two striking ethical ideas of *αἰδώς* and *νέμεσις*, and it is at least doubtful whether the author is right in assuming that the famous cycles of tragic stories about "Thebes and Pelops' line" were unknown to the Homeric poets. When one considers the very primitive character of the conception of the "curse" of Œdipus on his sons, in the *Septem* of Æschylus, or of the part taken by the ghost of Clytæmnestra in the pursuit of Orestes, does it not seem more likely that those stories were deliberately ignored by the epic poets than that they should not have been invented until the seventh century?

I doubt again whether the author has any real justification for his insistence upon the "aristocratic" character of the early Attic moral ideal, as illustrated by Herodotus' story of Tellus. There is nothing in the text of Herodotus to show that Tellus was either particularly rich or well-born, and the dramatic effect of Solon's praises of him to Cræsus rather suffers if we suppose that he was either.

I suspect that the connexion asserted to exist between Pythagoreanism and aristocratic sympathies is equally fanciful, though I know that most historians agree on the point with Dr. Wundt. Still, the best-accredited account of the persecution of the Pythagoreans in South Italy (an account which appears to go back to Aristoxenus), expressly ascribes the persecuting movement to "the nobles," and Empedocles, whose general ethical and religious activity cannot be severed from the wider Orphic-Pythagorean movement, was notoriously a fanatic for democracy. There are also some unfortunate omissions in the treatment of Pythagoreanism. Something ought to have been said of the famous doctrine of the "three lives," which almost certainly goes back to Pythagoras himself, and has left so deep a mark on the *Republic* and *Ethics*. On the other hand, it is pretty certainly a mistake to credit the early Pythagoreans with the conception of the soul as the *ἀρμυρία* of the body, which we know to have been current among the Pythagorean friends of Socrates and Plato. The whole theory really depends on the medical doctrines of Alcmaeon, which, by the way, are ignored by Dr. Wundt, though they are demonstrably the source of the Platonic (and Aristotelian) theory of the "mean," and of Plato's psychology of pleasure. Dr. Wundt, in fact, has been unable to do anything like justice to the part played by the Italian thinkers in the history of ethics, because he unfortunately shares the popular prejudice against the historical accuracy of Plato's account of the relation of Socrates to contemporary thinkers. A consequence of this prejudice is that there are certain grave omissions in the interesting section devoted to Socrates himself. Dr. Wundt is rightly sceptical about the historical value of Xenophon's reminiscences, but he has not seen that Plato, in the *Phædo* and elsewhere, provides us with a fairly detailed account of Socrates' spiritual history, which can be confirmed on almost every point by the satiric portrait of Aristophanes. It is our wilful neglect of this testimony which has made Socrates, what Dr. Wundt calls him, one of the least understood figures of history. If we will only believe what Plato has to tell us about the influence on Socrates of Archelaus and Diogenes, and the book of Anaxagoras, and his close relations with the Pythagorean communities of Thebes and Phlius, most of our difficulties about him will be found to disappear. We shall understand, *e.g.*, why Aristophanes represents him in the *Clouds* as a mathematician (a character which even Xenophon is unable to deny to him), and in the *Birds* as a necromancer. Dr. Wundt himself affords a good example of the way in which "having eyes we see not" when Socrates is concerned in his remarks about the famous story of the oracle given to Chærephon at Delphi. The oracle, he says, is represented as being at once the consequence and the cause of Socrates' philosophic career, and the contradiction shows that, though the giving of the oracle must be a fact, the account in the *Apology* of the circumstances under which it was

given cannot be historical. But the supposed difficulty does not really exist at all, and the result which follows from examining the statement of Plato is most instructive. What Plato's story presupposes is that, while it was the oracle which led Socrates to devote himself to his missionary career, of which his position among the inquiring *véoi* was a consequence, Socrates was previously well known as a "wit" in the more restricted philosophical circles — apparently connected with Pythagoreanism — to which Chærephon belonged. Now since in the *Charmides* and *Symposium* Socrates is represented as enjoying his peculiar reputation with the *véoi* as early as the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, or even earlier (as it is made to go back at least to the earliest boyhood of Alcibiades, who was of military age when the war began), it follows that Plato must think of the famous oracle as belonging to a date not much later, at the outside, than 440, when Socrates would be a man of thirty. His first reputation as a σοφός must therefore have been established by that time, a result which also follows from any careful study of the *Protagoras*. Hence the statements of the *Phædo* and *Parmenides* about his early interest in philosophy must be absolutely correct, and the whole current notion of him, defended by Dr. Wundt, as a person who knew only as much about the older Greek speculation as could be picked up in general conversation, must be dismissed as a pure blunder. In particular the way is opened for a perception of the all-important truth that it is largely through Socrates that the ethical side of the Pythagoreanism taught by Philolaus and his friends found its way into the works of Plato. It also becomes necessary to correct Dr. Wundt, and with him the generality of German students on a still more important point. We no longer have the right to assert, in the very teeth of Plato's most explicit representations, that the doctrine of εἶδη was invented by Plato, and consequently that *e.g.* the *Phædo* must be unhistorical. Dr. Wundt, like others before him, appeals for this view to the authority of Aristotle. But it should be noted that Aristotle nowhere says that Plato originated the doctrine of εἶδη. The persons whom he twice contrasts with Socrates, on the ground that they first treated universals as χωριστά, are always referred to vaguely in the plural, and in one all-important passage (*Metaphysics*, *M.* 1078 *b* 7 ff.), seem actually to be distinguished from Plato. At least, the identification of "those who first said that there are εἶδη" with Plato, and Plato alone, is never explicitly made in the Aristotelian text, but is due to the interpreters. Still it may, of course, be said that at least Aristotle denies that Socrates was one of the believers in the εἶδη, but even so, it does not seem to me, that a statement of Aristotle about a predecessor who had left no written statement of his views, and who had been dead for a generation and more before Aristotle's connexion with the Academy began ought to outweigh the very positive declaration of Plato. In fact, if, as I believe, it is demonstrable, not

only as Prof. Burnet has shown, from the *Phædo*, but also from the *Sophistes* and *Parmenides*, that the doctrine of εἶδη was already current in Socratic and Pythagorean circles before the death of Socrates, it can hardly be doubted that Socrates himself had a large share in its development. Whence I should infer that the *Phædo* is probably in the main a faithful reproduction of the conversation of the actual Socrates. I may add that I believe the same to be demonstrable of the *Symposium*, and to be probably much truer than is ordinarily supposed of the *Republic*. It is, at least, significant that no unmistakable traces of the very definite philosophy which Aristotle ascribes to Plato can be found in the dialogues until we come to the *Philebus* and *Timæus*. This seems to me to prove that "Platonism" really was, in fact, the product of Plato's old age. I am sorry to see that Dr. Wundt refuses to allow any share in the formation of the theory of εἶδη to Euclides, and assumes that the εἰδὼν φίλοι of the *Sophistes* represent Plato himself and his scholars. Dr. Wundt calls this result "zweifello"; to me it appears demonstrable that the persons meant are neither Plato nor any of his followers, and a process of exclusions leaves us with no one except Euclides as the philosopher whom Plato has in mind. It is further only this interpretation which explains why the criticisms of the *Sophistes* should be ascribed to a visitor from Elea.

I have little to add with reference to the author's treatment of Plato, except that the combinations upon which he depends for his chronological arrangement of the dialogues seem to me largely unsatisfactory. With Raeder I find it hard to believe that the *Gorgias* can have been written before the foundation of the Academy, to which it seems to contain one quite definite allusion, and quite impossible to place the *Phædrus* before the *Republic*. I think, too, that the Orphic and mystical side of Plato's philosophy is dwelt on far too much, and the logical and mathematical element too little.

And, finally, I can see no reason to suppose that Plato's intervention in Syracusan politics was, or was thought by the philosopher himself to be, a failure. As Prof. Burnet has recently reminded us, it at least made him the recognised supreme authority on constitutional problems for the Hellenic world.

A. E. TAYLOR.

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*Early Greek Philosophy.* By JOHN BURNET, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Greek in the United College of St. Salvator and St. Leonard, St. Andrews. 2nd Edition. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1908. Pp. x., 433.

THE first edition of this book, written when its author was very young, was received with welcome by readers who desired to see the early Greek philosophic theories presented objectively, by a sound scholar competently trained in philosophy, and not without

the equipment of scientific knowledge also needed for the appreciation of these theories. It is unnecessary to say that the more Mr. Burnet's book was read the more it won upon the confidence of such readers, and we are glad that he has had the satisfaction of seeing a second edition called for, and an opportunity thereby given him of publishing his reasonings and conclusions modified in the light of his maturer judgment, and of discoveries (*e.g.*, of portions of the *Ἰατρικά* of Menon) made since his first edition appeared.

No book ever written can absolve the critical scholar from the duty of consulting the original documents from time to time; but for one person interested in ancient philosophy who can do this safely there are a hundred who cannot; and the larger class of persons may consider it fortunate that they have an interpreter like Mr. Burnet to help them, and are not compelled to depend on interpretations of the only sort known to their grandfathers, from the times of Hegel to those of G. H. Lewes.

Mr. Burnet has the great initial merit of taking the Greeks seriously and making his readers take them so—not merely because their philosophic results have an absolute value, but because philosophic methods are always valuable and interesting even apart from results. It is a matter of intense interest, even from the view of the anthropologist, to observe the old Hellenic thinkers proceeding, each in his own way, to deal with philosophic problems which confront us still, and on some of which we are as far from having reached abiding results as they were. The records of the operations of human intelligence dealing with such problems in the past are a necessary propædæutic for their future treatment. As regards transcendental questions, the points on which we have any advantage over the Ancient Hellenes are few and scarcely essential. Our philosophy has not taught us either how to drop these problems, or how to solve them. Our scientific knowledge—our knowledge of nature—is, it is true, immensely advanced beyond theirs; but no one requires to be told how little aid is to be derived from science for the solution, or even the true apprehension, of transcendental questions. The Hellenes were attracted by these questions, just as we are; their interests in living and dying were like ours; they have left incontestable proofs of their intellectual power in all the departments of work which admit of elenchus; and therefore it is reasonable (as Mr. Burnet makes one feel) to endeavour patiently to place oneself at their point of view, if not in the hope of seeing light, at least with the assurance of interesting and pleasant companionship along the dark ways of philosophic speculation.

There is another feature of Mr. Burnet's work which commends it to us favourably, namely, his steady avoidance where possible of the stale terminology of which our ears have grown tired. The constant use of such terms as 'hylozoism,' for instance, is deadening to all interest. Readers want to know first of all what these terms mean, and a writer who persistently uses them without ade-

quate explanation sooner or later excites the just suspicion of not understanding them himself. But what explanation of them ever was or could be adequate? Mr. Burnet uses the plainest terms he can. To be plain in such matters is no easy task. It is hard to divest oneself of the jargon of the Schools, mediæval and modern, which is so often a cloak for barrenness of ideas. Only a clear and independent thinker can safely venture to write on philosophic subjects in the language of ordinary people; but it is something to be thankful for when we find one who does so. Mr. Burnet has taken pains to choose the words and forms of expression which convey their meaning most directly, and thereby spared his readers a great deal of trouble. A corollary of the adoption of this method of expression is that, when he comes upon something which he does not understand, he says so, and leaves no doubt in any one's mind either of his sincerity or of his perspicacity.

He aims at presenting the ancient theories in their inter-relationship. His constructive work, however, is not a baseless fabric. He has the imagination without which history cannot be written, but all his structures rest upon reasoned grounds. They can be accounted for. He is free from that comfortable temperament—that *εὐνομοσύνη*—to which any given theory may become a sort of *παντοκράτεια*, and be found to contain "in germ" all other theories. He pays due regard to decisive points of differentiation as well as of affinity between the views of different philosophers. Early Greek systems of Philosophy, if they do not form an organic whole, have at least a certain articulation *inter se*; they are not, at all events, a mere congeries. They seem to exhibit themselves to Mr. Burnet as a partially woven web, with different patterns in its different parts; and he shows—often with admirable acumen—how the successive or contemporary weavers modelled or modified their designs according to the patterns thus set by their fellows. He endeavours to show us this fabric at every angle of vision; to describe for us the history of its parts, and to explain how far the weavers of the various pieces were influenced one by the work of another.

Such seems to be the scope of his book, and it is one with which, we think, even Momus could not quarrel. We cannot here examine the work in detail. We will, however, add some more or less desultory observations which occurred to us in the pleasant task of reading through it once more.

The introduction announces and illustrates the principles which pervade the whole. It is written in the rapid, brilliant manner characteristic of a writer who has thoroughly digested the subject which he is to develop.

In his account of the Ionic philosophers Mr. Burnet chooses the term 'Boundless' as the best English equivalent for Anaximander's *τὸ ἄπειρον*, which he regards as spatially, not qualitatively, infinite. He assigns cogent reasons for so regarding it (pp. 60 n, and 77).



He makes some valuable remarks (p. 74) on the use of the word *θεός* by the early philosophers, to designate their primary substance, without any of the ordinary theological implications. This has also its modern analogues, *e.g.*, in Spinoza's use of 'deus,' and is interesting in many ways. The accounts which he gives of the 'Arithmetic,' Geometry and harmonics of Pythagoras, and afterwards of "The Pythagoreans," are eminently satisfactory. His attempt to rationalise the theory that "things are numbers" is extremely good.

His chapters on the Eleatics are fresh and vigorous. He endeavours to dispel the notion that Xenophanes wrote a philosophic poem (p. 128) and he explains well the meaning of Xenophanes' monotheism. Xenophanes "was really Goethe's *weltkind*, with prophets to right and left of him; and he would have smiled if he had known that one day he was to be regarded as a theologian" (p. 142). Mr. Burnet's account of Parmenides, too (pp. 198, 204, 212), is good, though the theory he adopts as to the philosophy of Parmenides may well have fluttered the dovescotes of idealism.

We like very much his account of the relation of Atomism to Eleaticism.

We are favourably impressed also with his explanation of the term *όγος* as used by Heraclitus (p. 152). He is convincing when he argues against the belief that Heraclitus himself held the doctrine of *ἐκτίρωσις* (p. 178).

His firm grasp of the connexion between the development of medical studies and that of philosophy, after a certain stage in the latter had been reached, is highly satisfactory. This connexion is rooted in the nature of the two subjects. The deep human interest of the one leads back or forward inevitably to the other. The questions of the origin, changes, and destiny of the individual life—the physiology and pathology, so to speak, of the microcosm—connect themselves with those of the macrocosm, and this not merely on speculative, but also on practical grounds. Scientific medicine, indeed, profited by an extended knowledge of nature, and we have the striking testimony of Aristotle (436<sup>a</sup> 19—21) to the historical fact of the relation between the development of philosophy and that of medical science.

Mr. Burnet regards Empedocles as a genuine poet. Perhaps it is for this reason that, when he comes to translate the fragments of Empedocles, his style rises, as it does, to a high pitch of excellence.

Besides his account (already referred to) of the relationship of the atomism of Leucippus to the teaching of the Eleatics—especially of Parmenides—there are many other points in his treatment of atomism which commend themselves as sound. Among these is his discussion of the question whether *βάρος* was for Democritus a primary quality of each atom *per se*, out of relation to the *δύνη*. Atios asserts that *βάρος* was added to the list of atomic primary

qualities by Epicurus; while Aristotle, on the other hand, seems to imply that Democritus had already included it among these qualities. We have read this discussion with special interest, nor do we see how to add anything of consequence to the data for arriving at a decision put before us by Mr. Burnet, or to quarrel with his conclusion, when he makes *βαρος* a secondary quality, due to the vortex-notion of the atoms in the *δύμη*. This was probably the view of the old Atomists themselves.

We do not wish to spoil the picture of a thoroughly good—and even great—book by petty criticisms, but perhaps we should mention that on page 298 the judgment—"Schaubach (*An. Claz. Fragm.*, p. 57) fabricated a work entitled τὸ πρὸς Λεχίνεον out of the pseudo-Aristotelian *de Plantis*, 817<sup>a</sup> 27"—seems unduly hard on this painstaking commentator, whose actual words, on the page referred to, are—"Quaeritur, num hoc loco libellus ab Anaxagora conscriptus intelligi debeat, necne? Expectaverim ἐν τῷ πρὸς Λεχίνεον. De Lechineo isto nihil aliunde nobis constat, quantum equidem scio." Here Schaubach (though no doubt ignorant of the history of our Greek text of the *de Plantis*), instead of 'fabricating' such a work appears to be incredulous as to its existence, and to warn his reader, against believing in it.

We conclude by wishing that Mr. Burnet's *Early Greek Philosophy* included Democritus. Plato, of course, falls outside its scope, and besides would require a large treatise to himself; but we cannot help thinking, and may be allowed to say here, that a full and objective treatment of Plato, on Mr. Burnet's favourite lines, by one who possesses his peculiarly fresh and full knowledge of Plato, would be valuable to philosophers and scholars.

JOHN I. BEARE.

## VII.—NEW BOOKS.

*Neurasthenia.* By GILBERT BALLEZ, Professeur agrégé à la Faculté de Médecine de Paris. Translated from the Third French Edition by P. Campbell Smith, M.D. London: Kimpton & Co., 1908. Pp. xxviii, 408. Price 6s.

THIS volume is an excellent general exposition of Neurasthenia. It has all the usual lucidity of French medical works, and the translation is well done. The translator contributes a valuable introduction. He distinguishes Neurasthenia Minor from Neurasthenia Major, the latter being the subject of this volume. Neurasthenia Minor is marked by chronic fatigue of perception, memory, will and the nervous system generally; vaso-motor instability; defective metabolism, resulting in auto-intoxications, and in various diseases, *e.g.*, nephritis; abnormalities of internal secretions (probably) as shown, *e.g.*, in the likeness between neurasthenia and exophthalmic goitre, in the tendency to alcoholism, which may be due, according to Dr. Harry Campbell, "to insufficiency of an internal secretion of a stimulating nature"; often, if not always, some diminution of sexual power; slight bodily malformations. All these point to "degeneration". Dr. Smith holds that Neurasthenia Minor is a distinguishable clinical entity. The person is "born tired," and things never go well with him. The name is serviceable to describe a definite condition of hereditary weakness; but we are far from understanding the possible positive ante-natal causes, toxic or other, and it is not necessary to assume that this state of chronic fatigue or feebleness of the nervous system is really an inheritable "variation" rather than a "modification" produced *in utero*.

Neurasthenia Major "may be defined as a group of symptoms due to chronic fatigue with (perhaps one should rather say 'including') defective metabolism and vaso-motor irregularity, which may be produced *de novo* by cares, prolonged intoxications, various drains upon the system, certain strong emotions; by certain forms of trauma"—*e.g.*, railway accidents—"but which results much oftener from the action of one of these influences on a degenerate constitution that has shown some degree of chronic fatigue from infancy" (p. xviii.).

The word 'degenerate' must be taken with the precaution that it need not imply a really degenerate stock, but may be due to ante-natal perversion by toxins, or injury, or perverted nutrition of the mother. The natural history of undeveloped organs, like the thyroid or supra-renal secretions, is still full of conjecture and mythology, and, therefore, it is premature to call even Neurasthenia Minor a degenerate state in a strict sense. The definition given of Neurasthenia Major indicates admirably the scope and standpoint of this book. The fundamental symptoms of Neurasthenia are: a persistent headache of a special character, insomnia, muscular asthenia, rachialgia, a peculiar mental state, and, lastly, dyspepsia, due to gastro-intestinal atony (p. 3).

Neurasthenia is an exhaustion disease, so differing from the neuroses, particularly hysteria, "in which the disorders are more especially psychic in nature, and depend on the fixation in the mind of certain images, or, in the current phrase, of suggestions" (p. 3).

Part i. deals with definitions, etc. Part ii. has chapters on general causes, special causes—heredity and education, exciting causes—such as over-brain-pressure, school over-pressure, which affects young children hardly at all, but adolescence considerably, moral over-pressure, muscular over-pressure, intoxications, above all, the abuse of alcohol and tobacco, and the use of morphine and cocaine (p. 31), various infective diseases, for example, typhoid fever, scarlet fever, malaria; traumatisms; dyspepsia; genital disorders, uterine affections.

Part iii. deals with the clinical forms of Neurasthenia and the leading stigmata, which are carefully discussed. The chief mental symptoms are a conscious weakening of the personality, aboulia, shown by "interminable hesitations; nothing is more distressing to them than to come to a decision; it is often on the enfeeblement of the will that the motor-asthenia depends, still more than on a special debility of the muscles" (p. 70).

"The memory is also affected, owing to enfeebled attention. The amnesia of neurasthenics is indiscriminate. Their emotionalism is extreme; everything impresses them, and every emotion is especially distressing to them, because they perceive with unusual vividness the diverse sensations produced in the different systems—heart, respiratory system, intestines—by all emotional states" (p. 71). "Hence timidity, fear, easy fatigue, hypochondriasis, and the many phobias—agoraphobia, claustrophobia, or fear of narrow and closed spaces; antropophobia, or fear of crowds; stasophobia, or fear of the upright position" (p. 74).

"The condition is made worse by incessantly renewed inquiries as to their state of health and the recommendations that are showered on them by their friends" (p. 74).

There are many secondary symptoms, of which the chief are the disorders of common sensation of the vaso-motor innervation, angina pectoris (functional, not organic). There may be disturbances of eyesight and the other senses as well as of the genito-urinary organs.

Prof. Ballet distinguishes four types of Neurasthenia—cerebro-spinal, including cerebro-asthenia and myelasthenia; neurasthenia of women; genital neurasthenia; traumatic neurasthenia. Unlike P. Janet, he would prefer to reserve the term "psychasthenic" "to denote the mental fatigue and the inability for brain work of simple neurasthenics."

Part iv. contains a good summary of the theories of the causes of exhaustion. None of the theories—gastric auto-intoxication, dyspeptic vitiation of nutrition, the genital theory, the vaso-motor theory—is quite satisfactory. "These theories leave totally unaffected the conception that is most generally held to-day, namely, that nervous exhaustion has its source in a modification of all the nerve centres" (p. 135).

The real nature of this exhaustion we do not know. "Neurasthenia is not a disease due to autosuggestion, like hysteria, or at least it is only secondarily so; it is, above all, a disorder of the energy" (p. 140).

Part v. deals with prophylactic measures, which include physical, mental and moral education.

Part vi. deals with treatment, which includes psycho-therapy among the most important. This part maintains a clear distinction between indirect psycho-therapy, or the psychic influences of the different hygienic measures utilised in the different treatment of neurasthenia, and direct psycho-therapy, which includes three distinct methods,—hypnotic suggestion, suggestion in the waking state, moral guidance by means of reasoning (p. 192).

The processes described as "suggestion of the waking state" resemble closely those named by Dr. Boris Sidis as "hypnoid". The patient lies down in a comfortable position, shuts the eyes, thinks of sleep, until he feels a certain torpor supervening. He then gives himself suitable suggestions, and then opens his eyes. This is the method recommended by Lévy. Dr. Sidis, however, who has studied this condition carefully, shows that it is not entirely a state of "waking" consciousness, but a definable transition state, which may pass either into sleep or into the hypnotic state proper; and he has found that free-play of the phantasy and the effort to recall the origins of any illness or accident leading to the fixed idea or depressed state frequently results in dissipation of the obsession. Ballet rather uses the state as opening the patient's mind to the doctor's suggestions.

There is a very careful chapter of 100 pages on diet. The remainder of the book is occupied by Hydro-therapeutics, exercise in gymnastics, and the special application of the Weir-Mitchell system, particularly in women. There is an index (subject and author) of forty pages. It would be difficult to name any volume that gives a better general view of this baffling, yet important, psycho-physical condition.

W. L. M.

*The Metaphysics of Nature.* By CARVETH READ, M.A., Grote Professor of Philosophy in the University of London. Second Edition, with Appendices. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1908. Pp. xiii, 372.<sup>1</sup>

It is a pleasure to record this early appearance of a Second Edition of Prof. Read's ably and often finely written work. Those who are as yet unacquainted with it should become so now that they have the advantage of reading the valuable Appendices on Truth, Consciousness, Transcendent Being, and Moral Freedom in which the author strives, by formulating his position more clearly, to defend his doctrines against published criticisms. The present writer is exceedingly grateful for Prof. Read's very thorough attempt to remove his objections. If, in spite of all that he has done for me, I remain guilty of perplexity, Prof. Read will remember that he has himself said that his conception of Being is such that "no words can meet the difficulty of expressing its relation to Consciousness" (p. 211). When I have been trying to grasp the relation of Personal Consciousness, Generic Consciousness and the Continuum of Consciousness to one another, and to Being and to the Activity of Manifestation which is the concomitant or correlative of the Changes of Being, I have felt the force of his remark. It is easy to follow what Prof. Read says about the "Universality of Consciousness,"—his amusing discovery that he was a *Pampsychist* rather reminds one of M. Jourdain—but exceedingly difficult, for me at least, to avoid thinking that he has at times confused the World of Consciousness with the World in Consciousness. When he says that Consciousness as "the totality of experience or awareness in the World" may accompany all Being, he is talking of the former; when he says that "the World in Consciousness develops at the same rate as consciousness develops in the World" he is talking of the latter, and the ambiguity of the word World may be the reason why he transfers the difficulties of the one to the other. Thus it is quite clear that, as Prof. Read says, the World in Consciousness is a product of social intercourse. It is not identical with, or fully equivalent to the World of Consciousness, which we may believe,

<sup>1</sup> For Critical Notice of First Edition, see MIND, N.S., 60, p. 554.

with Prof. Read, reaches like, and with, Being, far beyond our ken. That the World *in* Consciousness is another to Consciousness, leaves it doubtful whether Prof. Read has any right to deny that consciousness may be actually the entire Being of the World of Consciousness. That consciousness in this wider sense of world ever develops is a doubtful and fantastic speculation, which belongs to the dangerous side of *Pampsychism* to which Prof. Read refers. But if he is in for the game he must play it, and admit the possibility that since his World *in* Consciousness, the world which is the work of his "Generic Consciousness" without which Being would not constitute an actual world, the world of space and time and the categories is *not* his World of Consciousness, it may, after all, be our way of cognising what is veritably a Conscious World, that, for example, the Solar System may have an organised consciousness corresponding to, and perhaps identical with, its immense complexity of organisation as a Being. To come down to Prof. Reid's wisely restricted speculations: his Generic Consciousness seems to me somewhat of a myth, and it seems to me again ambiguous to say that without it "Being would not constitute an actual World". All we can say is that certain conscious beings might not. Again, Prof. Read is very much afraid that the consciousness in which there is an "actual world" should be mistaken for phenomenal. I think that fear well grounded. He proposes "to regard personal consciousness as a function, or activity, or (as it might be best to say) the actuality of that Being of which the Body is the phenomenon". But Prof. Read's effort "to preserve the 'subject' and its transcendent significance" along with a belief in Being that is more than anything that can be expressed in consciousness results in throwing most weight on the material fact. "A man's body," he says, "expresses his character as much as his mind, and even more than his apperception; for it is the phenomenon of his whole Being, including that which is only subconscious, but which influences the apperceptive mind in innumerable ways, though rarely or never rising into apperception." This seems to make human consciousness a partial appearance of that Being which is completely *manifested* in the body, and reduces our "knowing" to something that *appears* in experience i.e. in consciousness. One word in connexion with the Appendix on Moral Freedom. Prof. Read insists on Cosmological Necessity. Now if the Cosmos goes on its own way, and man's illusion of personal freedom is merely his way of recognising the fact that his action is the outcome of his character, and that is the outcome of antecedent causes, so that he does right or wrong by Cosmological Necessity, why does the Cosmos bother us to keep advising one another that we ought to do this and avoid that? Why does Prof. Read, for example, conclude this Appendix by saying that the recognition of Cosmological Necessity must lead us to turn to the control of the causes of character? By education, by social reform, by breeding and by elimination, human nature must, he says, be regenerated. I believe and grant all this. To put it crudely, I see that human freedom must admit and employ natural necessity, but it can only do it if it is in some way that is not an illusion superior to it. All that Prof. Read urges presupposes that we can exert ourselves to induce people to recognise certain things: that there is a vital matter in our hands. What is the good of talk like this if all goes by process of cosmological necessity? or is this the way by which cosmological necessity works? If so, it seems to me a wearisome and stupid device.

DAVID MORRISON.

*Mental Pathology in its Relation to Normal Psychology.* A Course of Lectures delivered in the University of Leipzig, by GUSTAV STÖRRING, Dr. Phil. et Med., now Professor of Philosophy in the University of Zurich. Translated by Thomas Loveday, M.A. Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1907. Pp. x, 298. Price 10s. 6d.

The general aim and plan of this book are excellent. It describes and illustrates with well-selected cases the principal types of mental derangement, and discusses their bearing upon the problems of general psychology. It is written, not for the medical man or specialist in mental diseases, but for all students of psychology; and it is written by a professor of philosophy who has had considerable experience as a medical specialist for nervous and mental diseases. We have no other book that brings together so conveniently for the student of normal psychology the principal results attained by mental pathology, and Mr. Loveday's excellent translation will fill a serious gap in his bookshelf. The book consists of a series of twenty-five lectures, which treat successively of hallucinations and illusions, aphasia, amnesia, anomalies of self-consciousness, imperative ideas and insane delusions, imbecility, abnormalities of feeling and of volition.

Prof. Störriing's discussions of these conditions are everywhere clear, interesting, and admirably concise, and are illustrated with well-selected cases, which might perhaps have been made more numerous with advantage to the lay reader. His theory of hallucination seems to be more acceptable than any of the well-known theories which he criticises; but it needs to be supplemented on the physiological side, which is left very obscure in these lectures; for like so many others who have attempted theories of hallucination, Prof. Störriing has neglected to furnish the prime requisite of any completely satisfactory theory, namely a clear definition of the neural conditions or concomitants of the peculiarities that distinguish the representation from the perception of an object.

A feature of the book which will be widely regarded as a serious defect is its polemic against the conception of unconscious or subconscious mental process, both in the form of unconscious links in normal mental process and in the form of independent or collateral processes. The author recognises the "phenomena of double consciousness" in the sense of alternating trains of memory and would explain them as the effects of "alteration in the *concourse* of reproduction," especially alterations of the organic sensations. But the facts which are widely accepted as evidence of unconscious links in normal mental process are regarded as explicable by "the hypothesis of dimly-conscious psychical states"; while the evidence for the reality of the doubling of the stream of mental process and for the occurrence of co-consciousness is simply ignored. Now, although the occurrence of co-consciousness must always remain incapable of actual demonstration, no unprejudiced person familiar with the facts of post-hypnotic suggestion and of automatism in general, with the studies of divided personality which have been published in recent years in France and America, and with the work of the Society for Psychical Research, could deny the occurrence in some cases of a collateral or concurrent stream of mental process which manifests itself in the intelligent control of bodily movement and yet remains altogether outside of and independent of the stream of normal consciousness. Caution in the interpretation of the facts of this strange and puzzling order, is commendable; but Prof. Störriing, together with a large number of his fellow-psychologists in Germany, seems to go beyond commendable caution and to lay himself open to the charge of ignoring a large group of facts, the interpretation of which constitutes the most fascinating and perhaps the



most important problem of present-day psychology. It is only fair to note that since the date of publication of the German original of this book, the facts in question have been considerably added to, notably by the publications of Dr. Morton Prince and his colleagues. Prof. Störriing seems to be aware of only one of the various hypotheses suggested for the explanation of these facts, namely the hypothesis of a second-self or secondary-consciousness, conceived as an enduring feature of the normal mind. But the rejection of this, perhaps the least acceptable of the hypotheses advanced for the explanation of the facts, by no means justifies the ignoring, or the denial, of the facts themselves.

The principal feature of the later lectures is the insistence on the leading part played by "affective conditions" in the production of a variety of abnormal states, especially of those the leading feature of which is the dominance of a fixed idea. All this is welcome as a contribution from the side of mental pathology to the protest against intellectualism in psychology; but its value is somewhat diminished by the author's attribution of all the potency of affective-emotive processes to the organic sensations involved in them and to "increase in the flow of blood to the brain" (p. 284); for he thus seems to take away with one hand what he has given with the other.

Other points of special interest are Prof. Störriing's application of the principle of inhibition by drainage (p. 263) to the explanation of the fixation of "ideas" and of the restriction of the field of consciousness; and his conception of "summation-centres of feelings". This last seems to be essentially similar to Mr. Shand's conception of a sentiment, the importance of which has been urged elsewhere by the present writer.

W. McD.

*Principles of Logic.* By GEORGE HAYWARD JOYCE, S.J. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1908. Pp. xx, 429.

As a text-book for the students who are likely to use it this book has many strong points. It is neither the bald summary of logical doctrines so frequently forming the content of primers, nor is it a metaphysical treatise with a logical title. The main outlines of the subject are sketched in concise paragraphs in which headings and definitions are printed in heavy type. But the print is attractive and the reading pleasant. Supplementary paragraphs and sections containing extended discussions of important topics are printed in still smaller type and these are dispersed throughout the book. But even here the print is still attractive.

The work is, in addition, thoroughly up to date and shows that the author is well-versed in the most modern theories as well as in the writings of those whom too many post-Renaissance logicians neglected. The writer has the good fortune to feel confident that he can base his logical doctrines on a satisfactory metaphysical system, *viz.*, scholasticism. These metaphysical deductions, not spun out to undue length, form the matter of many of the supplementary paragraphs, and the difficulty caused to the student by the introduction of abstruse questions is fully compensated by the satisfaction he will find in the coherency of the whole.

The partisans of scholastic logic, of whom Prof. Joyce is one, are naturally reinvigorated by the revival of interest in the Aristotelian writings, the ultimate source of their own doctrine. The neo-scholastics are fully entitled to claim the support of the Neo-Aristotelians in all matters in which the schoolmen reproduce the spirit of their teacher.

Prof. Joyce, giving liberal quotations, dwells upon the accord between him and his mediæval interpreters. But he seems to ignore the fact that there is a profound difference between the finality, the roundedness, and the compactness of Thomism and Aristotle's own cautious and often cryptic utterances on questions of ultimate import. The *Posterior Analytics* and the *Metaphysics* may be a fountain-head to which we are always willing to return, while Thomism, though deriving from that source, may be a stream long since stagnant or perishing in the desert. If Scholasticism is such a wholly satisfactory philosophy, its adherents have still to show how it comes about that modern science and modern logic have been formed by a breach with that philosophy.

But the author will doubtless be much applauded by his friends for producing a work which is both serviceable, erudite and orthodox. He is entitled to make as much as he can out of the reflexion he quotes, in his introduction, from Prof. Case, as to the backwardness of the Reformed Churches in elaborating any philosophic basis for their faith. But this and one or two other references in the book betray a little of the *odium theologium*. In a work in which the dogmatic spirit, though carefully held in leash, is always ready to spring out, it is only too natural that there should be an occasional hasty assumption or inconsistency summarily disregarded. Thus it is said on page 188 that 'the Dictum is an immediate deduction from the principle of Contradiction'. Hegel is classed as a conceptualist on page 132. Induction is said not to be ratiocinative and yet we hear of the 'evidence' for our induction. The whole treatment of the uniformity of nature and of causality is rather thin in spite of its learning. The possibility of 'interference' with the laws of nature is discussed without careful definition of what 'interference' would imply. I have verified some of the references and found them accurate with the exception of the substitution of *An. Post.* for *An. Prior. II.*, c. 23, on page 229.

G. R. T. ROSS.

*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.* New Series, vol. viii. Containing the papers read before the Society during the Twenty-ninth Session, 1907-1908. London: Williams & Norgate, 1908. Pp. 268.

The present volume fully maintains the interest and value that have attached to preceding issues. So much good material, with such diversity of topic and standpoint, is not easy to find. Mr. R. B. Haldane, the President of the Society for the single year, opens the Proceedings with an address on 'The Methods of Modern Logic and the Conception of Infinity'; the purpose of which is to show the confusions which result from assuming quantity to possess a merely discrete character, and neglecting the continuous aspect which gives true or qualitative infinity. It concludes with a succinct statement of the doctrine of absolute idealism. This is followed by a paper on 'Purpose' by Prof. R. Latta, who argues that, just as every purpose implies an end, so an end always implies a purpose. Wherever there is system there is function and therefore end; but equally, wherever there is system there is purpose. Only, the more system so much the more purpose. Accordingly, since there is purpose throughout nature, there is (contrary to pragmatist assumption) purpose without self-consciousness and without selection between contingent or indeterminate alternatives. In a lengthy discussion of 'Prof. James's "Pragmatism"' Mr. G. E. Moore contends that the main propositions of the pragmatist theory of truth (*e.g.*, All useful beliefs are true, All truths are made true by those who believe them) would be true if asserted

about *most* or *some*, but are false when asserted about *all*. Utility is not the only, nor the universal, property of true beliefs; and true beliefs are made true by those who believe them, only to the extent that they themselves make corresponding alterations in existence. The discussion is acute and clear—the reader must be left to judge how far it gets to the heart of the problem. Next comes 'The Religious Sentiment: An Inductive Enquiry,' by Prof. A. Caldecott. "This is a study of a small group of thirty-four autobiographies of Wesley's early Methodist Preachers." The religious sentiment appears from these cases to consist of a dominant or central emotion organising all other emotions and mental elements into a system under its control. The religious emotion proper manifests itself especially in a joyfulness which is indicative of efficiency and mental health. Dealing with 'The Ideal of Totality' Mr. S. H. Hodgson points out the ambiguity of the term according as we mean a whole of merely conceptual or a whole of perceptual content. The former implies limitation and finitude, the latter infinity. Our experience involves that the universe is infinite, but its infinity precludes explanation of it. We know that it is being or power which is the infinite and eternal object of infinite and eternal consciousness as subject, but we have no more positive idea of this concrete whole. Mr. Hodgson remarks, at the outset of his paper, on the agreement and disagreement that exist between it and Mr. Haldane's. The reader will find it highly suggestive to take the two together. In a paper entitled 'Impressions and Ideas—The Problem of Idealism,' Mr. H. Wildon Carr expounds a scepticism that follows the lines of Hume, and accepts this as 'a final and definite philosophical position' which yet 'leaves the practical issues of life unaffected'. In the course of his exposition he subjects to criticism the philosophy of Mr. Hodgson, and of Mr. Moore, as well as idealism and pragmatism. The next contribution is by Mr. T. Percy Nunn, 'On the Concept of Epistemological Levels'. Premising that logic as the study of the methods of science cannot advance without considering 'the process of acquirement of knowledge as it takes place under definite psychological conditions,' he proceeds to investigate these conditions and to apply the result to characterise the stages in the development of science—their character depending on the relation subsisting between the cognitive, the conative, and the affective aspects of the process. This is an instructive piece of work. Prof. G. Dawes Hicks treats of 'The Relation of Subject and Object from the Point of View of Psychological Development'. Starting from the position that psychology and epistemology are inseparable, he goes on to show (1) that the relation in question is not psychologically ultimate; (2) that cognition is not derivative from feeling. Proceeding regressively, by eliminating factors that are evidently not primordial, he concludes that an elementary experience consists of an 'obscure and confused awareness of sense qualities, barely and imperfectly discriminated, and not apprehended as belonging either to an independent world of fact or to the modes of the subject's inner life'; and contends (1) that such sensory elements are at no stage of experience psychical in character; (2) that there is no generic distinction between the so-called immediate apprehension of a sense quality and the apprehension of it when interpreted or mediated by thought. The Proceedings close with a symposium in which Profs. S. Alexander, J. Ward, C. Read, and G. F. Stout explain 'The Nature of Mental Activity,' and defend their several interpretations against adverse positions. The discussion, which it is rather difficult to summarise, will be found throughout very interesting and suggestive.

*Neo-Platonism in Relation to Christianity.* By CHARLES ELSEE. Cambridge University Press, 1908. Pp. xii, 144. 2s. 6d.

Mr. Elsee's essay, which gained the Hulsean Prize at Cambridge in 1901, gives a lively and on the whole sympathetic sketch of the history of Neo-Platonism and its influence upon the Christian Fathers, but I cannot feel that the writer has justified his assertion that the school had, from its inception, the deliberate purpose of defending a reformed Hellenism against the inroads of the new religion. For one thing, Mr. Elsee is forced by his thesis to date the revival of religious seriousness in the Pagan world far too late, when he ascribes it to "the period between Lucian and Plotinus". He himself on occasion quotes Plutarch, and surely must know of the existence of such writers as Apuleius, Maximus of Tyre, Dion Chrysostom, Aristides, none of whom fall within the limits he assigns. It is a pity that he seems to be unacquainted with Dr. Dill's *Roman Society from Nero to the Antonines*, which would have put him right on this important point. Nor do I think that he has successfully shown the existence of traces of Christian influence in the *Enneads*. He refers, e.g., to the "beatific vision," as the source of the doctrine of ecstasy, but the "beatific vision" itself is purely Platonic, and comes from the *Phædrus*, where it seems to be, in turn, borrowed from the Orphics. To overcome the objection created by the absolute silence of Plotinus Mr. Elsee institutes a comparison with the *Life* of Apollonius of Tyana, and argues that Plotinus ignores Christianity precisely because he wishes to supersede it. But the parallel is really an unfortunate one. The *Life* of Apollonius reveals knowledge of the gospel story on almost every page, and the spirit of propagandism which is its chief feature is entirely absent from the *Enneads*. They are a contribution to speculation, not a gospel. Nor is it to the point to urge that Plotinus, who wrote against the gnostics, cannot have been indifferent towards orthodox Catholicism. The orthodox did not directly impugn any fundamental Platonic doctrine, as the gnostics did by their pessimistic doctrine "that the *κόσμος* is evil". Porphyry, again, seems to have attacked Christianity much more in the character of a "higher critic" than in the name of Platonic philosophy, and to questions of criticism Plotinus was always indifferent. So again, it is an error to see a loan from Christianity in the Neo-Platonist conception of "likeness to God" as the end of life: the thought and language are strictly Platonic, and go back through Plato to the Orphic conception of the soul as a fallen divinity, and the Dionysiac theory of the identity of the "Bacchus" with the God whom he serves. Is not the real explanation of the resemblances between Christianity and Neo-Platonism simply that both are saturated with words and ideas which go back to Orphicism and cognate religious movements? Thus, e.g., the very words of the Apocalyptic song, "Worthy is the lamb," seem to be an echo of the old chants in honour of the *ἄγιος ταύρος* by whose blood, shed before the foundation of the world, the "Bacchus" believed himself to be redeemed. When the first Christian artists depicted Jesus with the lyre of Orpheus their presentation contained more truth than perhaps they dreamed of.

A. E. TAYLOR.

*The Origin of the Sense of Beauty: Some Suggestions upon the Source and Development of the Æsthetic Feelings.* By FELIX CLAY, B.A., Architect. London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1908. Pp. xviii, 302. 6s. net.

In this book, as the result of much reading and a good deal of reflexion, we have some judicious observations on Æsthetics in general and a

rather abortive attempt to trace our artistic likes and dislikes to instinctive preferences originally necessary for survival, and to exhibit their rudimentary form among the activities of the lower animals. The instinctive pleasure in harmony springs, according to Mr. Clay, from the impelling need for suitability to environment. It is thus an instinct for conformity with nature, and is directly dependent upon the connexion between the conditions of nature and the functions of organs. Art thus springs from the needs of life, and "is the interpretation of environment by helping towards harmonious adjustment" (p. 281). There may be such innate emotions as pleasure which is a necessary corollary of consciousness and the power of choice (p. 76); as a diffuse feeling of general pleasure from the direct sensuous appeal to the eye or ear (p. 107); as an "instinct for conformity with environment" (p. 138), etc.; and they may be, or come to be, all one with the purely æsthetic emotion we recognise ourselves as experiencing: Art very probably does possess some biological significance; also, to go at length into "the growth and origin of the instinctive desires" in order to "conjecture how the mere vital necessity of conformity with environment may be conceived to lead to the curious aptitude with which man's heart goes out, as it were, to nature" may be the clear purpose of Mr. Clay's book, may be a satisfactory explanation of our pleasure in Art, and may have been successfully executed, only I do not think so. Much of his time is taken up with perfectly gratuitous and rather elementary psychologising, and it may be said that the author never really gets down to his task, or succeeds in performing it satisfactorily. Although many of man's practical satisfactions may hitch themselves on to his æsthetic feeling, they do not constitute its whole essence; the ethical judgment of value is potent now in the pseudo-æsthetic factors alone. That it was ever more potent in æsthetic emotion is assumed here, not demonstrated; and, even with the aid of this assumption little else is established. Much that Mr. Clay says is sane and excellent criticism, e.g., his chapter on "Meaning and Expression".

D. M.

*Utopian Papers, Being Addresses to "The Utopians".* By Prof. PATRICK GEDDES, S. H. SWINNY, Dr. J. W. SLAUGHTER, V. V. BRANFORD, Dr. LIONEL TAYLOR, Sister NIVEDITA, F. W. FELKIN and Rev. JOSEPH WOOD. Edited by DOROTHEA HOLLINS. London: Masters & Co., 1908. Pp. xi, 208.

This book may be taken as an expression of Evolutionary Idealism and of the tendency of sociological science to become didactic. As such it is not without significance. To demand that a collection of sociological discussions should exhibit a high degree of unity, above all when the discussions deal with the meaning of progress, would be asking more than was altogether reasonable; but, interesting as all the papers are, some of them are related altogether too distantly to the main purpose. Among the most business-like and to the point is Dr. Slaughter's short paper on the social significance of the imagination. "It is not maintained," he says, "that any Utopia either is, or need be, realised. The disparity between dream and deed need trouble no one, if the dream has sufficed to produce the deed." "But these clearly expressed Utopias are of little importance as compared with the more groping, but more powerful dream that may dominate the life of a period." As adolescence teaches, the present is determined by the future, actually the remote future. Most of the other papers, some of the writers of which seem to suffer from slight fevers of enthusiasm of a highly non-infectious

type, are an illustration or amplification of Dr. Slaughter's remarks. From Mr. S. H. Swinny we have a good and clear account of Comte's view of the future of society, a typical attempt to add a new force to those moulding the future and so to assist in the realisation of one's own prophecy. Prof. Geddes elevates the re-erection of Crosby Hall into a symbol of the immortality of the social soul. The Rev. Joseph Wood discourses of Utopias Past and Present, and is wisely sceptical as to the possibility of any readjustment of society putting an end to the supply of fools and wrongdoers. Mr. Victor V. Branford has chosen St. Columba as a study in social inheritance and reinterpretation in the phrasing of current science. This is an attempt to exhibit the individual quest of adolescence developing into the collective mission of manhood. It is more particularly a study of the effect of religious ideals, their hold over "the poetic surge of adolescence". The practical question is little more than stated: Can we cultivate varieties of the saintly type which shall have the qualities and not the defects of the mediæval saints? Dr. J. Lionel Taylor teaches that in Vocation and Marriage—our only two life-aims—we have what is capable of developing and increasing mental and physical power. Realise what your nature is, trust it, and develop it. The little book with all its defects is of interest in itself and as a sign of the times.

D. M.

*The New Word.* By ALLEN UPWARD. An Open Letter addressed to the Swedish Academy in Stockholm on the meaning of the word *Idealist*. New Edition. London: A. C. Fifield, 1908. Pp. 317.

This is undoubtedly a work of some genius, full of wit and out-of-the-way scholarship, and by no means lacking in wisdom. It deserves to be read, and I hope many will read it. The author's intention, in his own way of putting it, is to head "a rebellion of the Baltic against the Mediterranean mind," above all against the tyranny of "Mediterranean words" by showing men how true, strong, bright and mighty are those daily words which burn "with the long thoughts of a thousand Baltic generations". There is much point, if occasional extravagance, in his attack on the accepted language of science and philosophy, even if some of his own philological discoveries leave one rather dubious. He states his own philosophy of Strength and Hope in the simplest words: The Strength Within is played upon by the Strength Without, and what we call the Body is a network woven between the tiny Strength Within and the great Strength Without (p. 198). Whirl and Swirl or, if you must have a learned word, *Metastrophe*, is the meaning of life. Involvement in the midst of evolution. The Outer Strength flows in and out of the Inner Strength, whirling as sense, and swirling as emotion. Ideal science is the science of the swirl (pp. 200-203). The Self, *one's elf, aelf or half*, is the One Half of the All-Thing, of which the Outer Strength is the Other Half (p. 208). The Strength Without has partly turned into the Strength Within, and has so far set bounds to its own strength. The Twin-wrestlers of the whirl-swirl are both God (p. 217). Fear is the enemy the Idealist has to fight, yet Fear and Hope are in *Metastrophe*. The Idealist foretells and finds the new religion only to be excommunicated by it. The Hope he teaches wrestles with heredity in the shaping of life, and evolution is the triumph of hope over heredity.

D. M.

*Magic Squares and Cubes.* By W. S. ANDREWS. With Chapters by P. CARUS, L. S. FRIERSON, C. A. BROWNE, JR., and an Introduction by P. CARUS. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1908. Pp. vi, 199.

Most of the essays which make up this little volume are reprinted, with slight modification, from recent numbers of the *Monist*. Dr. Carus refers to magic squares as "*lusus numerorum*," and Mr. Andrews remarks that they are, "of themselves, only mathematical curios". They have, however, the fascination of intellectual puzzles at large, so that the book will doubtless find many interested readers. The writers appear, indeed, to believe that they possess a further, truly mathematical importance; a concluding Note calls attention to the opinion expressed in 1892 by Major MacMahon that "problems of the general nature of the magic square are intimately connected with the infinitesimal calculus and the calculus of finite differences". But no attempt is made to work out this scientific side of the subject.

In chapters i. and ii. Mr. Andrews discusses the qualities and characteristics of magic squares and cubes, odd and even, and gives rules for their construction. In chapter iii. he and Dr. Carus analyse the squares of  $8 \times 8$  and  $16 \times 16$  which Franklin sent as an "arithmetical curiosity" to Collinson. In chapter iv. Dr. Carus offers a graphic key to the interrelation of the figures arranged in magic squares. In chapter v. Mr. Frierson undertakes a 'mathematical study' of the squares, and lays down rules which suffice "to produce all forms of  $3 \times 3$  and  $4 \times 4$  squares with their compounds," and whose principles apply, in large measure, to all other forms. In chapter vi. Mr. Browne offers an interpretation, on the basis of a square of 27-side with 365 at its centre, of the number of the State in Plato's Republic; the number comes out as 9855, not far from Jowett's 8000. Dr. Carus appends a comment. In the two final chapters Mr. Andrews treats of some curious magic squares and combinations, and of various constructive plans by which the squares may be classified.

P. E. WINTER.

*The Problem of Form in Painting and Sculpture.* By A. HILDEBRAND. Translated and revised with the Author's co-operation by M. MEYER and R. M. OGDEN. With thirty illustrations and a portrait. New York: G. E. Stechert & Co., 1907. Pp. 141.

When an artist writes a book upon the theory and practice of his art, the result is likely to be difficult to review. For a statement of the empirical principles and a description of the empirical procedure which give at once the measure and the expression of the artistic personality, the critic will have nothing but gratitude; and the greater the artist, the more valuable for theory will be this account of practice. But the theory which the author himself professes is, as a rule, only a generalised transcript of his practice; it is partial and one-sided, couched in a peculiar terminology, mainly interesting as a bit of individual psychology.

What holds in these respects of such a book as Ross's *Theory of Pure Design* seems to the reviewer to hold emphatically of Hildebrand's *Problem of Form*. The theoretical introduction, obviously a mere outline, and difficult reading whether in the original or in the present translation, must be supplemented and corrected at every point. The technical sections, on the other hand—with their insistence on the pictorial character of sculpture, on the necessity of a single dominant plane, on the mode of progression from front to back—these and the historical sketches are



admirably done, and it was distinctly worth while to render them into English.

It might be well, in a second edition, to gather the half-tones together in a series of plates at the end of the volume, and to refer forward to them from the text. As it is, they come distractingly early, and there are no back references on the pages which they are intended to illustrate.

P. E. WINTER.

*What and Why: Being the Philosophy of Things as They Are.* By SHAW MACLAREN. London: George Allen & Sons, 1908. Pp. xvii, 118.

Mr. Maclaren is perhaps of opinion that he is storming a stronghold of error in sending his book to MIND, for he believes that "the works of rationalistic or school philosophers" are "amiable and ingenious works of the imagination," which any one "who prefers reality exposed to theories expounded must gravely and resolutely for ever set aside" (pp. 99-100). His position is that the rational faculty is only applicable to physical facts. To deal with non-physical facts we must employ the spiritual or ethical faculty, which we all possess. Spiritual knowledge differs from rational in kind, in nature, and in method of attainment. The language of this highest knowledge is entirely symbolical, founded on the power of drawing analogies between the seen and the unseen world. Philosophy so-called is the mistaken habit of dealing logically with stereotyped analogies: Get rid of the bad habit and the happiest results will ensue. Mr. Maclaren has raised rather a big question, and reached rather harsh and sweeping conclusions, regard being had to the knowledge he displays of the whole subject and the slightness of his treatment; but his point is tolerably well put. One, however, to whom "concept" represents nothing actual; one who does not recognise that the language of science in turn is based in some instances on analogies between the unseen and the seen-think, *e.g.* of "energy"; one who does not see that it is the business of philosophy to scrutinise the conceptions of science, is overlooking too many facts. He also overlooks the fact that analogies, if they are to furnish real religions and philosophies must be arranged in some sort of system, and their coherency can only be judged by the rational faculty—into the nature and claims of which he would require to go ever so much more thoroughly. Nor does he know much about living philosophy, or the extent to which it is awake to the danger of falling a prey to the letter. He forgets, too, that the effort to be rationally spiritual is ineradicable in human nature; and, if he were just, he would recognise how much of imperishable spiritual significance has reached mankind enshrined in the systems of the great intellectualists.

D. M.

*Friedrich Nietzsche: His Life and Work.* By M. A. MÜGGE. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1908. Pp. xi, 442.

As books on Nietzsche go, this one deserves mention because it contains a good deal of information and less nonsense than one usually expects from his admirers. Mr. Mügge is not a mere worshipper. He is even prepared to admit defects in Nietzsche's character and doctrine, but generally speaking he is in sympathy and has taken some trouble to bring together from various sources a deal of data regarding a man in whose importance he believes. The volume contains a Life of Nietzsche, a Critique and Appreciation, a Bibliography and Iconography, and a

portrait of Nietzsche. The extracts from Nietzsche (in English) are long and numerous. People who do not read German but have some curiosity on the subject of Nietzsche might do worse than look at this book. It is not for the philosophically trained.

D. M.

*The Psychology of Advertising: a Simple Exposition of the Principles of Psychology in their Relation to Successful Advertising.* By W. D. SCOTT. Boston, Mass.: Small, Maynard & Co., 1908. Pp. 269.

The first attempt at an applied psychology of advertising—partly experimental, partly statistical—was made by H. Gale in No. 1 of the ill-fated *Psychological Studies*, 1900 (*MIND*, April, 1901, p. 272). Three years later Dr. Scott published a book on the Theory of Advertising, the subtitle of which is repeated in the present volume. The Theory contained chapters on attention, association, suggestion, perception, apperception, imagery; the Psychology again discusses suggestion and attention, and treats further of memory, feeling and emotion, instinct, will, habit. The Principles of Psychology which are thus simply expounded are, of course, those of Prof. James. Among the practical questions considered are the relative value of large and small spaces (the "pronounced increase in space and decrease in the number of advertisers is perhaps the most astounding fact observed in the development of advertising in America"), the necessity of an æsthetic element in the advertising of food-products, the importance of securing the time of the buying public (shown by the high effectiveness of the overhead advertising cards in street-railway cars), and the motives which lead the general public to subscribe for a newspaper (as brought out by questionnaire returns). The book ends with a selected bibliography of advertising: there is no index.

Dr. Scott's analytical plough does not, perhaps, go very deep; but the soil which it turns is undoubtedly fertile. A great deal might be done, in the way of giving precision to results already roughly assured, by use of the elementary methods of statistical correlation. It is comforting to find that, on the whole, the types of advertisement most offensive to the cultivated mind are at the same time those least effective from the point of view of the merchant.

P. E. WINTER.

*Clinical Lectures on Neurasthenia.* By THOMAS DIXON SAVILL, M.D. LOND. Fourth Edition. London: Henry J. Glaiser, 1908. Pp. xv, 226. Price 7s. 6d. net.

The Third Edition of this lucid series of scientific and clinical lectures has already been noticed in *MIND*. In the Fourth Edition the author has a special note on the psychology and psycho-therapy of neurasthenia. The chief psychological symptom is failure of attention with consequent garrulity and prolixity. The chief points in "psychic" treatment are encouragement and hope, rest and peace of mind, change of environment, separation from friends, or isolation, hypnotism (difficult and occasionally successful), auto-suggestion, hetero-suggestion and persuasion. "Faith-healers innumerable are in this domain in rivalry with the Medical Profession, but, for my own part, of all the faith-healing cures I know, faith-in-your-doctor is the most potent" (p. 199). The author would probably allow that a scientific analysis of the doctor's capacity is, with many neurasthenics, an important preliminary to their 'faith'; but certainly mere "notional assent" is never enough. The bibliography has been brought up to date.

W. L. M.

*A Primer of Ethics.* By E. E. CONSTANCE JONES, Mistress of Girton College, Cambridge. London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, W., 1909. Pp. 101.

This little book should prove a useful introduction to those who are beginning the study of Ethics. The author does not attempt so much to sketch a system as to present in brief form the fundamental conceptions of the chief ethical theories. Sidgwick's influence, however, is predominant throughout. One or two of Miss Jones's assertions might be disputed, e.g., that 'Aristotle's mean cannot properly imply more than quantitative regulation,' but her interpretation of authorities is usually well accepted, as it should be for a book of this kind. The Ethical Vocabulary and Questions appended add to the value of the work.

L. B.

*Logique et Mathématiques. Essai Historique et Critique sur le Nombre Infini.* Par ARNOLD REYMOND. Saint-Blaise: Foyer Solidariste, 1908. Pp. ix, 218.

This book consists, as its title indicates, of a critical history. It is divided into three parts, the first dealing with antiquity, the second with the discovery and philosophy of the infinitesimal calculus, the third with the modern treatment of infinity by means of symbolic logic. The first two parts, as is inevitable in so short a book, are necessarily somewhat sketchy, but in the main they tell what is of most importance. It is, however, somewhat surprising to find in the second part, where there is hardly a mention of any of the great philosophers except Leibniz, a whole chapter (one out of four) devoted to Renouvier and M. Evellin. M. Reymond justly criticises Renouvier for supposing that the infinite could be replaced by the indefinite, since, as he points out, if a quantity can be subdivided indefinitely, it must contain an infinite number of parts. The views of M. Evellin, who regards space and time as finite and finitely divisible, are rejected, apparently on the ground that spatial and temporal continuity are data.

M. Reymond has a theory that zero is not a number like other numbers, but a mere possibility, "une possibilité d'un certain genre, la possibilité numérique" (p. 118). His reasons for this view seem to rest on some confusion. He says: "Some reflexions seem to justify this point of view. The expression  $1 + 0 = 1$  is very obscure from the logical point of view if zero enjoys exactly the same properties as other numbers. The unity in the first member of the equation is a given whole, which ought to be modified by the adjunction of zero, if this is a number like the others; this unity could not therefore be rigorously equal to that which appears in the second member" (*ibid.*). From this passage (as well as from certain others, e.g., p. 172) it would appear that the author confuses arithmetical and logical addition, and does not distinguish between a number and a class having this number of members. " $1 + 0$ " means "the number of terms in a class consisting of two mutually exclusive parts, of which one has one term, while the other has none." The second part here is null, and therefore the first part is the whole of the supposed class. It is not easy to see any logical obscurity in this.

The third part on "Logistic and Infinite Number," unfortunately shows a very inadequate knowledge of symbolic logic, and is full of elementary mistakes. The following are a few of these mistakes. On page 140, " $p$  implies  $q$ " is said to be equivalent to " $p$  is false, but  $q$  is true" (this may be a misprint); on page 142, a wrong definition of " $p$  or  $q$ " is given, according to which " $p$  or  $q$ " would be meaningless unless

$p$  and  $q$  were both true or both false; on page 143, it is said that the product of two classes is equal to their sum, and on page 148, the product of a class of relations is spoken of where the sum is required. On pages 145 and 151, "logical constants" are spoken of where "constants" should occur. On page 146, the relation "greater or less" is said to be asymmetrical, whereas in fact it is symmetrical, since if  $x$  is greater or less than  $y$ ,  $y$  is greater or less than  $x$ . Since M. Reymond proceeds to criticise various parts of the logical theory of number, it seems a pity that he has not first mastered it more thoroughly.

M. Reymond's main objection to the logical theory of number is that the word "all" cannot be applied to classes of numbers in the same sense as to other classes, on the ground that numbers form a series of terms all differing *inter se*, and that the fact that they form a series is essential. Assuming the definition of "12" as a class of classes, namely the class of all dozens, he says (p. 153) that the terms of this class, *quâ* dozens, are all alike, whereas the terms of the class "number" succeed each other in a definite order, and are all different one from another. It is very hard to see how this contention can be supposed to have any force. If the class of Apostles and the class of months are to be regarded as exactly alike *quâ* consisting of twelve terms each, so are 1 and 2 exactly alike *quâ* numbers. "The only property," he says, "common to all whole numbers is being obtained by a determinate law of succession" (*ibid.*) This is by no means true, since whole numbers have also, for example, the common property of being classes of similar classes. But even if it were true, it would not prevent numbers from forming a well-defined class. "The seed of Abraham" is defined by a certain law of succession, but that does not prevent it from being a well-defined class. A "law of succession" means a relation between any two consecutive terms; the field of this relation is then a class like any other, and the fact that the members (like those of any other class) differ *inter se*, offers no difficulty.

M. Reymond criticises at length the logical definitions of 0 and 1. His criticism of the definition of 0 (p. 170 ff.) seems to rest partly upon confusing a term with the class of which it is the only member, as when he says (p. 172): "The null-class is not a number; the arithmetical zero is therefore necessarily excluded from the null-class which therefore cannot serve to define it". The arithmetical zero is of course excluded from the null-class, since the null-class has no members, and therefore everything is excluded from it. But it is hard to see why, on this account, the null-class should not serve to define zero; the definition of zero as the class whose only member is the null-class is untouched by M. Reymond's remark. The bulk of his argument against the definition of zero appears to rest on the contention that no statement can be found which is false for every number. Yet M. Reymond himself contends that to every number 1 can be added. Hence the statement " $n$  is a number to which 1 cannot be added" will be false for every number, and so will the even simpler statement, "1 cannot be added to  $n$ ". Hence it would seem that his criticism cannot be maintained.

The conclusion reached by M. Reymond is as follows: "A nominal definition, either of whole number, or of infinite number, by means of logical constants alone, is impossible, and that principally because the principle of induction must be assumed as an indefinable, implying conditions of existence foreign to the relations envisaged by logistic" (p. 199). This conclusion cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as rendered in any degree probable by the preceding arguments, owing to the large number of misunderstandings which they contain, and to the assumption that general statements about all the members of a class are impossible if the

members differ *inter se* in a manner which gives rise to a series, as is the case with the finite integers.

B. RUSSELL.

*L'Idéal Moderne: La Question Morale, La Question Sociale, La Question Religieuse.* Par M. GAULTIER. Paris: Hachette et Cie, 1908. Pp. 355.

This book is written from the point of view of an optimistic idealist, who finds a never-failing solution for all philosophical difficulties in the conception of the higher synthesis. The method is familiar, but M. Gaultier's reapplication of it is on the whole justified by his quite unforced enthusiasm, by a notable lucidity of exposition, and by a thoroughness of treatment which, if not by any means invariable, is yet characteristic. The main antithesis which supplies M. Gaultier with material for criticism and construction, is, as might be expected, the antithesis between the abstract objective and the abstract subjective; between, for example, the theory of the scientist who interprets morality in terms of biological or sociological fact, and the creed of the formalist or intuitionist who invests the unexamined conscience with sacred authority; again between the theory that society is based on force, and the theory (not perhaps stated in so many words by M. Gaultier) that it is based upon the pure good will; or again between the political ideal of an absolute equality in which all individuality is lost in a system as abstract as that of any positive scientist, and of an absolute freedom in which the fact that man's nature is essentially social is ignored. M. Gaultier's criticism of these and similar antithetic abstractions is usually admirable; but his constructive reinterpretation is not always so satisfactory. Thus he rebukes the intuitionist for pausing upon an irrational hypothesis, and holds that Ethics is an inductive-deductive, though not positive science; and yet he claims for moral certitude validity which neither "logical nor sensible" certitude can possess. How if this claim be just, a science of Ethics can be anything but external and positive he does not explain. Again in his solution of the antinomy between abstract legality and abstract morality M. Gaultier shows some uncertainty. For at one time the 'moral' that is the essential correlate of the legal is represented as the ideal, at another as living and current ideas and customs. It would be dangerous optimism to claim for the psychological or historic present the unique right to be the ideal's representative; and though M. Gaultier never does so in as many words, yet both in this discussion and elsewhere he leaves us with a vague impression that such a claim, if made, could be justified. In his consideration of these two antinomies M. Gaultier perhaps forces his method to guarantee more than is legitimate; in his chapter on 'Morality and Religion,' on the other hand, he seems to refuse his method full play. For he accepts an ontological inference to a perfect reality from the fact of morality, and thus makes its objective significance identical with that of religion; whereas the moral attitude seems essentially to imply an ideal unrealised, and if the method is to be of any real value, this particular significance should be insisted on. M. Gaultier's discussion, it is only fair to say, is usually free from such ambiguities and irresoluteness. An especially good feature of the book is the practical treatment of immediate problems, such as poverty, and the place institutional religion should occupy in our modern life.

LOUIS BREHAUT.

*Dieu : l'Expérience en Métaphysique.* Par XAVIER MOISANT. Paris : Marcel Rivière, 1907. Pp. xiii, 300.

The author divides his work into five sections which treat of The Existence of God, The Personality of God, The Divine Attributes, The Problem of Evil, and Psychological Experience and the God of Christianity. M. Moisant has a considerable acquaintance with recent and contemporary French thought, but the volume is greatly lacking in close and consecutive reasoning. The result is that the treatment is rapid and fragmentary throughout, and the conclusions are often only feebly connected with previous discussions. We are told in the first section, that Positivism, Agnosticism, Pantheism and Idealism all break down before Experience. It may be so, but there is nothing in the foregoing pages to justify the statement. In his second section the author gives a slight but fair exposition of some difficulties raised by the attribution of personality to God. But his reply is not satisfactory; and he sometimes uses arguments which do not help his case at all. The evils of democracy in France and America, even if due to the lack of 'a directing personality,' are no relevant argument for a Supreme Ruler above; and would M. Moisant assert that the condition of France under that 'directing personality' Louis Quatorze was sounder than under the present régime? In the following chapter there are some useful criticisms of those who explain the universe as a system of impersonal laws. Moisant criticises the term 'law' after the manner of Boutroux and Poincaré. But he will not go the whole way with them, and declares that law expresses a relative truth, which truth presupposes an Eternal Consciousness. Why it should be so is not made clear. The section on the Problem of Evil, if in no way original, contains sensible remarks. While the metaphysical problem is insoluble the practical issue is plain—this is the conclusion. In his last section Moisant pays some attention to Pascal's advice to adopt the attitude and perform the ceremonies of religion in order to produce belief. He finds something immoral in this, and advocates a 'loyal experimentation' which confirms us in the truth and 'protects us against illusions. It is more difficult to follow him when he contends that Catholic Dogma has the witness of experience in its favour, and maintains rational truths which pure reason does not firmly grasp.

In a brief reference to Pragmatism—which is rejected as a dubious ally—M. Moisant complains that its use of the term 'practical' is vague. But if 'pragmatic value' is an elastic phrase, so is *experience* in this volume. The writer does not take pains to make clear whether he is using the word in the individual, collective or historical sense; nor does he seriously consider the way in which interpretation and inference enter into experience. As a contribution to a great subject, the book is unequal and disappointing.

G. GALLOWAY.

*Insuffisance des Philosophies de l'Intuition.* CLODIUS PIAT. Paris : 1908. Pp. 319.

M. Piat's book is a defence, against intuitionists of all kinds, of the rights of human reason, and the necessity and value of its work. First in the sphere of our knowledge of the external world, and then in theology and in ethics, he examines the nature and extent of all that different thinkers have claimed as 'immediately given,' and decides that it is quite inadequate without the use of inference and discursive thought. The

arguments against the validity of such thinking, moreover, are found when examined to fall to the ground. A large part of the book is naturally occupied with criticisms of particular writers. Since these include Newman and Sabatier, James, Bergson and Boutroux, J. S. Mill, Aristotle and Spencer, St. Anselm, Descartes, Leibniz, and Hegel, Malebranche, Fénelon, and Kant, it is evident that the foes of reason are found in many different quarters; and at several points the reader would certainly be glad of more explanation of the various meanings of 'intuitionist'. Yet the work hangs together better than might be expected, and the only thing which in the end seems baffling is the attribution to 'intuitionist' theology of the ontological proof. Surely this is as much a matter of reason and argument as any proof of anything can be. Of course it rests on the alleged fact of our possessing a certain idea, but M. Piat's criticisms are directed for the most part against the inferences drawn from this fact by discursive thought, and therefore seem irrelevant to his general purpose.

Expositions and criticisms alike are admirably clear, and nearly always worth remembering. The treatment of M. Bergson's work is particularly valuable, in spite of an occasional common-sense literalness which seems to do a little less than justice to that rainbow-like philosopher. The book is a good and sensible contribution to the defence of reason.

HELEN WODEHOUSE.

*Der Philosophische Kritizismus, Geschichte und System.* By ALOIS RIEHL. Erster Band: Geschichte des Philosophischen Kritizismus. Zweite, neu verfasste Auflage. Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann, 1908. Pp. vii, 614.

It is quite unnecessary to introduce the first volume of the long and eagerly expected new edition of Prof. Riehl's great work to the readers of *MIND* by any words of commendation or criticism. It has long been a great misfortune for English students of Kant, most of whom received their first initiation into the critical philosophy at the hands of teachers who leaned strongly towards the "idealistic" interpretation of the *Critique* that Prof. Riehl's weighty presentation of the case for the "realistic" interpretation should have remained so long inaccessible. Patience, however, has not, in this case, gone without its reward. The principles of interpretation adopted in the former edition have been retained unmodified, but the text has undergone so thorough a revision and expansion that the book, as it now lies before us, is almost a new work, rather than a second edition. Students of Kant, who will find Prof. Riehl's work in its new form an indispensable adjunct to the Kantian text, can only hope that the second volume, containing the actual exposition of *Kritizismus*, as understood by one of its foremost representatives, may not be long delayed.

A. E. TAYLOR.

*Vier Vorträge über Entwicklungsstörungen beim Kinde.* Von Professor D. G. ANTON, Direktor der Klinik für Nerven- und Geistes-krankheiten in Halle. Berlin: Verlag von S. Karger, 1908. Pp. 91.

These four contributions to the study of the feeble-minded include a discussion of the forms and causes of bodily infantilism, of mental infantilism, of the nervous and mental diseases incident to the onset of sexual maturity, and of some practical points in the management of the backward and degenerate children. Great stress is laid on the parts



played by the thyroid, the thymus, the supra-renal capsules, the pancreas, and other glands, in the arresting or promoting of development. Dr. Anton gives an elaborate but provisional classification of the forms of infantilism. In the mental section an effort is made to distinguish infantilism as such from imbecility, and a good deal of psychological detail is given to point the differences. There is also, in the remaining two papers, much practical direction for treatment both medical and institutional. The four pages of bibliography and the ten pages of names of institutions combine with the practical nature of the discussions to make this an excellent introduction to the study of infantilism.

W. L. M.

*Gehirn und Schädel. Eine topographisch-anatomische Studie in photographischer Darstellung.* Mit 69 zum Teil mehrfarbigen Lichtdrucktafeln. Von Dr. FR. HERMANN, A.O., Professor der Anatomie an der Universität Erlangen. Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1908. Pp. 12 + 69.

Since the introduction by Blum in 1893 of Formaldehyde for the fixation of tissues, much work has been done in the study of the cerebral convolutions, and especially in connection with their relation to the surface.

Dr. Hermann's book, *Gehirn und Schädel*, has made a valuable contribution to the topography of the brain. The work consists of sixty-nine plates from life-size photographs showing the relation of the convolutions and deeper parts of the brain to the sutures and contour of the skull, and it should prove a valuable help to the student of Anatomy and Psychology. In the profile views the author has wisely selected the left side of the brain, where, except in left-handed people, Broca's centre for speech is situated.

While no single brain can be taken as representing an invariable standard of the normal, those portrayed in this book may be taken as showing an arrangement usually met with. The work is enhanced by superimposed tracings showing the outstanding features of each photograph, and the publishers are to be congratulated on the excellent way in which these photographs have been reproduced.

J. M.

*Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart. Der Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart Vierte Umgearbeitete Auflage.* Von RUDOLF EUCKEN. Leipzig: Veit & Co., 1909. Pp. xii, 410. M.8.

The increased and well-deserved attention paid to Prof. Eucken ought to ensure many fresh readers of this important work, which now reaches its Fourth Edition. Prof. Eucken has wrought over some passages and added one on the "Wert des Lebens". He considers that he has given more precision to his main theses, dealt more immediately with the problems of the time, and taken more account of movements outside of Germany.

D. M.

*L'Individualismo etico nel secolo xix.* By GIOVANNI CALÒ. Napoli: 1906. Pp. 378. (Opera premiata. Napoli: 1904.)

*L'Individualismo nelle dottrine morali del secolo xix.* By GIOVANNI VIDARI. Milano: 1909. Pp. 400. (Opera premiata. Napoli: 1906.)

*L'Intolleranza e i suoi presupposti.* By GIOVANNI MARCHESINI. Torino: 1909. Pp. 266.

In view of the multiplication of fields for investigation and of books, the surface fact of the first two titles would seem to be a result of those

'spleens' that 'make the angels weep,' or is it 'laugh themselves mortal' withal? Within three years, 1904 and 1906, at one and the same centre of learning, we see two treatises on the same subject winning 'prizes,' the later of the two in no way, implicitly or explicitly, developing, or being apparently expected to develop the materials and conclusions contained in the earlier volume. Altogether an intensely individualistic state of things—such as should itself supply material and conclusions for yet a third competition '*bandito su analogo tema*' during the current year! We are yet far from realising generally that ideal of organised and collective scientific research urged so eloquently by the young Renan, sixty years ago, as an absolute economic necessity of the near future (*Avenir de la Science*, pp. 248 ff.). In that humaner Eden of the To-Be, academies will be less keen to continue the competitive scrambles of schoolboys by offering prizes in the nobler world of adult scholars, and be rather concerned to act as the Labour Bureaux of Research, as intermediaries and organisers of scholar with scholar, and of scholar with materials.

While however we may, on the one hand, deplore the wastage, for writer and reader, as we watch, in our two treatises, the same names of thinkers and of books marshalled before us and, like Emerson's 'hypocritic Days,'

marching single in an endless file,

we hasten to admit, on the other hand, not only the ample scope of the subject for diverse points of view, but also our satisfaction at the fact of its being so emphatically selected. The distinctive attitudes of the two authors in their analyses of the concept of individualism, and the different results obtained by each vindicate to some extent an individualism in treatment.

An analogous analysis of the concept of 'personality' may be said to form the centre-point in the third book under consideration—G. Marchesini's *Intolerance and its Presuppositions*—since, apart from historical treatment, intolerance can only now be interesting as the expression of something in the psychology of the personal, or the social unit. Personality or individuality, according to Mr. Marchesini, reveals under analysis the four main attributes of *transitivity with continuity, individuation, value and relativity*. Or rather, it is a *system of values* and a *system of relations*, and the former of these systems 'subsists through the effect of' the first-named twin characteristics. Of these, 'continuity expresses the possibility of mind increasing' (*incremento*), 'binding, as it does, the successive mental moments' constituting the transitivity one to another. Here we should have preferred to see continuity called the binding, and not raised into a mythical entity which binds. And we should have liked to see this ingenious analysis rendered more convincing by a constructive effort of synthesis.

The significance attaching to the prominence which such study of individualism and individuality is gaining in philosophy can scarcely be over-rated. When philosophical ultimates are analysed and criticised, it may well be due to the felt need of fresh correlating. England has contributed more than her quota of great individualistic thinkers, notably in ethics and political economy—is contributing them, according to Mr. Vidari, who thus summarises the philosophy of Mr. Schiller (with that of Prof. James)—"historically and logically connected with the instinctivistic irrationalism of Nietzsche . . . and based on the gnoseological conclusions of other contemporary philosophic currents, especially on contingent indeterminism, and on the newer experimentalism . . . their moral doctrine attains nevertheless a form of individualism only classifi-

able as instinctivistic". But we have not as yet met with any notable Anglo-Saxon essays analysing or criticising such concepts, and we are reminded of Matthew Arnold's quip at the want of self-consciousness about Philistinism in England, and as to the lack of 'solecistic' critique at Soloe. It may console us to think that we shall probably get more thoroughly 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast' when our evolutionary moment arrives, and, it may be, go one step further than our neighbours.

The distinction and the justification of the individualistic ideal—whether it find expression in genius, in anarchistic dreams, in religious regeneration, or in the perfectly cultured personality—is nobly expressed and socialised thus, by Mr. Calò: "When the individualist revolts against a sterile state of society, or one in which the free energy of the unit is violently repressed, it is not because he feels himself outside of, and hostile to society, but because he realises his membership of a better and more advanced society, of an ideal society" . . . which recalls Emerson's pregnant comment on the hint of sarcasm in a beautiful face as implying: "Yes, I am willing to attract, but . . . a little better kind of a man than any I yet behold". This is perhaps the last and best word in the socialisation of individualism. But that word has not yet been uttered with respect to the relation of personality to the universe and to universal law.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

*Il Concetto della Natura e il Principio del Diritto.* GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO.  
Milan: Fratelli Bocca Editori, 1908. Pp. 174. L. 5.

The Kantian distinction between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself is no less valid for the theory of jurisprudence than for natural science. Nature as phenomenon is entirely subjected to the *a priori* category of causality, and hence natural science is justified in demanding a purely mechanical explanation of all processes, including those of life and consciousness. But the causal connexion between phenomena itself implies the permanence of the underlying noumenon, which can only be conceived in terms of teleology. Hence the teleological conception of nature as a progressive realisation of ends, and the schemes of valuation based on this conception, are equally valid with the constructions of mechanical science. Nature is throughout teleological, as noumenon, and throughout mechanical as phenomenon. Similarly, Kant is right in holding that the true expression of morality is the categorical imperative which arises from the character of man as noumenon. The systematic unfolding of the contents of the categorical imperative as a scheme of social relations (*relazioni di convivenza*), is Jurisprudence. The assertors and the impugnors of the "law of nature" have alike erred by failure to recognise this connexion between jurisprudence and the noumenal. Both have understood by "law of nature" a supposed actual code under which mankind lived in some obscure past. In this sense the "law of nature" is a fiction, and the positivist is justified in treating all existing codes as products of a social environment, and calling for their causal explanation. But the validity of a transcendent norm is independent of its actual recognition. The "law of nature" should be thought of as the ideal towards which all actual progressive legislation tends to approximate; *i.e.*, as a scheme of social relations which adequately embodies the Kantian conception of "humanity always an end, never a means". So understood, it is an indispensable standard for the evaluation of actual legislative progress.

Prof. del Vecchio's essay is illustrated by notes attesting a wide familiarity with the whole range of the literature of the subject, and its

conclusions will probably appeal to every one except the "radical empiricists" in moral philosophy. I confess myself unconvinced by the rigid Kantian orthodoxy of the form in which they are presented. If "nature" is really teleological, it seems to me that there must be a point at which the attempt to carry out the conception of it as a pure mechanism will break down, a region where "explanation by causes" will be found futile. And a good deal might be urged against the author's identification of the equations of mathematical Physics with "causal laws". But all this is perhaps matter for "another branch of philosophy".

A. E. TAYLOR.

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- W. Hilger, *Die Hypnose und die Suggestion, ihr Wesen, ihre Wirkungsweise, und ihre Bedeutung und Stellung unter den Heilmitteln*, Jena, Gustav Fischer, 1909, pp. 194.
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- Giorgio Del Vecchio, *Su la Teoria del Contratto Sociale*, Bologna, Zanichelli, 1906, pp. 118.
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## VIII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. xvii., No. 6. **C. M. Bakewell.** 'On the Meaning of Truth.' [Starts out from the naïve view of truth as something objective, to be sought and discovered; works from this to the view that "truth is always conceiving a particular object in the light of its 'idea,' its concrete universal, that is to say, simply conceiving it in its total context or setting"; "we may then define truth as grasping the transient fact in its transcendent context". Truth is not therefore identical with reality, "for the judgments and conceptions which state the true meaning of the facts should be distinguished from the facts whose true meaning is in them reported, even from an absolute point of view". The copy-theory gets its plausibility from the substitution for the individual investigator of "a rational observer of a common order of experience".] **J. E. Creighton.** 'The Nature and Criterion of Truth.' [Philosophy is matter for the systematist, not for the essayist. The history of philosophy leads to the belief that experience is to be conceived as process; that truth has to do with the interrelation of the parts of this process; that knowledge is the process whereby the individual and the race attain consistency of experience; that consciousness is the immanent and dynamic function of interpretation in experience; and therefore that the relation of mind and reality is essentially inner and organic. If we criticise pragmatism on this basis, we see that, while it is a timely protest against abstraction, it tends to deprive thought or reason of all hegemony in experience; or that, if it be given the widest interpretation, it may be accepted by idealism, but must then be supplemented by a theory of reality.] **H. W. Wright.** 'Self-realisation and the Criterion of Goodness.' [It has been said that self-realisation fails to furnish a standard for the evaluation of conduct. But if we can clearly conceive the demands of the self in its unity, we shall be able to discriminate actions which fulfil these demands (good), and actions which gratify only a part of them (bad). Now the self is an organising agency. Hence the object of supreme worth is a completely organised life, and the criterion of moral value must refer directly to such organisation. And organisation implies the actual conditions of human life: the adjustment of natural impulses, of self-interest and the interests of others, of the individual to the cosmic order. Thus regarded, self-realisation offers a criterion of good and evil that may be put to practical use, and is itself brought into line with universal evolution.] **G. W. Cunningham.** 'The Significance of the Hegelian Conception of Absolute Knowledge.' [Hegel's conception of thought, as given in the category of absolute knowledge arrived at by the procedure of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, is based directly upon our actual knowing experience. Absolute knowledge is, first, objective, in the sense that it transcends the individual and expresses the essence of things. It is also universal; not in the sense of formal logic, but in that of a "synthesis of differences," the inclusive living unity of mind. "Therefore, when Hegel teaches that thought is coterminous with the real, he is simply stating the doctrine that



experience and reality are one."] **Reviews of Books.** **Notices of New Books.** **Summaries of Articles.** **Notes.** [F. Thilly on Prof. Friedrich Paulsen.]

**PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW.** Vol. xv., No. 4. **M. Meyer.** 'The Nervous Correlate of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness.—I.' [Abstracts a 'collection of contradictory views' (Lagerborg, Fite, Stumpf, Pikler, etc.) of the nature of feeling, as a preliminary to constructive work.] **H. H. Bawden.** 'Studies in *Æsthetic Value*, I. The Nature of *Æsthetic Value*; with a Critique of Miss Puffer's Theory of its Alleged Absoluteness.' [The writer accepts Urban's definition of value as "the selective funded affective-volitional meaning" of an object for a subject, but insists that the distinction of value and meaning, description and appreciation, is functional only. He then discusses the two theories of the æsthetic attitude, those of survival (the attitude is pre-reflective) and of consummation (post-reflective), and finds that "both are true: the one is but the negative counterpart of the other". Miss Puffer's ultimate laws of beauty are really "the capitalised culture-reactions of the past history of the human race". All æsthetic judgments are derived: and this means that the standard of judgment is not fixed, absolute, timeless, but is to be sought in the type, "in the relationship of beauty to the conditions out of which it has grown".]

**R. W. Sellars.** 'An Important Antinomy.' [The antinomy may be phrased, with Bradley, thus: "nature is only for my body; but, on the other hand, my body is only for nature". It arises from the double meaning of 'nature,' which in the first clause "must be looked upon idealistically, as a construct of mine" and in the second refers to the macrocosm of reality, other than my experience. Now in the brain the two natures meet; so the antinomy leads us to the mind-body problem. This may be solved by way of functional identity: reality as process may be looked at from the side of conservation, and we have its invariant aspect, stated in terms of phenomenal energy; or it may be viewed from the side of variance, and we have consciousness. The advantage of such a solution is that we may accept the efficacy of consciousness without running against the principle of the conservation of energy.] **O. Nagel.**

'On Seeing in the Dark: Remarks on the Evolution of the Eye.' [Speculative inferences from the now generally accepted doctrine of the functional difference of the rods and cones.] **Discussion.** **B. H. Bode.**

'Some Recent Definitions of Consciousness.' [Reviews the recent articles by James, Perry, Dewey, McGilvary and Woodbridge. Concludes that, from the point of view of an intelligent scepticism, "whether an adequate definition of consciousness can be obtained seems a matter for legitimate doubt".] Vol. xv., No. 5. **H. H. Bawden.** 'Studies in *Æsthetic Value*, II. The Nature of *Æsthetic Emotion*.' [The writer starts out from Herrick's theory that the conditions of pleasurable feeling are irradiation (1) along lines of habitual response; (2) of stimuli whose summation and discharge fall within the limits of the normal function of the organs involved; he shows that this theory comports with the relativity of pleasantness and unpleasantness. He then passes, by way of Marshall's statement that only the permanently pleasurable can be æsthetic, to a formulation of the general law of the æsthetic consciousness: the maximum of intellectual meditation compatible with its remaining a pleasurable value-experience. The formula is tested by a detailed criticism of Puffer's theory of 'repose in excitement' or 'combination of favourable stimulation and repose'.] **M. Meyer.** 'The Nervous Correlate of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness, II.' [The nervous system must be considered as an integration of reflex arcs; and its consequent functions are variation of response, sensory condensation,

motor condensation and inhibition. The correlate of sensation then appears as the nervous current itself, while the correlate of pleasantness and unpleasantness is the increase or decrease of the intensity of a previously constant current, if the increase or decrease is caused by a force acting at a point other than the point of sensory stimulation. The theory is tested by brief and schematic reference to a dozen of the more important facts in the psychology of feeling.] **H. A. Peterson.** 'Correlation of Certain Mental Traits in Normal School Students.' [Tests were devised for accuracy (copying of a bibliography), memory (reproduction after dictation), reasoning (logical, arithmetical, geometrical problems), generalising power (generalising from printed data, general-knowledge questions), and power to understand abstract thought (recasting of paragraphs from works on political economy, philosophy, psychology), and the results were correlated in the usual way. The values of the coefficients of correlation are, naturally, much higher than those ordinarily obtained for the simpler mental processes. After considering various objections to his procedure, the author concludes that every test involved several kinds of ability, but that some one kind was predominant; and that it is this predominant ability that was measured by the tests.] Vol. xv., No. 6. **C. H. Cooley.** 'A Study of the Early Use of Self-Words by a Child.' [Record of observations of a girl, relating chiefly to a period of about a year, beginning with the twentieth month. "The child gradually comes to notice the indications of self-feeling (the emphasis, the appropriate actions, etc.) accompanying the use of 'I', 'me' and 'my' by others. These indications awaken his own self-feeling, already existing in an inarticulate form. He sympathises with them and reproduces them in his own use of these words. They thus come to stand for a *self-assertive feeling or attitude*, for self-will and appropriation." ] **M. Meyer.** 'The Nervous Correlate of Attention.'—I. [(1) The fundamental laws of nervous function. The neuron systems are likened to pipe-systems filled with fluid and furnished with valves; the function analogous to that of the valve-gear of a steam engine is explained by reference to the dynamic law that hydraulic is less than hydrostatic pressure. (2) The uniqueness of pain reactions. If the pain reaction is repeated, owing to continuance of stimulus, the movement is not the same, but differs in every reaction. (3) The susceptibility of connecting neurons. Explanation of the establishment of special forms of habit.] **H. C. Stevens.** 'Peculiarities of Peripheral Vision.'—II. 'The Perception of Motion by the Peripheral Retina.' [In a previous paper the writer showed that objects imaged on the nasal retina of the right and on the temporal retina of the left eye appear larger than similar objects oppositely imaged. This difference of space perception is the condition of the apparent increase in the rate of motion of objects indirectly viewed. For (1) the distribution of the size illusion, in the visual field, is exactly coextensive with that of the rate illusion. And (2) the former is fundamental, because the differences in space perception appear with motionless cardboard discs.] **B. Sidis and H. T. Kalmus.** 'A Study of Galvanometric Deflections due to Psycho-physiological Processes.' Part I. [Brief review of work so far done. (The only reference is to the paper by Peterson and Jung in *Brain*, 1907; these authors, however, give a bibliography.) Description and arrangement of apparatus.] Discussion: **F. J. E. Woodbridge.** 'Consciousness and Meaning.' [Reply to Bode. "When objects become known, they do not . . . lose any of the properties or relationships they had before. . . . But when objects become known, then they mean something." It is not necessary to add 'awareness'; awareness is but another term for consciousness.]

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. xix., No. 4. **F. L. Wells**, 'Normal Performance in the Tapping Test before and during Practice, with Special Reference to Fatigue Phenomena.' [An attempt to standardise a "psychological measure of a relatively high degree of simplicity, precision and responsiveness," that of the maximal rate of repeated ten voluntary movements. Report of eighty experiments (two each upon normal individuals, and thirty each upon two individuals), the experiment consisting of two records (right and left hands) of five thirty-sec. series fractionated into six successive five-sec. intervals. Rest-periods of two and a half min. intervened between series. We select a few of the results. (1) The most important aspects of the practice effect are gross gain and the warming-up phenomenon. (2) Fatigue tends in all respects to decrease variability. Subjective condition, as estimated introspectively, bears no relation to gross rate; susceptibility to fatigue is, however, greater when the grade assigned is 'good'. The ratio of the first to the average of the later interval-performances gives an 'index of fatigue,' which may be used to express quantitative relationships in susceptibility and immunity to fatigue. (3) The right hand is ordinarily more immune to fatigue than the left. The left hand does not improve by practice more than the right. Under the conditions, the warming-up phenomenon appears clearly in the right-hand series of unpractised subjects; it is not so clear for the left hand. (4) Individual differences are large, and their neural conditions cannot be stated. The 'index of right-handedness' (Woodworth) is a distinct point of individual difference.] **C. E. Ferree**, 'The Streaming Phenomenon.' [Gives sketches and descriptions of the phenomenon for various observers. Compares the accounts of the phenomenon with published accounts of the circulation and of other entoptic movement phenomena (e.g., Purkinje's *wandelnde Nebelstreifen*); concludes that the streaming has not been observed by previous students of psychological optics.] **J. C. Bell**, **G. E. Hatch**, **L. T. Ohr**, 'The Effect of Suggestion upon the Reproduction of Triangles and of Point Distances.' [Discusses the effect of auditory and visual suggestion upon the estimation of vertical distances, as evidenced in the graphic reproduction of the figures. The aggregate error without suggestion is positive (overestimation); the type remains constant for a given observer; four observers showed the positive, two the negative type. There are marked individual differences in suggestibility. The suggestion of underestimation is more effective for the positive type, less effective for the negative type, than that of overestimation. Suggestion is most effective at the outset of an investigation.] **M. Ashmun**, 'A Study of Temperaments as Illustrated in Literature.' [Classification of literary figures mainly in terms of Ribot's classification of characters.] **H. E. Houston** and **W. W. Washburn**, 'The Effect of Various Kinds of Artificial Illumination upon Colored Surfaces.' [Comparison, at a single constant intensity, of variously colored surfaces illuminated by daylight, incandescent, are and oil lamps, candle, gaslight, and Welsbach burner.] **E. B. Titchener** and **L. R. Geissler**, 'A Bibliography of the Scientific Writings of Wilhelm Wundt.' [First instalment of 215 titles, 1856-1908.] **Minor Communications**. **J. W. Harris**, 'On the Associative Power of Odors.' [The secret of the suggestive power of odours lies simply in the fact that that they are observed with interest, and are so infrequently experienced that the preponderant association is not blotted out by others.] **L. G. Winston**, 'Myself and I: a Confession.' (Brief account of a normal condition approximating that of dual personality, and characterised by the persistence of a younger along with the elder 'self'.) Psychological Literature.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. v., 15.

**J. E. Boodin.** 'Energy and Reality: II. The Definition of Energy.' [An interesting paper coming to the conclusion that energies may be classified in three fundamental groups—material, electrical and conative; and that if their unification should ever prove to be feasible, it would be in panpsychist terms.]

**T. P. Bailey.** 'Organic Sensation and Organismic Feeling.' [A vivid study in the concrete psychology of the whole man, describing introspection during an absurd lecture.] Report of the Section of Anthropology and Psychology of the New York Academy of Sciences. v., 16.

**E. A. Kirkpatrick.** 'The Part Played by Consciousness in Mental Operations.' [Dr. Morton Prince's evidence for a co-conscious 'sub-conscious' is so difficult to test that "it seems safer for the scientist to attempt to use the physiological explanation until more is known". Does not say how more is to be known if the physiological theory happens to be wrong.]

**A. W. Moore.** 'Truth Value.' [A brilliant paper criticising the 'special-instinct view of thought' that "true judging is the satisfaction of a want—the purpose, namely, to judge *truly!*" and concluding that "judging means inquiry, inquiry means *doubt*, and *doubt* means *conflicting impulses*".] v., 17.

**G. Salvadori.** 'Positivism in Italy.' [Ardigo and Varisco.]

**G. R. Dodson.** 'The Function of Philosophy as an Academic Discipline.' [Philosophy "deserves the contempt it receives if its final effect is to impair confidence in the validity of those inferences which we have to make in order to live".]

**G. A. Tawney.** 'Ultimate Hypotheses in Psychology.' [Miss Calkins's.] v., 18.

**H. R. Marshall.** 'Subtentative Consciousness and Suggestion.' [Reply to Kirkpatrick, v., 16. Substitutes the 'subtentative' for the subconscious, and contends that "the field of inattention is fundamentally of the same nature as the field of attention," that 'auto-suggestion' is volitional control, and that prayer is a form of suggestion.] Contains also a long review of three books on Darwinism. v., 19.

**F. Thilly.** 'Friedrich Paulsen.' [An obituary notice.]

**J. H. Farley.** 'Types of Unity.' [Distinguishes ten: "(1) Individuality, (2) logical indivisibility, (3) substantive or dynamic indivisibility, (4) allness, (5) bare continuity, (6) concatenation, (7) harmony, adjustment or order in the bare content, (8) kinæsthetic purpose, (9) teleological unity, (10) immediacy to all," and confronts current monism with much the same problem as existed for the 'philosophy of the Unconscious' when its author subsequently distinguished nineteen different senses of 'unconscious'.]

**J. H. Tufts.** 'Ethical Value.' ["Value belongs to objects of consciousness, and not to objects or things apart from consciousness." Ethical value is "the value which belongs to objects in the ethical consciousness".] v., 20.

**H. H. Bawden.** 'A New Scientific Argument for Immortality.' ["A mode of activity, a value, once come into being cannot perish. It may be transformed. It must be transformed in order to endure, since the essence of being is in becoming. But this transformation cannot mean its destruction, for this would mean the annihilation of reality."]

**R. W. Sellars.** 'Critical Realism and the Time Problem: I.' [Idealism cannot solve it. As absolute idealism, it confesses that if time is real the Absolute is a delusion. As personal idealism, it lapses into panpsychism and pluralism in order to solve it. Critical Realism must construe reality dynamically. It must conceive organisation not as an unchanging entity but as a form developing in time. Real time is identifiable with change. But things do not change at the same rate.] v., 21.

**J. A. Leighton.** 'Time, Change, and Time-Transcendence.' [Admitting the distinction between perceptual time-series and the pure concept of time which is an abstraction from the changing order of consciousness, can we not

imagine that "the continuous fulfilment of human ends presupposes the ultimate reality of a supreme and controlling system of cosmic ends, in which human ends and values must be integral elements, though we may not be able to see how this is so" ?] **T. Nakashima.** 'The Time of Perception as a Measure of Differences in Sensations.' [Tables.] **G. S. Fullerton.** 'The Meeting of the Third International Congress of Philosophy at Heidelberg.' [Thinks it has been of value.] v., 22. **E. B. McQuilvary.** 'The Chicago "Idea" and Idealism.' [Argues that though Dewey is not an idealist in the sense he gives to "idea," he is in the current sense that 'all reality is regarded as embraced within experience,' and that he blurs the distinction between fact and idea, observation and inference, and ignores the existence of *datissima datorum*.] **R. W. Sellars.** 'Critical Realism and the Time Problem.—II.' ["Change is characteristic of the individual, but so is organisation and the conservation of past activities," and "the need of bringing his past experience to bear upon present problems puts a premium" upon the construction of conceptual out of perceptual Time.] Contains also a long review of Bergson's *Evolution Créatrice*. v., 23. **A. Schinz.** 'Prof. Dewey's Pragmatism.' [Holds that Dewey ultimately reduces the logic of ethics to the logic of science, though this is the opposite of what he intended to do, and lands in the *science des mœurs*.] **H. C. Brown.** 'Infinity and the Generalisation of the Concept of Number.' ["Mathematicians have committed the fallacy of converse accident in their generalisation of the concept of number and only the finite numbers are legitimate."] **M. W. Calkins.** 'Ultimate Hypotheses in Psychology.' [Reply to Tawney in v., 17.] v., 24. **A. C. Armstrong.** 'The Evolution of Pragmatism.' [A paper read at the Heidelberg Congress. Integration and differentiation are both taking place, especially the latter. There is agreement that Pragmatism is a method and is not subjectivism, and applies variously to different subjects. But Dewey appears to diverge from James and Schiller as regards humanism and metaphysics.] **J. E. Downey.** 'Automatic Phenomena of Muscle-Reading.' [Experiments pointing to the conclusion that "automatism with a certain amount of elaboration may be the lot of a greater number of us than has usually been supposed".] **F. C. Sharp.** 'Custom and the Moral Judgment.' [Comments on A. O. Lovejoy's review of the author's inquiry in v., 20.] v., 25. **J. A. McVannel.** 'Edward Caird.' [Obituary.] **C. H. Judd.** 'The Doctrine of Attitudes.' [Pleads for making fundamental the "division between objective sensations and subjective reactions" on the ground that there is no proper place for attention in the triple division of consciousness into cognitions, feelings and volitions, which breeds "confusion without end," and that "feelings and attention belong together".] **F. N. Spindler.** 'Some Thoughts on the Concept.' [The older, formal doctrine of the concept was formulated by pronounced visualisers (realists, conceptualists) or audiles (nominalists), and overlooks its motor function, and functional value. Students should be taught that "concepts are only possibilities, not entities or fixed ideas," and that "the only reason for ever seeking the abstract and general and logical is that we may conquer, manage and take a rational attitude towards the real, the concrete, the particular".] Contains also an important review of Hégbert's *Le Pragmatisme et ses formes diverses* by **W. James**, who once more repudiates the charge of subjectivism and urges that the pragmatist account of truth is the only one extant, and that anti-pragmatist criticism is "the renunciation of all articulate theory". He proceeds to explain that the apparent difference between his account of truth and Schiller's is due to the fact that whereas the latter starts from the subjective pole of the cognition process

and is not bound to treat of reality-in-itself as opposed to reality-as-known, he himself starts from "the object-pole of the idea-reality chain" and so traverses the same path in the opposite direction. v, 26. **F. M. Urban.** 'On a Supposed Criterion of the Absolute Truth of Some Propositions.' [Criticises Royce's attempt to extract absolute truth from indirect proofs in mathematics. (1) As all mathematical truths can also be proved indirectly, absolute truth must belong to all or none. (2) They all depend on a set of fundamental propositions, and hence none possesses absolute truth, since there exists no logical necessity for accepting any system of such propositions. (3) The principles of logic may be called absolutely true in that no proposition in an abstract system may contradict them, but the problem remains "why phenomena of actual experience also must comply with them," or "why the laws of thought are also the laws of things," of this problem the solution is begged, if the principles of logic are declared absolutely true.] **J. L. Perrier.** 'The True God of Scholasticism.' [He is not so 'remote and vacuous' as James takes him to be.] vi., 1. **H. R. Marshall.** 'Algedonics and Sensationalism.' [Pleads for a qualitative view of pleasure and pain as against a sensationalist view of them.] **J. Dewey.** 'Objects, Data and Existences; a Reply to Prof. McGilvary.' [Cf. v., 22. Denies (1) that *datissima datorum* have been denied, seeing that a situation needing conceptual reconstruction is always postulated; (2) that such data are facts in the scientific sense, or (3) higher than the facts constructed out of them; (4) that he is any more of an idealist than his critics, whose terms, however, are ambiguous.]

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. Vol. xix., No. 2, January, 1909.

**F. Thilly.** 'Friedrich Paulsen's Ethical Work and Influence.' [A statement of the fundamental principles of his ethics with special reference to their practical setting and significance.] **J. S. Mackenzie.** 'The Late Dr. Edward Caird.' [A brief eulogy of his work and character.] **M. E. Sadler.** 'The International Congress on Moral Education.' [An interesting account of its origin and character, and of the three outstanding episodes of its proceedings—discussions of (1) the degree in which the great English public schools foster a sense of civic obligation, (2) the value of systematic courses of direct moral instruction as helps in the formation of right principles of conduct, (3) the relations between religious education and moral education.] **H. H. Schroeder.** 'Self-esteem and the Love of Recognition as Sources of Conduct.' [An analysis of these 'feeling-dispositions,' in the large variety of forms and grades which they assume in individual character and action, with a careful appraisal of them and some suggestions as to their treatment in education.] **A. W. Benn.** 'The Morals of an Immoralist—Friedrich Nietzsche.—II.' [A critical examination of Nietzsche's doctrine of the superman. Shows the many changes and inconsistencies in his conception; and, incidentally, that he was persistently unjust to the philosophers (e.g., the English thinkers, Darwin, Mill and Spencer) to whom he owed most. His professed immoralism is grounded on an appeal to a higher morality.] **W. M. Urban.** 'The Will to Make-Believe.' [Make-believe or practical assumption is the key to life. "Our passional nature, with its instinct to make-believe, not only lawfully may but really must do so when the make-believe is genuine or whole-souled, that is, when it is, in turn, the necessary condition or resultant of some other belief, the only alternative of which is disbelief and scepticism. . . . When the realisation of an end, itself useful or good, depends upon the reflex effect upon ourselves of the assumption, even pretence, that we already have it, then make-believe, pretence, is



certainly a lawful and probably an indispensable thing." **C. Heath.** 'Crime and Social Responsibility.' [A short paper referring especially to a recent pamphlet on the subject by Dr. Bernard Hollander. But urges the need of an ethical along with the physiological and medical attitude to the problem.] Book Reviews.

**THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW.** Vol. ii., No. 1, January, 1909. **A. E. Zimmern.** "Was Greek Civilization based on Slave Labour?" [Authorities disagreed about the nature, causes and consequences of slave-labour in Greek City-States. Sure foundation for investigating facts in studies of economists on working of slavery in more recent times, e.g., Cairnes' *Slave Power*. Aristotle was not a dispassionate political observer or a trained economic reasoner. Greeks practical men of affairs, not contemplative æsthetics with their material needs ministered to by tame drudges. The conditions which are natural result of slave-labour did not obtain in Greece. To understand what did obtain we must distinguish between chattel-slavery and apprentice-slavery. A slave who can own property is serving his apprenticeship to freedom. Both forms in Greek City-State but apprentice-slavery predominant.] **J. H. Leuba.** 'Magic and Religion.' [Whether Magic antedated Religion or not—in its primary forms it probably did—Religion arose independently of Magic; they are different in principle.] **W. Trotter.** 'Sociological Application of the Psychology of Herd Instinct.' [Application of biological conceptions to man and society as they actually exist, and discussion of the effect of Gregariousness on the future of man.] **J. A. Hobson.** 'The Psychology of Public Business Enterprise.' [Analysis of the structural changes of industry involved in socialisation. Might result in waste of controlling and co-ordinating power unless counterbalanced by a new public spirit and new methods of popular control. The further fear of a corrupt use of political power by socialised workers a vice of crude democratic methods, not specially of Socialism.] Discussions, Reviews, etc.

**ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE.** Tome vii., No. 4. **E. Claparède.** 'Classification et plan des méthodes psychologiques.' [Psychological methods fall, primarily, into four groups, according as the direct psychophysical process by means of which measurement or analysis is made is a phenomenon of reception, judgment, execution or expression. Under each one of these headings we have quantitative (psychometrical) and qualitative (psycholexical) methods. In the former, measurement may be expressed in terms of amount of stimulus (psychophysics), duration of process (psychochronometry), work done (psychodynamics), or number of observers (psychostatistics). In the latter, description or appreciation is based upon subjective analysis (introspective psychology) or external indications (extrospective psychology). Illustrations are given of the various types of method, and a final note outlines a classification of the methods of animal psychology.] **J. Varendonck.** 'Les idéals d'enfants.' [Report based on questionnaire returns. The child idealises, first, the characters of persons in his immediate surroundings; then the characters of contemporaries; and, lastly, characters that he has come to know about at school or in his private reading. A large number of girls (26 per cent.) idealise male characters. The author appends a few pedagogical suggestions.] **Recueil de faits: Documents et discussion.** **E. Claparède.** 'III<sup>me</sup> Congrès allemand de Psychologie expérimentale, Francfort, 22-25 Avril, 1908.' Bibliographie.

**REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE.** 1<sup>er</sup> Novembre, 1908. **P. Geny.** 'Position of the Problem of Knowledge.' [The parallogism of the word Con-



sciousness the foundation of subjective idealism.] **Domet de Vorges.** 'How do we get the idea of Object?' ["Not from any of the senses, but from the intellect, which comes in upon sensory appearances and seizes upon the solid foundation to which those appearances owe their reality." "We get the idea of Being by abstraction from our earliest knowledge, which is that there are bodies."] **G. Fonsegrive.** 'Certitude and Truth.' [Social character of truth. Relativity of Knowledge. Theory of Assimilation, resting on the principle of Causality and the principle of Likeness of effect to cause. An able article.] **P. Duhem.** 'Absolute and Relative Motion.' [Copernicus.] **H. Trouche.** 'M. Bergson's *L'Évolution Créatrice*.' [An acute and amusing criticism.] 1er Décembre, 1908. **F. Chovet.** 'Relations of Induction to Deduction.' [That in Induction the particular instances observed are taken as a type expressive of a common nature: "consequently the passage from particular to general is anterior and not posterior to experience, since at the outset we consider the elements of this experience as representing the entire species: and we may conclude with Claude Bernard that the mind of man functions always in the same way, by syllogism—or rather by deduction, for there is a further question whether deductive reasoning assumes always the syllogistic form".] **G. Fonsegrive.** 'Certitude and Truth.' [We have certain knowledge of our own causative minds and wills, also of our own bodies, and thereby of the bodies of other men, whereof we have a better objective cognition than we can have of brute matter. Kant is victorious over all who hold, with Descartes, ideas antecedent to experience. A deeply thought-out paper.] **E. Peillaube.** 'Reproduction of Memories.' [Synopsis: curious cases of association of sounds with colours.] **P. Duhem.** 'Absolute and Relative Movement.' [Descartes, Newton, theory of the body Alpha, the ideal fixed centre of the universe, by reference to which all motion is ultimately measured.] **P. Rousselot.** 'The Intellectualism of St. Thomas.' [Book reviewed.] 1 Janvier, 1909. **G. Fonsegrive.** 'Certitude and Truth.' ["The argument of St. Anselm and Descartes is not and cannot be aught else than a paralogism. In a concept, as such, we shall find always a concept only, and not a being. We shall not find God in any inward experience. We find God only on condition of going beyond ourselves. The one intellectual datum which enables us to do that, is the principle of causality. To give being, a cause must itself possess it by nature. This cause is God. One world, and one God."] **P. Beaupuy.** 'Psychology of Thought.' ["Thought is tendency inasmuch as that tendency is conscious."] **S. Belmond.** 'Transcendent Being according to the mind of Duns Scotus.' ["In the thought of Duns Scotus, God is the Transcendent Being in this sense, that He is beyond and above all categories of Being, all genera and all species: this absolute transcendence, however, does not exclude, conceptually, a certain univocal use of the term Being as applied to God and creatures."] **A. Farges.** 'Summary of Philosophic Modernism.' [Modernism is essentially a philosophy, and that philosophy is Evolutionist Monism.] 1er Février, 1909. **Dr. Goix.** 'Fasting one Aspect of Mysticism.' [The fasts of St. Rose of Lima.] **P. Duhem.** 'Absolute and Relative Movement.' [Is movement a succession of distinct states or a continuous being, *forma fluens*?] **H. Léard.** 'The Third International Congress of Philosophy at Heidelberg.' [Summary of proceedings.]

**REVUE NEO-SCOLASTIQUE.** Novembre, 1908. **P. Mansion.** 'Gauss versus Kant on Non-Euclidian Geometry.' [Kant's view of Space is mathematically untenable.] **M. de Wulf.** 'The Philosophical Movement in Belgium.' **H. Hoffmans.** 'The Genesis of Sensations accord-

ing to Roger Bacon.' ["To Roger Bacon belongs the honour of having been the first to declare war on the theory of *species* so dear to his epoch."] **S. Deploige.** 'The Conflict of Moral Science with Sociology.' [The real conflict is between Sociology and the Moral Science, such as it was, of J. J. Rousseau. "Of man, Rousseau knows next to nothing; of society, still less. He proclaims man good and reasonable, and takes his passions of the moment for natural rights." His system "is the triumph of artificialism," in the teeth of history. Reaction of de Maistre and Comte against Rousseau.] **L. Noël.** 'At the Congress of Heidelberg.'

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. 16<sup>e</sup> Année, No. 6, Novembre, 1908. Contains as *Mémoires* the contributions of French philosophers to the Third International Congress of Philosophy at Heidelberg, 31st August to 5th September, 1908, and a *Compte rendu des Sections et des Séances générales*. This is a bulky number of 380 pages of great interest and value. The *Supplément* contains: *Nécrologie*: F. Paulsen; *Livres Nouveaux*, etc. 17<sup>e</sup> Année, No. 1, Janvier, 1909. 'Correspondance inédite de Ch. Renouvier et de Ch. Secrétan.' **F. Rauh.** 'L'expérience morale.' [Preface to the Second Edition of his work of that name, just published.] **Ch. Andler.** 'Le premier système de Nietzsche ou philosophie de l'illusion' [Importance of Nietzsche's æsthetic ideals for his subsequent doctrine.] *Études Critiques*: **H. Micault.** 'Sur de récents travaux de philosophie physique d'Abel Rey.' *Enseignement*: **L. Dugas.** 'Psychologie et pédagogie ou science et art. Questions pratiques: Conditions d'une doctrine morale éducative' (suite). *Supplément*: *Livres Nouveaux*; *Revue* et *Périodiques*.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE. Bd. xlviii., Heft 3 und 4. **C. F. Weigand.** 'Untersuchungen über die Bedeutung der Gestaltqualität für die Erkennung von Wörtern.' [(1) Words slowly moved in from a distance at which they are unrecognisable, are cognised not so much by their general form as by certain peculiarities of detail. These details may be subjectively seen and subjectively localised; obscurely seen and objectively localised; objectively localised and subjectively interpreted; objectively localised and objectively interpreted; or objectively cognised and visually identified. Total word-form plays, on the other hand, a large part in the recognition of known words. (2) Messmer's tachistoscopic types are invalid. By variation of conditions, an objective observer may be made to give results of the subjective type and conversely. The main factor is the attitude of attention, which may be concentrated at the point of fixation or diffused over a wide field. (3) In tachistoscopic experiments, in which the exposed word is immediately replaced by a post-exposure word, the acoustic-motor word-image may be effective at a point where no single letter of the exposed word has been identified. Reproduction is initiated, nevertheless, primarily by letters and only secondarily by total word-form.] **W. Hellpach.** 'Unbewusstes oder Wechselwirkung. Eine Untersuchung über die Denkmöglichkeit der psychologischen Deutungsprinzipien.—I.' [The 'unconscious' may mean any one of eight things: the not-remembered, the unpurposed, the unremarked, the mechanised, the reproducible, the mentally productive or creative, the psychically real, and the absolute. The first three uses are descriptive and may be discarded. The last three are interpretative and must be examined. The middle two are mixed, interpretatively descriptive.] **P. von Liebermann und G. Revesz.** 'Über Orthosymphonie. Beitrag zur Kenntnis des Falschhörens.' [Cases of paracousis,

in which the misheard single tones are rightly heard in combination. Beats are determined by the objective pitch, as in normal hearing; subjective analysis of the (correctly heard) interval gives components of the pitch at which they are heard singly, *i.e.*, may give pseudotones; the degree of consonance of the interval remains unaffected by analysis, *i.e.*, by the occurrence of (singly heard) pseudotones.] *Literaturbericht. Dritter internationaler Kongress für Philosophie, Heidelberg, 31 August bis 5, September, 1908. Bd. xlviii., Heft 5 und 6. W. Hellpach. 'Unbewusstes oder Wechselwirkung. Eine Untersuchung über die Denkmöglichkeit der psychologischen Deutungsprinzipien.—III.'* [The assumption of an unconscious necessarily takes us beyond the sphere of experience or knowledge. Nevertheless, it may be transformed into a scientific theory, either by way of analogy (Freud) or by way of metaphysics (von Hartmann). Both courses have their dangers. Shall we then reject the unconscious outright? If we do, we meet the difficulty that mind cannot be explained from consciousness alone: something more is necessary. The explanation of psychical by physical, of mind by body, does not help us; indeed, it does away with psychology altogether, and leaves the psychical a sheer riddle, a causeless and effectless concomitant of a part of the physical. What of the principle of parallelism? It, again, does not help us; for either it explains mind by body, or (if it holds to the independence of the psychical) it must supplement consciousness by the unconscious, and explain in terms of this latter. A consistent parallelism, that rejects the unconscious, is simply an interactionism couched in misleading terms. So we are left with the alternative that gives its title to the present inquiry: the unconscious or interaction? Only, we must remember that the issue takes the form of an alternative merely when parallelism is in question: for a psychology that is freed from the historical shackles of parallelism it may prove more useful, as in the case of biology and history, to combine interactionism with the doctrine of an unconscious.] **S. Alrutz.** 'Die Funktion der Temperatursinne in warmen Bädern. Anhang zu den "Untersuchungen über die Temperatursinne". Bd. xlvii., S 161 u. 241.' [Determination of the *RL* of the sensation of heat for warm water (baths), with various cutaneous temperatures; discussion of the bearing of these results upon hydrotherapeutics (affective tone, shock, action on the nerves of warmth and cold); formulation of further problems.] **T. J. de Boer.** 'Zur gegenseitigen Wortassoziation.' [The frequency of association of correlated terms depends upon the order of their occurrence in linguistic usage; normal or forward association stands to backward association in the ratio of 1.5 : 1.0. The association of numerals is not without exception in the forward direction. Both results modify statements of Thumb and Marbe.] **E. Becher.** 'Energieerhaltung und psychologische Wechselwirkung. Ein Nachtrag zu meinem Aufsatz in Bd. xlv. dieser Zeitschrift und eine Erwiderung auf Einwände.' [Elaboration of certain points of the previous argument, in reply especially to A. Müller and Köhler. Proof of the theorem that the postulate of the law of conservation of energy does not of itself univocally determine the course of events in any sort of isolated mechanical system. Nevertheless, the empirical confirmation of the law, while by help of hypotheses it may be reconciled with interactionism, speaks in favour of parallelism.] **O. Lipmann.** 'Eine Methode zur Vergleichung von zwei Kollektivgegenständen.' [Two similar series of results are ordinarily compared by determination of their average or median values. The author proposes to array the terms of the two series in order to determine the difference between every two corresponding terms, and then to take the median (plus or minus) of these differences as the representative

value required. The average deviation of the differences (again determined as median) from the representative value furnishes a measure of reliability.] Literaturbericht. **N. Stuecker.** 'Erwiderung.' **E. von Hornbostel.** 'Duplik.' [Discussion of Stücker's article on the D. S. for tonal pitch, published in the *Proceedings of the Vienna Academy*, 1907.] **H. Ebbinghaus.** 'Erwiderung.' **G. Martius.** 'Bemerkung zu vorstehender Erwiderung.' [Discussion of Ebbinghaus' psychology of art, as outlined in his *Abriss d. Psychologie*.] Bd. xlix., Heft 1 und 2. **R. Hennig.** 'Beiträge zur Psychologie des Doppel-Ichs.' [A long and somewhat rambling account, with many quotations from the casuistic literature, of the facts of double and multiple personality and of kindred phenomena: trance-speech, automatic writing, glossolalia, the solution of problems in dreams, the 'inspiration' of the constructive thinker, the ecstasy of the mystics, intoxication, etc. The author's aim appears to be the paralleling of the abnormal or 'occult' by occurrences that admittedly characterise the normal mental life. The parallels are often happy: but the explanatory suggestions (double personality, e.g., depends on the alternating activity of the two halves of the brain) are for the most part superficial.] **E. von Aster.** 'Die psychologische Beobachtung und experimentelle Untersuchungen von Denkvorgängen.' [A critique of the experimental work which began with Marbe and culminates with Bühler. The advocates of a unique and irreducible thought-element have confused description (*Beschreibung*) with information (*Kundgabe*) or, in Dürr's language, with expression (*Ausdruck*). The phenomenological problem, however, is precisely that of description; the object of the *Ausfragemethode*, in psychological regard, is to bring out introspective details as to the constitution of thought, its nature as conscious experience, and not to determine what the observer was thinking about. The writer's descriptive analysis leads him to a threefold classification of the conscious experiences involved. We have (1) affectively toned sets or trends of consciousness (*Bewusstseinslagen*), 'states' of mind (*zuständige Erlebnisstrecken*), which may be either directly or emphatically experienced; (2) feelings of transition, the direct impression of sameness, difference, relatedness; and (3) ideational elements, often of a residual kind, and often closely compacted with the verbal perception. These introspectively verifiable processes, supplemented by the Lippsian unconscious (which may, of course, be read by psychologists of other schools as physiological or psycho-physical disposition), are apparently adequate to the facts of observation. Systematically, the *Bewusstseinslage* is to be classed with feeling, and therefore to be set over against sensation and idea.] **A. Aall.** 'Über den Mass-stab beim Tiefensehen in Doppelbildern. Bathoskopische Untersuchungen, mit einer Figur.—I.' [The paper opens with a brief characterisation of the nativistic and empiristic (genetic) theories of space perception. It is shown that the localisation of double images offers a sort of *experimentum crucis* in the controversy between Wundt and Hering; for we may ask, first, which of the two theorists is right in point of fact, and secondly which of the two theories satisfies the facts when we have them. After a brief review of previous work, the writer outlines his own problem.] Literaturbericht. **M. Ettlinger.** 'Tierpsychologie. Sammelbericht.' [The first attempt made by the *Zeitschrift* in this direction. The list of works reviewed is oddly defective, but the Editor makes an express request for books and articles dealing with animal psychology.] Bd. xlix., Heft 3 und 4. **A. Aall.** 'Über den Mass-stab beim Tiefensehen in Doppelbildern. Bathoskopische Untersuchungen, mit einer Figur.—II.' [Description of apparatus and report of experiments. If secondary criteria are ruled out, the adjustment of depth in monocular vision

depends upon angular magnitude; in binocular vision, on the other hand, it obeys a law that holds solely for the double retina, the same law that governs stereoscopy in the narrower sense. The subjective estimates cluster about a value that accords with the objectively correct distance. This result is found with the most various arrangements of the separate test-objects; in individual cases, with asymmetrical lines of regard, the deviation from objective correctness is minimal; there is a fairly constant error of overestimation of distances represented on the temporal halves of the two retinas; there is progressive underestimation, as the test-objects which limit the one distance are represented farther and farther from the centre of the retina. The basis of this estimation of depth is a direct sense-impression. The third dimension is a sensory content, due to the simultaneous and homogenous stimulation of cross-disparate elements of the retina of the double eye. The experiments prove for depth-estimation by double images what Heine and Kothe have shown for stereoscopy in the strict meaning of the term: that disparation is better evaluated when the observer knows that he is dealing with a comparatively large absolute distance.] **K. Marbe.** 'Über die Verwendung russender Flammen in der Psychologie in deren Grenzgebieten.' [Discusses the use of sooty flames in registering the melody of speech and the heart-tone in various physical and electro-technical experiments, and in chronographic work.] **B. Eggert.** 'Untersuchungen über Sprachmelodie.' [Experiments with Marbe's sooty-flame apparatus, prompted by Sievers' statement that an author's style embodies a characteristic speech-melody. The tests prove that the soot-records can be quantitatively evaluated, and indicate laws of uniform recurrence; farther than this the results do not go. Incidentally it is shown that Marbe's dynamic accent is in all probability a stress accent, and not (as Kruegar suggested) an accent compounded of pitch, duration, stress and clang-tint.] **G. Saling.** 'Assoziative Massenversuche.' [Class results and demonstrations concerning most frequent verbal associations. The author shows that many associations interpreted by Gross and Wertheimer as complex-reactions cannot be turned to account for tests of criminals, and remarks in general that the association-test can never of itself be more than indicative. The paper ends with the first beginnings of a dictionary of verbal associations, and with some instances of contamination.] **J. Plassmann.** 'Astronomie und Psychologie.' [An appeal to psycho-physicists to utilise the materials ready to their hands in various fields of astronomical investigation. The classification of the stars by Argelander's method has been turned to general psycho-physical account; not so the estimation-curves of variable stars; the influence of conditions of illumination, of nearness to the limen, of colour; the sudden changes, independent of practice, in the standard of the observers; the tendency to overestimate small and overestimate large differences; the influence of hour-angle, of change of latitude; the preference for certain tenths, etc.] **O. Lipmann.** 'Ein neuer Expositions-Apparat mit ruckweiser Rotation für Gedächtnis- und Lern-Versuche.' [Improved form of the instrument described in 1904 (*Zeits.*, xxxv.). The cost (Mk. 300) is moderate; and the running is said to be practically noiseless. It is difficult to judge of an apparatus from description, but it appears that this piece will be a formidable rival to the *Neue Rotationsapparat mit ruckweiser Bewegung* (Mk. 350) of Spindler and Hoyer. The latter, however, admits also of continuous rotation of the drum.] *Literaturbericht.* Bd. xlix., Heft 5. **E. Duerr.** 'Über die experimentelle Untersuchung der Denkvorgänge.' [Critique of Buehler and Wundt. (1) Buehler's method is unsuited to give knowledge of the essential nature of thought in psychological regard. His

observers reported things about their thoughts, but did not describe these thoughts as conscious contents. The distinction of intention and qualitative determination as partial moments of a thought rests largely upon a metaphysical basis. The distinction of types of thought must also be adjudged psychologically unfounded. What we find in experience is simply the (simple or complex) intention. (2) There is in idea something more than sensation, namely the 'relational consciousness,' which shows itself in our apprehension of space, time, likeness, difference, identity, unity, substance, attribute, change. This 'something more,' analysed out from the idea, gives us the essence of abstract thought. (3) Wundt's attack misses its mark, except that from the author's as from Wundt's standpoint it is advisable to experiment with material simpler than that used by Buchler. Wundt's own psychology of thought is not adequate.] **E. Becher.** 'Über die Sensibilität der inneren Organe.' [Continuation of the work begun by Meumann in the *Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol.*, 1907; experiments with a form of stomach pump, etc. The œsophagus is sensitive to pressure, warmth, cold, pain and electrical stimulation. There are great individual differences; sensitivity is in all respects less keen than that of the skin; localisation is fairly accurate; the sensations sometimes show a 'peculiar colouring'. The stomach and intestines are insensitive; sensations referred to them are set up in the skin and muscles of the abdomen. The larynx is sensitive; the bronchi are variably, the alveoli and lung substance doubtfully sensitive. Heart and arteries are apparently insensitive; veins are sensitive to pain. In general, the writer inclines to restrict sensitivity of any marked kind to peritoneum, diaphragm, pleuræ and œsophagus.] Literaturbericht.

ARCHIV F. D. GESAMTE PSYCHOLOGIE. Bd. xiii. Heft 1 und 2. **W. Warstat.** 'Das Tragische. Eine psychologisch-kritische Untersuchung.' [Psychologically considered, the æsthetic attitude shows two stages: the purely æsthetic (the attitude of æsthetic enjoyment) and the critically æsthetic. The former is characterised by the fact that its objective aspect, or ideational side, is perceived only, whereas its subjective aspect, the feeling, is apperceived. It follows from this that pure æsthetic pleasure is functional or formal pleasure; it depends, not on the quality of the idea, but on the subject's attitude to the feeling which attaches to the idea, i.e., to the free and unimpeded course of this feeling itself. Three questions now present themselves: those of the quality of æsthetic feelings, of the mode of connexion of these feelings with the idea, and of the character of the idea itself. The first is answered by reference to the criterion of the purely æsthetic attitude. The second has been answered by appeal both to association and to empathy: it may be relegated to psychology. The third has a formal and a material answer: the idea must possess æsthetic actuality, inner consistency; and it must possess concreteness, affective value. How, now, does this analysis of the purely æsthetic attitude help us towards a theory of the tragic? Negatively, it affords a basis for the criticism of existing theories, the metaphysical, the Aristotelian (theories of subjective effect), and the affective (Volkelt, Lipps). Positively, it points us to the objective basis and the subjective differentia of the tragic. The objective basis of tragedy is a suffering fellow-man. Tragic feeling is composed of tragic suffering (which retains its pleasurable character, within the purely æsthetic attitude, as free and unimpeded feeling) and tragic fear (due to the objectively given antithesis of sufferer and cause of suffering); the latter appears, however, only in the trembling hesitancy of the resolution with which the feeling of the æsthetic subject takes the suffering upon itself.] **V. Benussi.** 'Zur experimentellen Analyse des



Zeitvergleichs.—II. Erwartungszeit und subjektive Zeitgrösse.' [With a well-marked interval between normal and variable times, and with expectation-periods of different length, the author finds the following results. With short times: (1) a long expectation-period lengthens the following time; (2) the second member of a pair of times is shortened; (3) the subjective difference between  $N$  and  $V$  is greater in the order  $NV$ . With long times: (1) the second member of a pair of times is lengthened; (2) the relation  $V < N$  increases the number of right judgments (Weber's Law). In this case there is no noticeable influence of length of expectation-period or of order of presentation of  $N$  and  $V$ , as in the former there is none of the relative magnitude of  $N$  and  $V$ . It appears, then, that whatever enhances the complex of limiting noises, or makes it more striking, sets up a tendency to subjective shortening of the time; and that whatever throws into relief the temporal difference between these noises sets up a tendency to subjective lengthening.] Literaturbericht. **E. Duerr.** 'Erkenntnispsychologisches in der erkenntnistheoretischen Literatur der letzten Jahre.' **H. Keller.** 'Sammelreferat über die Neuerscheinungen der Akustik in den Jahren, 1903-1905.' Einzelbesprechung. [E. Bloch on L. W. Stern, Person und Sache: System der philosophischen Weltanschauung.—I. Ableitung und Grundlehre.] Referate.

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE. Band xiv., Heft 4. Dezember, 1908. **Vitalis Norström.** 'Naives und wissenschaftliches Weltbild' (suite). (See *Archiv. für S.P.* xiv. 4.) [The explanation of Personality through Nature must be supplemented by the explanation of Nature through Personality.] **Gustav Tichy.** 'Altruismus und Gerechtigkeit. [Justice a principle capable of taking the place occupied by Altruism in theoretical systems of morality.] **Emil Raff.** 'Über die Formen des Denkens.' [Discusses relation in perception of intuitive thought to abstraction. These are two functions of consciousness, but consciousness is simple if regard is had to originating perceptions. *In alternatione posita est duplicitas, in essentia unitas.*] **Georg Wendel.** 'Prolegomena.' [A glance over the main divisions of philosophy to ascertain the conditions under which a new philosophical system is possible, and the demands with which the great philosophical genius yet unborn must comply.] **David Koigen.** 'Jahresbericht über die Literatur zur Metaphysik.' Neuste Erscheinungen, Systematische Abhandlungen, Bücher.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE. Neue Folge, vii., Heft iii., Oktober, 1908. **K. F. Wize.** 'Eine Einteilung der philosophischen Wissenschaften nach Aristoteles' Prinzipien.' [Æsthetics corresponds to unfettered Freedom; Theoretical Philosophy to the scrutinising activity; Practical Philosophy to the teleological activity.] **Ernst Lehmann.** 'Idee und Hypothese bei Kant.' [*Idee* characterises absolute totality, non-phenomenality, freedom. *Hypothese* requires simple constant elements in space and time to explain complex data. Kant's sharp distinction between the two justified.] **G. von Glasenapp.** 'Die Leviratsche, Eine soziologische Studie. [Marriage of deceased husband's brother.] **Gerhard Hessenberg.** "'Persönliche" und "sachliche" Polemik.' [Discussion arising out of Cassirer's 'Kritische Idealismus'.] Besprechungen, etc. Neue Folge, vii., Heft iv. **Rich. Müller-Freienfels.** 'Die Bedeutung des Ästhetischen für die Ethik. [Art disturbs and emancipates emotion, and arouses specific interests, thus affecting the moral condition. Con-



sideration of special arts and problems, *e.g.*, the nude in art.] **Kuno Mittenzwey.** 'Der iii. internationale Philosophenkongress.' **Paul Barth.** 'Die Geschichte der Erziehung in soziologischer Beleuchtung VII.' [Renaissance and Reformation. Influence of Italian Humanism on Theory and Practice of Education.] *Besprechungen, Zeitschriften, Bibliographie.*

**RIVISTA FILOSOFICA.** Anno x., vol. xi. Fasc. iv. September-October, 1908. **G. Gentile.** 'Il concetto della storia della filosofia.' [We must know what philosophy is before we can write its history. Gentile defines it in an Aristotelian sense, as the science of absolute Being. But modern thought since Descartes has ascertained the purely spiritual nature of Being. And it has also taught us to conceive spirit as essentially a process, a becoming. Thus the history of philosophy turns out to be philosophy itself. That is Hegel's view; but Gentile, improving on the master, goes on to identify philosophy with history in general. According to him, the movement of speculation initiates and determines every other movement.] **E. Lugaro.** 'La base anatomica dell' intuizione.' [Assuming without proof the fundamental positions of Spencerian associationism, *i.e.*, (i.) that belief means the simultaneous apprehension of two distinct concepts, (ii.) that this process is represented by corresponding modifications in the cerebral cortex, and (iii.) that such modifications are capable of becoming permanently fixed and transmitted by inheritance—Lugaro argues that intuitions, viewed on the physiological side, consist in the automatic cerebral registration of the common element in our most habitual experiences, the nervous processes which represent uniform connexions in the external world being more deeply impressed on the cortex than those which represent casual and changeable connexions.] **L. Snelli.** 'Un trattato elementare di filosofia indiana (*contin. e fine*).' [Shows incidentally how the interest of controversies relating to the theory of knowledge in ancient India was heightened by their bearing on the dogma of Vedic inspiration.] **E. di Carlo.** 'Il concetto della natura ed il principio del diritto.' [A review of Prof. G. Del Vecchio's last work on the Philosophy of Law. Del Vecchio accepts the theory of Natural Rights, founding it—not very successfully, in his critic's opinion—on the transcendental idealism of Kant and his German followers.] **P. F. Nicoli.** 'La riforma della scuola media.' [Seems to advocate the retention of literature, and more especially Greek literature, as the basis of secondary education. Where Latin literature is taught, it should be brought into closer touch with philosophical culture.] **G. Vidari.** 'Terzo Congresso Filosofico Internazionale.' [The proceedings of the Heidelberg Congress seem to illustrate three important results of recent philosophical activity: (i.) the increasing influence of philosophy on science and history in the narrower sense; (ii.) the tendency to profit by what is helpful in Pragmatism without adopting the extreme conclusions of its advocates; and (iii.) the rising importance of the contributions to philosophy made by non-German nations.] *Rassegna Bibliografica, etc.*

## IX.—NOTES.

### MIND ASSOCIATION.

THE annual meeting of the Mind Association will be held on Saturday 29th May at the University, Edmund St., Birmingham, at 4.30 P.M. This will be followed at 5.30 P.M. by a meeting of the Aristotelian Society, to which members of the Mind Association are invited and may bring friends. The papers on the subject—*Why Pluralism?* (by Messrs. J. H. Muirhead, F. C. S. Schiller and A. E. Taylor) will be taken as read, and will be sent to members of the Association, and also to their friends, on application to the Hon. Mr. H. W. Carr, Bury, Pulborough, Sussex. At 8 P.M. there will be a dinner for members of the two Societies in the University Club. Further particulars may be obtained from Prof. Muirhead, the University, Birmingham.

The following gentlemen have joined the Mind Association since the printing of the January number:—

Handyside, J., 3 Hatton Place, Edinburgh.

Hardie R. P., 13 Palmerston Road, Edinburgh.

### MR. McTAGGART ON THE "UNREALITY OF TIME".

As Mr. McTaggart apparently intends to return to the subject of the Unreality of Time, it would of course be premature to offer observations on his whole position. But there is a point of view from which his arguments are seen to be distorted from the outset by what we may perhaps call a flaw in the glass through which we habitually observe and consider the whole subject of 'time'.

This was roughly indicated and outlined in my Article on Time as Derivative (MIND, vol. xvi, No. 63); though, as the subject still lacks adequate exposition and discussion, the position assumed could hardly expect to be definitely taken into account. From this position, however, the orientation of our idea of time is changed, its perspectives are altered, or more strictly, it comes under the category to which perspectives belong.

If the sense-percept of Motion and therefore change in Space was not prior to the idea of time and did not include, as having involved, it, our choice of terminology for its expression and definition would not be what it is. We should have an instinctive sense of incongruity, *e.g.*, in speaking of a "series of positions running from the far past through the near past to the present, and then from the present to the near future and the far future" (*n.b.*, the question as to how a series of positions can 'run' is a distinct one). As it is, we curiously ignore the obvious origin of the idea of 'past' from passed, 'present' from presented (here, 'in this place') and 'future' from 'yet to come,' to arrive.

When we admit that time involves change, may we not rather suggest that change shares with Motion and its implied Space wherein to move, the parentage of time, as movement through the space of experience in an irreversible direction?<sup>1</sup>

We may agree that "the relations of earlier and later are permanent". But why? Because they are questions of position. A day, an hour, is a

<sup>1</sup>The question of reversal seems as yet practically begged. There is at least one sense—that of reminiscence, recollection, record, rather than memory—in which time is already reversible.

marked off *area* of experience, and an event "never ceases to have a *place*". But to say that the timeless never changes can be true only in one sense and on one condition: that change does not suggest or evolve the idea of time, but is derived from and dependent on, time. A fixed lighthouse may begin by being barely seen on our horizon, may be passed and at last barely seen on another. This surely implies two kinds or modes of Space: (1) the static and (2) the kinetic. We may say that Change implies *room* wherein to change, and thus movement internal or external; movement also of object or of its standing-ground, in given directions. To this we add as an after-thought, and *time* wherein to change.

Thus change can only be "a change of the characteristics imparted to events by their presence in the A series" (of positions). Rather their presence in the A series is one of many results of the events as characteristic. Character is not temporal, neither is Presence: character is qualitative and presence spatial: while Events *take place*. So long as we ignore these facts which, as in so many cases, reveal themselves through age-long and involuntary tendencies of speech—some healthy and revealing some diseased or antiquated—it is no wonder that even a trained and able dialectician should have to own that "we cannot explain what is meant by past, present and future". For they are lent by space for the measurement, the placing, the direction of our successive triad of past, present and future. When we say "whenever we judge anything to exist in time, we are in error" we are right, because existence in this sense depends on motion in space only.

It is apparently a condition of present consciousness or 'mind' that it should be able to *remember*, to *reproduce* in 'idea' the space already traversed in experience, and again with rare and doubtful exceptions should be unable to predict, to *foresee* the inevitable 'other half' of our time-area and time-movement.

It looks as though this arbitrary blindness to what is coming, approaching, or what we are advancing into (significantly reversing, it may be noted, the main condition of highly organised life—the forward-reaching vision), has a special reason and office, which, when we have acquired in higher forms a significating power once strenuously operative but now to some extent suppressed, may be safely removed. At present some of the most precious attributes of mind, and among them that of indirect future-vision, by predictive analogy and the sense of consequence, of mental or logical result, seem to be due to the partial paralysis of outlook which the apparent irreversibility of 'time' involves. The very idea of creation or origin seems to depend on a non-reversible (or reverting) 'time'.

When we have proved ourselves worthier of the gift we call moral sense, and of the power of reading the needs of the 'future' through those of the past and present, we may find ourselves safely entrusted by Nature with eyes couched of that 'cataract' which as yet hides from us the vista of what is in front of us, while curiously enough we have eyes for that which is behind us.<sup>1</sup> At present there is no doubt that it would make for the loss of valuable qualities. We should become morbid 'fatalists'. Many interests of the highest concern would die down in us. To anticipate as we recollect would be, as we are, ruinous. But let us imagine a lack of *background*, of register, history, memory and record, as complete as the present lack of *forecast*, and then realise what we are losing by failure to become fit for the vision of the Future. The severe

<sup>1</sup> And then our suggestively ambiguous use of 'before,' as at once front and back of our position, will be accounted for, and the paradoxical contrast between physical and mental vision recognised and interpreted.

training now called that of science, which has so suddenly come about with effects on the race yet to be realised, may well be the first preparation for this. No strictness of discipline in the seeking of experimentally-purged fact can be too great as the Fore-seer's preliminary training. Else we should be intoxicated by the resumption of a normal heritage which for good reasons has been in abeyance.

We have, as it is, too many confident prophets who are dogmatically certain of the validity of their message because they have not yet learnt to allow for sources of error such as the misplacement of the Time-idea, which is in fact out of context and thus out of relation. All our theories (and refutations) of 'immortality' are utterly astray, diverted from their true line of advance by this initial dislocation of judgment. From this point of view, then, I venture to ask whether a flaw in the very first conditions of observation may not be vitiating all our discussions of that room for experience which we call time.

As Mr. McTaggart's article and this comment both raise questions to be hereafter dealt with, nothing more need now be said. At present the difficulties seem entirely owing to the erection of Time, originally a convenient derivation or secondary product of Motion-space, into the rank of an original category.

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#### OBITUARY.

By the death of Emeritus-Professor Simon Sommerville Laurie, on 1st March, 1909, there has been lost to British philosophy a writer of rare intellectual courage, shrewd independence of judgment, and great speculative insight. Philosophy was the absorbing and unremitting occupation of his life, and was undertaken, as he used to say, simply to 'systematise his own experience'. He thought and wrote primarily for himself, and was not much interested in the promulgation of his views,—an attitude which reacted considerably on his style and manner of expounding his ideas. His earliest philosophical work was a volume on the *Philosophy of Ethics*, published so long ago as 1866 when he was thirty-six years of age. Another followed in 1868 on *Certain British Theories of Morals*. But it was in 1884 that he first took an original and independent place in the ranks of British philosophers with his *Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta*, followed a year later by the complementary volume, *Ethica, or the Ethics of Reason*. These books have been translated into French by an enthusiastic exponent of his views, Prof. G. Remacle of Hasselt. Prof. Laurie recast the theory developed in these two volumes, in a more comprehensive and more systematic form. The result of these further reflections was the production of the *Synthetica: being Meditations Epistemological and Ontological*, published in 1906.

In addition to articles contributed to philosophical journals, he wrote largely on the philosophy and history of education, and by this no doubt he is best known, not merely to the students who listened to his lectures during his occupancy of the Chair of Education in Edinburgh University, but to the wide circle of educationists abroad. One can see the reciprocal influence of educational theory on philosophical theory in *The Institutes of Education* (2nd ed., 1899), where he embodied his views on the fundamental principles of education.

His connexion with philosophy is naturally all that is relevant to this journal, and biographical information must therefore be omitted. But it is to be hoped that some one will be able to put on record Prof. Laurie's influence on the course of educational development in Scotland and give to a widely-interested public some account of a singularly attractive personality.